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Outline of discussion. 
(1) An introductory section dealing with; 
A. A brief summary of the various viewpoints. 
B. Historical orientation of the subject. 
n /1 




An analysis of experience at the primitive levels with a critical dis- 
cussion of the psychological act-,and its motivating factors. 
(3) 
Meaning at the ? erccptual level,involving a critical analysis of the 
factors entering into and constituting perceptual experience. 
4) 
(5) 
Two short notes on Attention and Affective association. 
Meaning at Ideational level,with a discussion of imaging and imagination. 
(6) 
A section on Experimental evidence. 
(7) 




Our purpose is to give a description of psychological meaning as it 
emerges in,or gives value to experience; to discover through invest- 
igation of its origin and developement what are its fundamental 
psychical qualities;and,thereafter to trace its growth and nature in 
the various and increasingly complex stages of psychical integration 
which are characteristic of our mental life. 
The importance of our enquiry can hardly be exaggerated. 
1 "t 
V.Welby says: That attention has already been called in an article in 
Mind(N.S.Vol.V11 nos.173c18) to the strange fact that the very con- 
dition on which all forms of study depend,that which is vaguely called 
their meaning +that very rreaning,which is to intelligence the cardin- 
al ,quality of fact - remains for us a virtually -i :q:studiea(, subject." 
That statement may and does call for some modification at the present 
time. Considerable work has been done in this field,not only in this 
coi.zntry,but also in America and Germany. The work,however, has been 
chiefly in the analysis and study of the higher thought processes. 
Experience has,in most cases,been considered as fundamentally cog- 
nitive. The tendency has been to study the subject more from the 
loltdal than the psychological standpoint:The analytic rather than the 
genetic method has been ernployed.It is the objective pattern of know - 
ledge rather than the processes on which knovledge depends that has 
dominated the enquiry. The explicitly intelligible is considered the 
highest , and., in many ways' th.e only avenue of explorat i on .Fe eling, f or 
example, and all that it involves as an ultimate phase of experience, 
and without which knowledge itself is impossible is, if - treated at all, 
given but a minor place. It is essential,therefore,to give a new 
orientation to the subject of meaning ,and study it from a more genetic 





Reymert, says , . survey of older and recent literature and experimenta- 
tion on meaning discloses,first of ally that t: :e Meaning of meaning 
is psychologically rather obscure at present,and further, that the topic 
almost invariably has been approached from the more or less preconce4v- 
ed notions of mental organisation - as embodied in the fundamental 
doctrines of the- various schools - and that apart from the indirect stud- 
ies on children's drawings,evolution of vocabulary, mental growths,etc, 
tt 
we have no direct ontogenetic attack. That statement made by a recent 
investigator in this field of psychological enquiry confirms the need 
for,What we may term, a more organic study of the entire sub j ect .It is 
strange,as V.Welby,suggests that,wrile psychology has made astonishing 
progress in the study of the various aspects of mental life, the very 
core of all experience, -that on which the very study of all mental life 
depe: ids, - should be in such an unsatisfactory state. 
It will help us considerably ,in the successful orientation of 
our study, if we set f orth, briefly, the various points of vies from which 
the subject 1 aS been treated.We cannot understand the term psychological 
without describing in outline ,at least, the theories gt present in 
the field,and indicating our agreement with';or depar. tune ftem, them. 
This will,at least, make evident, some of the pressing difficulties of 
the investigation;-the pressure, let us say, of philosopMcal bias on 
one hand,and of biological bias on the other. 
Briefly stated the points of view are as follows: 
(1) That which takes meaning to be purely and ultimately cognitive; 
a . point of view,which we shall find to be more logical than psycholog- 
ical.The fuller implications of this view we shall unfold in the 
course of our discussion. 
(2) One in which, owing te biological infl,rnces ,the extreme intellectual- 
ism of the first is nodified,and a place given to the affective aspect 
of mental life. This change,however, while marking a stage in the 
liberation of psychology from logical presuppositions still considers 
1 Lartin.L.Reymert.Ohio. , The ontogenetic aspects of leaning. 
International Pscyh.Congress 1926. 
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meaning as more or less fundamentally cognitive in natl.are.Conative 
N << 
interest, to use a term employed by Prof .Mc Douga11 in his OutlinR of 
Psychology,is given a place.It is ,however, more a subordinate and 
contributory than a determining place in the nature of meaning. The 
general cognitive stand -point remWns unaltered. 
44 PI 
(3 )Tree third point of view,which we would term the Sensationalistic, 
is that advocated by James,and later by Titchener. Meaning is,from this 
stand- point,always sensational,particularly kinaesthetic. In the writ- 
ings of Titchener this view -point is a very considerable advance in the 
intimate study of the subject. It points us back from the extremely 
external aspects emphasised by the two former views to certain organic 
factors without which no real insight into the problem is possible. 
in 
Reymert, says that as the result of his investigations by far the 
most dominating factors conveying meaning were almost invariably kin- 
aesthesia,or movement, or bodily activities( as apparent from the 
retracing of figures, suggested movements, etc) the more difficult the 
,+ 
stimulus,the younger the child,the more kinaesthesia. While we admit 
that ,in our jud; ent,this view gives a more intimate approach to the 
subject,we shall advance reasons for our dissent from it. 
(4) The fourth and last view -point DV be stated is, in our opinion, the 
one that indicates the real eman- *cipation of psychology from the 
limitations of philosophical presuppositions,and the more organic, 
and truly psychological study of behaviour. In this view meaning is 
found to be affective rather than cognitive. A true description of 
expel ience is found not in any analysis of any external pattern or 
structure of knnwledge,however exact,but in a comprehensive view,which 
realises the vital importance of the organic or subjective aspects of 
behaviour,and finds the wants, desires, and tendencies of the organism . 
itself motivating factors in all activities.We are,therefore,from this 
view -point compelled to a more organic study of the whole of experience. 
1 Reymert, see nrevieus page,3 
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This brief outline of the various theories of meaning that hold the 
field at the present time i s we 'admit, but a short summary and'as it 
stands,totally inadequate. It is rieant,however, to serve rather as an 
introduction to more searching enquiry into the psychological back- 
ground of the study, and the more accurate description of the critical 
terms in our thesis. Before we can come to any real grip of our subject 
It It 




A study of the critical termz., Psychological. 
What do we understand by a psychological enquiry into meaning? Despite 
the advance made,in recent years, in the study of psychology,a,nd its 
emancipation from the dominance of metaphysics,the enquiries into, 
what are termed the intellectual 'processes,are still shadowed by philso- 
phical presuppositions. The bifurcation of the organism into mind and 
body,and their relegation to g0fains44 universes of enquiry,which is 
characteristic of the Cartesian philosoph.y,is still casting a somewhat 
sombre shadow over psychological study. Mind is viewed as an entity 
separate from the body,and both are amenable only to their own princi- 
ples of explanation,yet maintaining some mysterious connection with each 
other. Mental operations are viewed and studied apart from the organism 
whose experience they constitute.The result is a rather hopeless,onesided 
view of the psychological nature of behaviour,especially on its intell- 
1" 
ectual side. This dualism,says a recent writer on philosophy," with . 
which modern philsophy starts in Descartes and from which, ire many quarters 
it has not eman-cipated itself is probably most manifest in its psycho- 
logical bearings,wh.ich has become more a study of a single phase of mental 
activity than a real recognising of the organic nature of experience as 
involving the total reaction of man as an organism.The conse4uence of 
this view is that intellect is viewed as a spectator,and results in a 
bias that considers intelligence or even experience as fundamentally 
1) 
cognitive. This a fairly accurate statement of the position. in 
l Seth Pringle Pattison. Idea ®f rod. pp zzo 
l 
in/ 
relaVi ®n to meaning,arid is influential in the determination of the 
Point of view indicated in the first thoery set forth in our previous 
section. 
We simply Point out at this stage that experience is never,nor can it 
be independent of the organism whose behaviour vve are investigating. The 
concrete fact for science and philo phy alike is not t }:r union in some 
mysterious fashion of two seoara te entities body and mind.. 7e may ,as 
4, 
Dr Dreyer points out, frame hytpotheses which go beyond the facts . i n 
order to account for the facts psychologically. For exarnple,we may find 
it necessary to talk of mind or of soul in order to account for te 
as of experience9but neither mind nor Middy is for psychology a 
41 
distir::.ct entity o?posed to each other, Both phases are,no doubt, quite 
legitimately segregated and distinguished for the purpose of specific 
enquiry,but r.ei then in itself ,can give a complete or adequate account 
2 
of the facts of human experience. Take away body or mind and you have no 
experience. The two aspects can be stated not a body and mind,but; as 
organism. and situation. The dualism thus stated is not the old separation 
of two distinct entities,but two aspects of a whole ,which we call 
experience. The dualism is resolved by the integrative action of the 
conscious orocess,and. that action ebraces more than the purely cogni- 
!) 
Live aspects of mental activity. 
The view stated ale ove lead to a more concrete and correct 
psychological treatment of the subject ß.f meani T. Th tendency to 
take knowledge and examine it in cross section4 leaving out of account 
the organic processes through which knowledge is acciuired,has obvious 
limitations,and can never be more than a study of a particular aspect of 
experience.lt is this difficulty we encounter in many of the studies of 
the thought processes. For example,no one,who has read Prof, Spearman's 
Principles of Cogntion, will gainsay the amount hard thinking and 
valuable work revealed therein,but one is ieft¡ with the uncomfortable 
1 Instinct in ivian. Dr Dreyer. p 33. 
2 Paper on the nature of Consciousness. Aristotelian soc, Feb.15 th 1925. 
Dr Dreyer. 
uncomfortable/ 
feeling that the assumptions on which the book is based have not been ade- 
quately examined,and that a discussion of processes anterior to any he men - 
tions is essential to a complete elaboration of the subject. 
There is,however, despite the persistence of this rather arid,intell- 
ectualism,the emergence,in modern study,of thought processes, of a more 
concrete ground of psychological enquiry,and this is due to the influence 
of biological science. 
With the extensive prosecution of biological research the whole Mature 
of psychological enquiry,and the study of human behaviour have been changed. 
The organic point of view is gradually gaining ground,and the necessity of 
the inner or subjective aspect as essential to a complete understanding of 
experience is more widely held, The evolutionary standpoint is generally 
1 
accepted. Mind presupposes living bodies both in the order of evolution,and 
as a condition of .growth and existence here and now. Prof.S.Alex .nder holds 
that mind as a new quality or level of existence in the order of evolution 
comes into being with living bodies possessing,however rudimentary in form, 
a nervous system. It is now more or less agreed that conscious behaviour 
cannot be construed as the guidance of a bodily machine by a separate soul 
somehow mysteriously attached to it. The most original thinking is made 
possible by,and grows out of, the whole organised system built up through 
,, 
conscious and unconscious experience.The purely intellectualistic standpoint 
has been modified to meet this demand from the biological side,and feeling 
has been given a more prominent place. 
It is here that we find the second theory of meaning,as stated 
in our previous section, coming into being. What is termed Conative interest 
the life urge of the organism, has been given a place in the study of meaning., 
n 
As stated this term is used by Prof. Mc Dougall in his work entitled Outline 
n 
of Pscyhology ,but with him the recognition of this factor seems in no way 
to invalidate the claim that meaning is fundamentally cognitive. 
Prof. Stout would,in all probability support this conclusion. In his 
I. ILatter,Life,Mind,and God, Hoernl ,p154. 
8. 
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Manual he states that it is conation that gives unity and continuity 
to the mental process,and that meaning -the acquirement of meaning depen(1 
on t}-) unity and continuity of the conative process. That is not untrue, 
out it seems inadquate. Stout ,himseif , in a previous page speaks of inter- 
est,and t 2is is affective. It is difficult to conceive of co niti on 
beir influenced by conation except in and through affection. sb;a11 
return to this point. 
The third main influence colouring and determining a new attempt to 
define or redefine psychological meaning is that of Psycho- pathology:- 
what may be termed the medical aspect of modern psychological study. 
This is also the result of biological influences .The schools of Psycho- 
analysis and psycho- therapy have, a.s a result of their researches, direct- 
ed attention to the inner and affective aspects of reactions and response 
Students have been led to look elsewhere than the purely cognitive f )r 
the determining factors in human experienceahile no one can or will 
dismiss environment as an altogether negligible factor, the, reaction 
of an organism is held to be determined primarily not by the environment, 
but by the life- forces of the organism. Environment is a modifying,not 
the determinir,. g,factor in the behaviour. lv.rotivationi40 in the needs of 
the organic life its appetites and tendencies. Take memory,, for example. 
.emory is organic,and recall is something more than the tracing of nerv- 
ous- connections in the physiological structure of the organism. That is 
but the mechanism. Recall is based on interest,and interest is not a 
a matter of sen ion,but relative to the organic needs . It is <:-'fective 
more tha.;n cognitive. 
These varied influences and points of view,a short study of which seem_. 
to have led us a little away from the main theme of our thesis, are 
critical to a real understanding of the psychological n_:ture of our 
enquiry° They indicate to us this vital point. We are on solid ground 
when we regard individual experience,v,rhich is the concrete fact for 
S 1/ " Sitiek,L.77 . / 5 6 
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investigation : as the integration of the organism and situation through 
a process wich is conscious`,and psychological explanation as one in terms 
of conscious purpose. Such a definition carries with it a recognition of the 
organic processes,which,while not in themselves conscious,are influential 
in behavieur.Organic behaviour is more than physical organisation, its deve- 
lopment more thaw physical growth and in it factors not amenable to physical 
explanation are present.The development consists primarily in the growth of 
internal arrangement rather tan external embodirnent.a qualitative rather than 
a quantitative precess,in the course of which specific functions arise and 
take their place in the econary of the mental life. These are named, C ®nation, 
Affectisn,and Cognition. We come to distinguish them,butnone is separable 
though distinguishable. The study of the intellectual processes is a distinct- 
ive study,and we would_ do violence to a description of psychological meaning 
if we limited our enquiry to one aspect alone. 
We must find meaning in that which gives quality o,^ value to the 
activity itself- value in and for the organism,and relative to organic needs. 
Reflection,which is a characteristic activity of the thought process,is not 
something divorced from the organic activity. It is a characteristic activity 
at a certain level. There mustphowever,be something on which to reflect - 
some meaning, or else thinking were itself impossible. This meaning ir of the 
very texture of experiencelard any enquiry into its nature involves the study 
of more thar4 the cognitive aspects of mental life. 
A further insight into the purely psychological nature of our 
enquiry will be given in the discussion of the other critical term in the 
title of our Thesis: - that of keaning. 
10. 
A discussion of the second critical terri.: Meaning. 
It i:3 essential to relate the terri Meaning to what we have set forth as 
the psychological nature of our enquiry,anc. lake clear the distinction 
1 
between psychological meaning and logic. ,l r_ZEaning. L.A.Reid,says, There 
are two senses 3f the word meaning( of course there are ;uany more) but 
here two are to be distinguished. First,what we may call the oo j ec tive 
meaning -we speak of the meaning of a thing.I mean that thing. That is 
ghat we may term, intention,arld. that seems to he the sense in which Prof. 
Mc Dougall uses the term in his discussion of meaning in his Outline. of 
2 '1 
Psychology. Science is manly engaged in explaining particular pheno- 
mena by shewing their significance within a systern.The relation between 
things and a mind i3 aivery difficult thing to justify without enuring 
into a discussion of the biggest questions in metaphysics. Seoand,there 
is what we may call subjective meaning.Meaning in this sense is a function 
of mind directed towards reality." The terminology used by seid is 
espistemological,but the distinction is suggestive. Generally speaking 
there are for us two senses of the word meaning:the psychological and 
the logical,and if they do not exactly correspond to the distinction 
given a bove,our quotation gives us a clue. 
In the first place let us look at what some of the leading 
Psychologists have to say on the distinction psychology and logic. 
1) 7 
Woodw:octh, says, Logic cares nothing about the explanatory processes which 
lead up to experience,but confines itself to inference alone,and its 
4 
validity. Stout holds That logic is concerned with the norm or ideal t 
which all reasoning should conform.Logic has for its field the distinctior 
between truth and error,not the process by which the fact itself arises. 
It is to show how thought must, proceed to represent its object correctly. 
This,by the way, seems to be the point of view `n.)rked out s) thmrr u hly 
by Prof. Spearman in his Principles of C ognition,and makes his discuss- 
ion more epistemological than psychological. Bosanquet states quite 
Knowled and Truth. L.A. -leid. Chap.2. pp .Z75&7.6. 
2 do do do do 
3 Outlines of Psychology. Woodworth. pp 
4 Manual of Psychology Stout. pp I Pe/ 
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frankly that in logic we have passed from a study of psychical processes 
in which we discover actions and affections,which must be studied if we 
would discover what,after all, are the actual conditions of experience. 
1 
Bosanquet makes it quite clear that knowledge is for logic something 
quite apart fro'ri the.menta1 processes by which it is acquired. It is 
something given,a realm apart,and its laws are not subject to psycholog- 
ical investigation. If that be so ,then no one studying the process 
would think that there is any other end in view but the interrelations 
of the elements of thought themselves. That is' a fairly common fallacy 
in many of the psychological treatments of the thought processes. The 
procedure of thought is examined in cross -section. There is a study of re- 
lations within a system of knowledge,andAsection is analysed into its com- 
ponent parts. Even where the attempt is made to trace devel+opOment, this is 
confined to showing the necessary steps in the evolution of thought. No 
one studying the analysis would gather there is any essential relationship 
with the living reality of a human being. 7e are not foolishly dismissing 
logic. e are simply trying to distinguish what is essential to our en- 
quiry . Logical meaning has to do with a highly articulated and systematisec 
body of knowledge,and the relationships wLth.in that system,eand of that 
system to others within the whole of experience. It has to do with validity 
Psychological meaning has reference to the r rocesses by,and in,which . 
experience itself is p'as si'ole e sychological meaning is that which consti- 
tutes the response of the organism to a situation an experience at all, 
and. , on. ich, knowiedge itself ultimat.ely depends. In the growth of 
experience ,ap in the economy of our mental life there4,are developed 
prsacess A we arrive at the more highly articulated bocley of knowledge in 
whimh logic takes its place. We shall trace l ¿rov,th in the course of 
our study. 
Pillsbury sums up a discussion of this topic in the following words. 
2 
Th;,t the attitude of logic is essentially different from that of psycholo- 
gy is evident frori the different division that it makes of the reasoning 
1 Essentials of Logic. Bosanquet. pp 3 and fol. 





operations.In fact the attitude of logic towards reasoning indicates that 
the ter-ns refer more to the product of mental ooerations that t) the 
operations theT1selves. logic,at least, is mainly concerned 
thinking as it is exoressed in words. In consequence the vutward operation 
alone is considered. The osyc'hologist makes reasoning one operation a'non,, 
manyi the logic ian, or at least several modern logigians , deny that think - 
,ver goes on in the mind that the psychologist investigates. Bradley and 
Bosanquet,and more recently Husserl,make the latter assertion with great 
emphasis. The former two men accept Mill's definition of consciousness 
as accurate,and,when they find no oossioility of a s.tisfactory explana- 
tion of reasoning in Mill's system, insist that it must go on in some 
higher realm that is apart from the individual comsciousness,although 
somehow related to it It is against all direct evidence to assume that 
thinking does not go on in consciousness.We cannot have any psychological 
invetigat.ion apart from the processes on which knowledge depends." 
It is certainly r4ruite impossible to have any investigation of psycholag- 
ical meaning apart from a study of the organism behaviour in relation 
to presented sitliatiens,and that involves a study of processes. 
We contend ;therefore*;, that it is essential to any clear investigation of 
this sI.1bject of psychological neani lgr to distinguish between the logical 
and psychological content of the term. 
We do not,whilc urging the foregoing distinction, make logic and 
and psychology antagonistic. They are not.The one is anterior to the other, 
It is nonsense to say that a thing is true for psychology and false for, 
s_-y metaphysics to which logic is closely allied. The fact is that the 
centre of interest is different,and the ,point of enquiry in psychology 
more primtive or antecedent. in our ordinary vocabulary we have words 
which denote distinction in the process of meaning. We.eref8r to words 
like meaning and si nificance,and it may help in our study tt investi- 
gate what exactly i.$ the experintt l content of these ter -'s . 
1 Psychology of Reasoning . Pillsbury. Chap 1. pp 1.7) and ff. 
13. 
Meaning and Significances 
1 
in quoting L.A.Reid, we said -that meaning had,at least,two main aspects: 
one in which it implied relations within a system,and the ot1 -er in 
relation to the organism. The latter is,znre think, more corredtly des- 
l4 1 $ t/ 
ribed as meaning,and the former as significance. Lloyd iúorgan draws. 
N 
a somewhat similar distinction in an article on what he terms Meaning 
2 
and Significance in the Journal of Experi.smental Pedagogyÿ Vo1,3.19i5 -60 
In this article Lloyd Morgan restricts meaning to the percep t-ial field, 
and significance to the conceptual. The distinction is, in our judgement, 
not quite so Cle=ar. -cut. There is really no sharp line of demarßa'tion. 
The more complex and developed psychical process known as conception is 
not a phase of experience from which perception has vanished, or in 
which it has no place. In the same way meaning is not a phase of experie- 
ence that has no definte reLItion to significance. It is antecedent 
to significance, and is presupposed in it. Meaning has to do with,and 
rnrrks9 a more primitive level than significance. There is .a primitive 
a reaction which is particular and organic ene its 
reference, -and that is really meaning. In the devel000ment of experience 
there is a further meaning in relation to that '.putt lexperienceland 
thus theee is leuilt up a higher srocess in which we pass beyond the 
immediate to other related, and it may be anticipated, experiences. The 
experience is thus significant within a wider field of reference. The 
phases thus denoted are coiriil rnentary,not separable. Dr Dre4r ,gays, 
3, 
We must distinguish clearly between meaning strictly so- called.,and the 
more developed secondary meaning ,which ought to be called significance. 
Significance is a pointing forward to other related experience or expe 
ience. Hence it is always the outcome of experience. It implies some 
antecedent meaning. We may speak of the acquirement of significance - 
1 Knowledge and Truth. L...Reid pp 258c 26. 
2 Journal of Experimental Pedagogy.Vo1 3 1915 -6. 




There is a psychical integration which is inclusive of more than the immed- 
iate present. 
An exainati on of the acquirement of meaning as described in Prof, Stout's 
Ma. nua 1 will b r i r.r g alit. more f u l l;j what is implied i n our d i s t i ri c, i o n . 
9i 
1 
Primary retentiveress,he says, is correlated with primary meaning. We may 
sum up the last section as follows. In all processes h ing appetitive 
or conative continuity sand consisting of a series of distinct steps a 
curiralá tîve disliosition is fs- fsiled,tvriich i`3 the prJduct of _antecedent mental 
change,and a cooperating factor in succeeding mental change. 2.The of ter 
affect of the precedincz; mental change is not reproduced,but simply persists 
or is retained. 3. Its persistence in no way involves the persistence. or 
resusdi Cation of the specific items of sensation or mental imagery which 
have contributed to form it. The3e do not pert i st ,but only their effects. 
If ime =. denote the soe ci fic items of nse -experience, or, it may be, ..f ideal 
imagery,by a,h,c,d, then a,b,c,d, by no means adequately symbolises the 
process as a whole. FVr when b occurs,the resulting state of consciousness 
is the J )int product -)f b. and the oPrsistent disposition orr after- ef_fett 
left behind by a. Simi tarly,when d occurs, the resulting Tnental state al 
consciousness is due to d in cooperation with the -persistent disposition 
left seh,ind by a,b, and _ c. We may denote the aftereeffect of a by m, ,the 
after-effect of a and b by mzand_ so en. The whole series may then be re )re- 
rented by a ,bm.cmi and. dm3. This after -effect is called rn and the m 
represents the relation of the specific items b , c , d. to t). whole of 
which they are a part,a peculiar character which belongs to th.erri in virtue 
of their being part of this whole. Now the only general word, which is at 
all a:propriate for expressing this kind 3f consciousness is the word 
a 
meaning or significance. 
The quotation is rather long ,but it is necessary for our purpose, 
and indicates what is exactly our point in arguing for the distinction 
between meaning and significances. T,'hat Stout sets down as meaning is really 
1 Instinct in Man . Dr Dreyer p 131 
2 Manual of Psychology Stout. Chap 2. p 91. 
15 . 
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significance in our understanding of the term. There is, in the primary 
reaci;ion, a particularity and disc :inctiveness,which,in its initial stages 
µ 1f 
has a feeling of wworthwhileness. It 1.6 this which constitutes the reaction 
an experience at all. There is in what Stout terms the antecedent mental 
c' ange a n.eaning,and each euccessive reaction which forms the steps in 
the cumulative disposition 
: 
not without- titer -primary meaning. Every 
reaction of the organism on its environment means a mödification of the 
organic life; a step in adaptability,the prosecution of some activity to 
a definite nd,and,as suchihas meaning, The meaning is not something that 
follows en expe®rie-nce, or is acquired by it; it ins. that which constitutes 
an experience at all. This is not what Stout means by the Acquirement of 
meaning. That is really significance ,and_ is ,no doufot acquired in exper- 
ience. The primary meaning,which really belongs tie the individual acts 
as such,and which constitutes such acts experience, is found in the rely' 
a,tisn of i_rrpuise and situation ,which is an expression of the needs of 
the organi.:sm,M1 the affect is really the factor giving content and 
value to Lite concrete act. This point will be more fully discussed later. 
JP.r f 9 i s Dougall is his Outline of Psychology raises much the 
same point,but in a very different fashion. He is quite emphatic in his 
1 
declaration of what is to be understood by psychological meaning. " To 
perciive an object is to mean that ob j ect,and no other. So long as I mean 
that ob j ect, it matters little what sensory or imaginal quali_ tie e enter,in t,o 
my experience. " Or, again, We cannot describe meaning otherwise than in 
ft 
the terms of the object we isean: we can only say I mean this or that object, 
64 
This,far from a satisfactory psychological description of meaning. In fact, 
no attempt is made to give a psychological description. The qualities, 
Ie 
sensory or imaginal, may not in themselves erlkor in,4 the experience,but 
they are not mere negligible factors in the experience. They area evolk A 
experiences,s0iich are qualifyin,L any situation,and thus,, to get at the 
psychological nieaningive must do sore than say I mean that thing. To say 
yskAce Teammng is simply this intentional form of experience is to give no 
indication of how such a stage has been reached. It is really a bald 
1 Outline of Psychology. Mc Dougall. Chap.8. pp 250 .ff. 
.statement of a 1atF° rationalisation of experience,which ignores the st:i e, 
in psychical integration of situation with organism out of which exper4 -,1 
ience is built up. We cannot, except as a m .tte r of conve-r,E,2nce, exter- 
n.alise an object in this way. The object I rnean is an object the value 
of which to me is found in exPerience,and,if,through experience ,I am 
able, to objPctivate to the extent of pointing and saying I mean that, 
the achievement of that stage is the end of a long process. Prof adc 
1 
Tougall in another place says "Experience is not made up of things;it is . 
process, :end. perk ,p6 gin 41l1 cases a train of activity". On that viEvf it iv 
difficult to see how any psychology of meaning can leave uninvestigated 
the organic motivation of this activity. A situation is attended to 
be avrse it is interesting to the organism,relative to a felt need .add 
it is there we lust seek for the psychological meaning. We reserve the 
wider term rsignii icancec for the wider and more re 4tional content of 
the term. 
'7e. pass now from the introductory and prelimmnary discussions to an 
analysis of the psychological act. If,at times, our discussion has 
seemed to lose sight of our distinctive quest, it is duc in large rgeas,lre 
to the necessity of r-,akin _. clear our use of terrns,and the --zany diffi- 
culties attending any discussion of the subject of meaning. 
1 Outline of Psychology. Mc Dougall. p 39 and ff . 
Second Section. 
The Thesis in this Section is that Psychological Meaning, it 
its primar nature is 2Emm Affective not Cognitive. 
Our argument is an examination of the FsycholoOcal 
Act to prove our Thesis. 
"Te define Primary meaning as the feeling of relation bet'freen an 
o )j ect or a situ.a.ti on,and. an impulse towards that object or situation, 
that f eelin[r being described as interest or i. otthwhileness," 1 
1 Dr D_rever's Instinct in Man. Chap 6. p133. 
" Meaning.... does not seem to us to reside in the stimulus but rather 
in a relation between stimulus and response- of a phenomenological 
nature. ?. 
Reylert. Ontogenetic aspects of h_;eaning,p3. 
18 . 
There is, ire one of Dr Dreyer' s books the following significant sentence: 
1 
an is primarily a doer rather than a knower,and his knowing is for the 
It 
sake of and with .reference to what he is doing, or intends to do. 
Living is a definite kind of activity,and the whole of experience is 
determined by this activity,yet this activity does not arise out of 
experience. It is the ground of experience. This fact points us back to 
certain energy -sources if we would discover the origin of the psycho - 
legi ¢al act. These energy- sources have been defined in various ways,as 
y 0 N 
1 
Libido, Elan Vital, Conative urge, etc. Jung,says, All psychological 
phenomena can be considered as the manifestation of energy in the save 
way as physical phenomena are already understood as emergic manifest - 
tations since Meyer discovered the law of the conservation of energy. 
I call it Libido using the word in the original meaning of the term, 
which is by no means sexual. From a broader point o `' view .rung's term is 
practically s nonyrnous with Bergson's Elan Vital. Its manifestation is 
through instinct. We may crit e Jung's statement that this energy is 
subjectively conceived a3 desire,finding it essential to distinguish 
a cr.aving,wbich is,more or less,purely biological,frori desire$,v'h.ich 
is a more highly complex and psychological state. The same ,nay loe -1._ß°F ed 
ir rrore or less dPgre.e main. t the other definitions,but their very 
Presence impress upon us the need for a new orientation of the analysis 
of experience. 
In any analysis of experience we find three principal factors: 
(1) The organism with its inherited structure, tF n.dencies,etc.,through. 
which the life -urge is manifested. (2) The environ-ment in W'nich the 
organism lives and moves and has its being. (3) The resultant response of 
the organism to the environment. Though thus described we /Moat not think 
there is anything static about experience. Life and its activity c .nnot 
s 
he expressed in static terris like sensations, ideas,and concepts. The term 
mast be dynamic. The failure to realise this lies at the back )f most 
of the errors of the faculty and inellectualistic psychologists. 
1 Psychology of Every -day life. Dr Drever.p 19. 
2 Analytic Psychology Jung. p 231. 
19. 
We must escape from the temptation to think of the organism. as passive. 
The first step in the activity is initiated by the life -impulse of 
the organism.The environment is the mtdium of the expression, or satis- 
faction, or modification of the impulse. The older,and 'perhaps more 
common acaderrii9,way of stating the order of experience as stiTellus or 
sensati on, organism, behaviour, sri ould. be set aside. We would suggest as 
a mole correct order,and one more in keeping with modern psy, thology,
organism,stimulus,behaviour. The former suggests too strongly what 
we have termed the danger of passivity ;the animal or human moves only 
when tickled. Such a position is quite out oof keeping with modern 
science. The stf imulus is not the determining factor in the activity ;it 
is the modifying factor.The determining factor is the life- i ellse of 
the organism exr,ressed i_r: its needs,appetites,and tendencies. John 
14 
Cralsworth.y in his novel, 4. Saint's progress" ,has a very suggestive illus- 
1 
tratior of this point. One of his characters is oictured looking down a,t 
a baby lying in its carriage.The man looks for some time e,and then asks 
tl ü 
the following question: What do they think about? The answer made by 
Ii 1t 
the mother is, they think Only when they want something. That is an 
arresting and suggestive statement by one of our most thoughtful writers 
of fiction. The statement itself is not _fiction,'out a thoughtful and 
provocative interpretation of a situation. 
It is necessary, then, if we would give an adequate account 
of behaviour,to turn Dian attention to the appetitive and instinctive 
tendencies. It is there we discover the pathway to an accurate 
description of psychological meaning. There are,in every organism, 
original and nativistic endowments through which the life -impulses 
14 
manir st themselves. While it is true,as Carlyle says, trat a Tan is 
Of 
more than a pocket edition. of Tais ancestors, it is equally true that 
every human being arrives on this planet with a definite structure and 
endowment that determines that he should behave in a definite manner. 
1. A Saint's Progress. John Galsworthy. p 361. 
20. 
manner./ 
He is a member of the race,and, in a very real sense, the }.ieir of all the 
s 
ages, moulded and shaped through long evolutionary periods irite specific 
and determinative form. He is not unequipped for the struggle of life. 
He has tendencies,which modern osycholog; call instinctive,and which are 
experienced as impulses. . Each is áec s pani d with,what we may terra, ir: ter- 
East. These instinctive: tendencies,experienced as impulses,and through 
which the life.- energy manifests itseif,are caoable sf being distinguished 
.as appetitive and reactive. The first term denotes the organic aspect. The 
appetitive tendency originates in the organism in an affective experience, 
and is represented in hunger and thirst,and the like. They mark certain 
affections of the organic life. The aecond,the :reactive tendenéies,are 
mere or less relative to the objective aspects of experience ,and refer 
to some object or situation. But,while both aspects are thus disting_uish- 
able,they really eombine to form the complete act of primitive behaviour. 
The psychological explanation begins with the life- impulse as its datum, 
and traces the process through which satisfaction is gained. 
The starting -point, therefore, in the activity, is a state of 
dissatisfaction in the case of any one of the instinctive tendencies; a 
dissatisfaction, which maintains a state of disturbed equili }rium, until 
®.atisfa.ction is achieved. The state of dissatisfaction arising, say, ire the 
case of the instinct condition of hunger,or sex,results in a lowering 
of the threshold for the relevant stimulus. It is difficult to describe 
behaviour, either primal D2 ,I.sissn, apart from some suck }lypothesis. Take 
the illustration of the Stoat in pursuit of its prey. The initial pint 
in the activity is not t?i e° presence of the prey. There is first the 
dissatisfaction arising in the appetitive tendency of hunger, and the 
arousal of the hunting instinct. The search for prey is thus initiated. 
The threshold is lowered for the entrance of the appropriate stimulus, 
and this appears in the form of the rabbit. Watch the animal as it pursues 
its prey, r.nd we see that the of fectivty thus aroused sustains the 
activity ,and gives value and content. The a- ctivity thus described is 
21. 
is/ 
not without rreanins in and for the animal. This meaning cannot be described 
in terras of the objective fact ors. It is found in trie relation of impulse 
It 
ta 3itua.tiori,a felt; relation of wortñ.whileness. What is it trr?.t is worthwhile? 
Is it the object or situation,or a cert^.in actinor a sitlaatior: arising 
from the action? Tt is really ell three ir_ a certain sensF ibut the sense 
will depend on the degree of psychical integration. There is present a 
certain irter.est which is really the primary meaning. 
¡Te are not concerns d,at pre.ent,witb any furthur analysis of the 
;,ts, }havicur descf-ibed above. Our purpose is really to prove our contention 
t;ha_L ß;1'ìm environment is not the determining factor. Jennings says, in 
support of this point; Activity does not require present external stimulation 
A first and essential point for the understanding of behaviour is that 
activity occurs without specific external stimulation. The n.srraal condition 
of the Paramecium is an active one with its cilia in rapid motion. It is 
only Lender special conditions that it curs: be brsught to rest. The organism 
is active,and its activities may be spontaneous so far as the present stim- 
ulation is concerned. The spontariesus activity ,óßf course, depends finally 
on external conditions in the sali sense that the existence of the srÿanism 
Tt 2 
depends on external cond_itians. Reaction by the selection of excess move- 
ments depends largely on the fact that movement is not itself produced by 
the stimulus .We admit that the life - impulses art derived î rorn, ur, t least, 
are not independent of the environment. So is the very life ,f the organism. 
The life- impulses are derived from the metabolism in the organism,and this, 
in turn4is contingent on that the environment gi.ves,but what we insist on 
is that psycr'l.gy begins with the life - impulse as its datum,and it is 
H 
concerned with the mental routes along which the impulse expresses itself. 
This rather long and laboured analysis of tuie primary nature of 
activity changes the emphasis as we have stated from the purely cognitive 
to the affective aspect of the behavieur,and indicates the region in which 
tep look fer the true nature of what we term psychol)gical meaning: a 
psychol.g,:cal quality,which is,we hold.,tb.e primary tissue of experience it- 
self. 
1Behaviour of Lower Organisms. Jennings. Ohap.1 &. 
2. Nature of Intelligence. Thurstone. p.23. 
22. 
another avenue of approach to a psycholsgical description of the 
R 
primitive behaviour is that given by Zi_gnano in hi s,Ptiycholagy of 
9 
Ieas ring. He approaches this subject from his own particular angle. 
"1 q0 g a 
If q _ e secve,he says, the term affective tendencies for that parti- 
cular class of organic tendencies which appear subjectively in man and 
animals as desireps3,or appetitea,or needs,and are subjectively trans- 
lated both in man and the animals as non- mechanised movements completed 
or incipierit,then a whole series of the principal affective tendencies 
thus d_ef ined.,may at once be reduced to the single fundamental tendency 
of each organism towards its own physiological invariability. We see, 
for instance, that hunger; the most fundamental )f e,11 of f_ ective tendencie 
is re ally nothing ,n-_ore than the tendency to maintain or restore the 
qualitative and quantitative condition f the nutritive circulating 
rriedium,which will make possible a continuation of a stationary xr:eta- 
't 
bolic state. The difficulties in this statement are two-fold. First, 
Rignano's description the affective tendencies is too savou 
too much of a purely biological one.It would be better to say that the 
reaction arises through the arousal of the affect,and the exoression of 
the impulse is thus affectively celGured. In every instinctive reaction 
there is the oresence of the affective quality .There is instinct-feel- 
ing. Second,'Nhile,adm.itting the statement about the tendency to recov- 
er or restore equilibriu.rn,we would point out that this is never a static 
state. It is dynamic. We would also free ourselves from the grouping 
of the affective tendencies under any auch generic terra. Our real pint 
in quoting Rignans is not,howeve*r,to eater ints any detailed criticism 
of his biological bias,but rather to indicate that, ;even allowing for 
that bias, there isss,confirmation of our oreviaus argument on the 
critical natura f affective tendencies in the determination of behav- 
i our,and the subject of psychological meaning. 
It is futile ta argue that there is no meaning in the 
It 
initial response. The very term used by ßignano, ,rest ®red e4uilibrium" , 
implies a qualitative change in the organic life,and this must be of 
1 Psychology of 'easoning. Aignano. Chap.l.r-ol,and ff. .
the nature of meaning. 
We would hold, then, that the primary. form of meaning)that which itself 
constitutes the reaction an experience at all -must be sought in the 
relation of the felt impulse,due to the life - energy expressing itself 
through one er other of the instinctive tendencies, with the situation, 
and L suing in satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The earliest conscious 
experience seems to be altogether inexplicable ixnlesz! it is a reaction 
to something more than simply presentations, The reaction must be to a 
meaning. The stimulus may be provocative of a reaction,which,so-faz,w, as 
the organism is concerned,mati be without content,though net without same 
modifying effect on its structure. The behaviour,-that is,may be more or 
less mechanical. But, in re iati In to the impulse,behaviour takes on a very 
definite psychological quality.The impulse tends to the lowering of the 
thresh.sld,and a more or less particularised form of attention. Interest is 
created through a rekationship between impulse and situation,and the vrhele 
response is regulated and coloured by a definite affective tone. The 
vr,rhole response issues in a satisfyingness of dissatis.fyingness,which con - 
s t i tutes for the organism the meaning of the 'let. It i; this qualitative 
content which constitutes the act an experience. Instinct experience may 
be the cognition of an object or situation never before coÿnised because 
of the instinctive inter(_ st of the situation,arid this the result of a felt 
relation between impulse and object and vice versa,b lt, if the object has 
meaning ,there must -- surely be a reference to something that is not in 
2 It 
the object,but in use Suppose that by a miracle a fully developed inr,e°ll- 
igence suddenly fell oa sip nless,was moved by no desire,felt no pleasure 
or pain,hyped r oth ing, f eared nothing, loved. nething,and hated nothing. 
ould it not straightway tend towards extinction and dwindle like a 
flame deprived of aif ? It would surely go eut,and with it its world. 
1. Instinct in Man. Dr Dreyer. p.134. 
2 Principles of Understanding. Stmrt. p Goad. 
24. 
If we turn,agairr for a rnoment,to our illustration from the novel of 
John Galsworthy we shall see,more fully,whaly is implied in our argument. 
The child is never purely passive,whatever the appearance may suggest 
There are certain metabolic changea going on in the organic life,and, 
though these may be strictly termed physiological, there is, =as a result, 
certain states of dissatisfaction arising in one or ether of the 
instinctive tendencies. These lead up to ,and issue in, some form of 
behavisur. There is,what R_ignane calls, a disturbed state of organic 
equilibriurn,o restlessness,and the consequent hunt for the relevant 
stimulus. Pleasure and unpleasure are oresent in some degree. It is 
surely beside the mark tea argue that these bi- polar expressions of feel- 
ing are not motivating factors in behaviour at this primitive level. 
The presence of the relevant stimulus arouses the affect,and there is 
the condition we term instinctive interest operative in the response. 
It is there,we h'old4 th primary meaning is found. 
We can approach the subject from another point of view. 
1, 
If we turn to Lloyd Morgan's book on Instinct and Experience" ,we find 
tiherein the discussion of the behaviour of a rest-- hen,which is suggestive 
in this connection. His whole argument as to the s igiîi of exsor ience 
centres round the development of the experience of the moor-hen. We have 
41 
three stages mentioned. At the time when the little bird was struggling 
out ssf the cramping egg -shell we ' have the time when the first experience 
aro3G o When there came that we may regard as the initial presentation, 
generating initial responsive behaviour in the earliest instinctive acts, 
accompanied initial emotional tone. coalescent to form what I have ven- 
tured to call the primary tissue of experience. This is the birth of 
experience. Of swimming experience it Kad none, aacial preparation had, 
hpwever, fitted the tissues contained within his black fluffy skin to 
respond in a quite definite manner. In the first act of swimming there 




response,a specific emotional tone,all c= oalescent into one felt situation. 
There was the moor -hen swimming in the stream. Sensory presentations 
through eye,ear,and skin from the various organs concerned in the behaviour, 
from the internal, viscera, frorl the whole organic make- up,th.ese together 
with a supplement of factors of reinstatement gained during two months of 
active vigorous life constituted what I conceived to be the actually exist- 
ent experience at the moment. Then comes along the blundering puppy,and 
,f 
the moor -hen dives.! 
Our concern with this illuetrati on is not a discussion of the 
relation of instinct to intelligence; it is rather with ao the nature of 
m.eating in the various steps of (;he experience described. There is as 
Dr Dreyer suggtYsts - no coalescence of Puppy presentation with the behav- 
iour experience.There is conative unity and continuity workinv out the 
interest of the situation and psychical integration. Puppy Roseeforoitat.d -yin 
does not seen to describe adequately the first part of the experience. 
There was cognition of an object puppy,d.eterrninirig and determined by an 
instinctive impulse, the origin of which must be sought in the race history 
of the moor- hen,v:rith the felt interest ,or primary meaning arising from 
of 
this relation. That is the point we are making. The primary meaning of 
the reaction even at two months old,as at other stages, i _ in relation 
of impulse to situation. It is not it the stimulus,nor in a primary s nse 
in relation to the wider context of experience. At every stage indicated 
the reaction has its primary meaning,and,, in the later stages , there is . 
what we may termederived iTeaning,v.hich is the result of experience. At 
each step there was the behaviour of the poor -hen Strrmineô by the felt 
relation to situation,the primary meaning or interest,and in the later 
experiences there is a secondary meaning acvired in experience, Meaning 
is never given by some wort of incomprehensible back- otroke from the 
resulting behaviour experience. 
1.Instinct and Ex ?per. ince ® Lloyd Morgan. /73. 
2. Instinct in J -Tan. Dr Dreyer. 
, . . 
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iris short discussion sn what we may term, for want of a better word, 
1 
preperceptual alstivity i.: essential to the investiation of our sub- 
ject in perception itself .Trie Haller elaboration of vhat we have termed 
.,e 
instinct interest will be given as we proceed. We close this section 
by gi4ving what ss. consider an acc .arc.t.e description of primary meaning. 
1! il 
Dr Dreyer in his Iri,tinct in Man defines primary meaning as follows: 
We define primary meaning as the feeling of relation between an ob- 
ject or situation and an impulse towards th-.t object or sit,sation, that 
fl 
feeling being described as an interest or worthwhileness. Sonne such 
defintion is essntial if experience is to be described at all. This 
meaning is not acquired through exoerience, b,.zt constitutes the very 
basis of. experience. This position s- hope to find confirmed by mr 
study of the higher levels of conss7_,.,,us activity. Te pass novv to a 
study of meaning in perception. 
ld Vote. This term is not ts be confused with the term preperception 
-whicho,h11e firmly fixed in psychology, is never too clearly defined. 
In some writers,preperce2tion means complication9--.:.. p..zrely perceptual 
yrocess, in others it refers to certain transitional `C'Jcesaf_'s towards 
ideation. We are r eî er r:i.n.g to a stage of experience which -se' - be more 
clearly described as instinct-exseerie=nce,r,at, as such experience is 
influential and determ.inativee in perceptmonawe have used the above term. 
2 Instinct in aan. Dr Drever. p.133. 
27. 
Meaning III the Perceptual process, 
(1) A discussion of the terms,Situation, 'Response, ,nd Experience, 
This i; to ;ive a clearer description of terms we have used in the 
last section. 
(2) ,A statement of the factors involved in the process of perceiving. 
(3) Perception and Affection. 
(4) A discussion of the concept Sensaticn,and an examinatioh of the 
Gestalt theory. 
28. 
Situation, Response,and Ex_perience. 
+9 n 
In the last :section we repeatedly employed the terms, situation, 
a n n It 
response ,and experience. It is necessary,before we proceed with a 
discussion of aïc:aning in perceptual experience,to define those terms 
a little more clearly. The word situation implies something more t i.n 
a mere generalised conception of environing conditions which surround 
the organism. These we found were,rnore or 1ess,ie continual pressure 
on the organic life,yet c )u1d not be considered ee the prime factor 
in the determination of behaviour. f. vund that there is on the organic 
side a definite structure,which determines that the organiAnwilî behave 
in a certain definite manner. The life expressing itself thnough the 
inherited structure has a definite kind of expression. It is not a mere 
blundering aimless attack or environing c- onditionâ,but is guided by 
1 
some specific tendency. Even the most undifferentiated total-response 
r 
is 4i.tite other than a gross attack on the whole environmmnt. Though it 
be but a sort of lunge into the unknown,the occasion for such an act 
is always something more of less articulate amid the mass of stimuli 
which the environment is capable of affording. Thus organisms respond 
to light,heat, or pressure,but not to a chaotic mixture of ell three 
stimuli acting At once. Just as the behaviour of the organism is 
patterned -if only by virtue of the fact that the organism is a definite 
structure, the members of which coo_oerate as a whole - so the situation 
is patterned. This statement suggests the sand- point Jf the 1estalt 
school,a position which we shall examine later. Yeantime,however, vie canin 
<: N4 l° omit some reference to it. Ogden,from whom we are quoting, continues 
9a 
as follows: The latter porti®n,which speaks of the situation Icing 
pa tt'rned, is not so obvious as the one in which we speak of the organic 
structure. We have too long looked on the situation to which the or.can- 
f 
ism responds as so many discrete stiriuli . It is against such a position 
we have protested in our introductory section. The situation,which is. tit 
the objective aspect of the psychological act p ,:and related 
to the impulse that impels to action. The situation is not something 
lBsychology and Education. Ogden. pp 109. 
2 do de do do 
?9. 
Something/ 
disengaged from the organism and its behavi= ur,but something which 
1" 
participates a3 a member of the organic pattern of res)onsee. The regul- 
ation of the external environment is, in fact, only the outward express- 
ion of the regulation of the internal environnent. An organisrrì and its 
9a 
environment are one. The situation ,then . is not any situation,but 
situation organically related te the impulse» nr its ,.ate -e. Lies in the 
manner in which it satisfies the impulse. 
Rezponw e. 
The response,which may be stated as the outcaze f the rela,ti3n between 
the impulse and situati_on,has s, twofold relation. It is related to the 
organism whose reacttcr it aonustitutes,but this relation ir3 r-1ot a merely 
general one. It is s ec.ific,and is related to the instinctive tendency 
evoked or active. That makes the r.espon3e,on the organic .side, qme With 
di g ti.nctive colouring. Even ,,though,by the growth of experience ,and 
the emergence of higher arrd more complex levels this -tlaÿ ,seem to be 
obscured,it is never absent. 
On the objective side there is a relation..ta,wha we have defined_ asp 
situation. Here` againowe have to note the specific nature of the relation. 
As stated ab ve the situation is not a series of discrete stimuli :,;nor , 
i3 it a generalised and 'inselected pattern. It is determined in a very 
real way by the nature of the instinctive tendency which is seeiiing 
satisfaction. The whole is really an organic whole. The core of the 
situation- response is ,not so much a thing that is discerned as .something 
enjoyed. This immediately points to the feeling aspect,and indicates 
to affective nature of the behaviour. The response is not any more than 
the situation or the impulse,a haphazard thing,but something controlled 
and guided by these* two,to which,indéed,it is organically, related. 
1. Or,,anism and Environment. Haldane.J.S. pp 9n9g. 
30. 
Experience. 
Experience is the third term in the c i .'cuit we have set at the top of 
this section. In discussing these te_rtss it is well to re sierri er that 
they must not be taken i_i any static sense. They are simply terms 
used to denote what is a dyrraeic and developing life -activity. Haldanegi 
quotation sA.ven above indicates that in a primary sense the .organism 
and the4.vironrnent are one. Distinctioii,s.ue to the development of 
higher mental processes, is still distinction within a whole. Any 
distinctLons which we have made are such, Stimulus and response are 
not separable from but di;tinguila.ble within experience, They are 
factors in,and have a determinate place in, the experience,but in 
themselves they d® constitute the experience. What then completes the 
circuit`' In our last section ire said that the stimulus- response has 
as its core something not ss rruc '_. discerned as enjoyed: a felt something, 
This satisfaction of some instinctive interests,- ,f i:s, in a very 
real sense, the primary meaning of the whcl- ,assisst ;orL,.sti tutee the 
0.14, 
actAexperience. T'rierf, is a modificdtion_ oL_ the life:It _is richer 
by so much. 
Let us be quite clear sn this point. From the foregaing it is 
evident that experience is a synthetic product. There iá the life- 
energy through the e ^(, manifested lr.il. c bll :_ inherited t ̂ aencies,and there is the 
environment. We have indicated theme tws in stimulus and response, 
but there is the integration of the two by a process that is mental, 
The product is an uniq.ue oroduct. To speak in the terms used to, 
denote the different aspects of mental lifeorle would say that 
donation and cognition,standing as they do fsi the life -urge and the 
objective 3i t1i ® , _ v .in;,re not 111 U1.jVi1wE.vfr ::,a., sU to zsssount forß 
or to pr odZice ,experie :nce. There ire the third element which differs 
a.q4 
essentially from bstri these °There is the affective s4 It is thin 
element that completes they circuit ,and vdgggia gives what we term 
primary meaning to the whole, arid, thus, is constitutive of experience. 
Our whole argument in this section may seem i to be unquali- 
fied individí.zalism.But it is part of our contention that meaning in 




jays Facts are discovered in and through experience,,nd to deny a 
scientific status to experience on the ground that it is always an indiv- 
idual phenomenon is to deny validity of objective fact ;,which must first 
1! 
be observed 'clef )re they can be formulated -ito a scientific system. 
We must remember we are discussing tho genesis of experience not fret 
later -:end more highly organised mental processes in which reflection 
®ii experience is o ssible. The fuller elucidation of the differentia- 
tion within experience , through mental growth, cocaf,s later in our discuss- 
ion. Meantime we have reached a clearer understanding of what is impl i_ed 
in our terms. 
1. Psychology and Education. Ogden. pp 115 9.f f . 
Perception . 32:,. 
In ou- last section wee d.iscussed tJ¡e inner ash oct of e_ erience- the 
energies and impulses with their characteristic mode of e1 cress Sion 
that mar_ behaviour on its subjective or organic side. We found that 
K 
the inner core of the situation- response was a feeling of wobthwhile- 
r 
ness passing Tito satisfaction. This we contended constitutes the 
prirìary meaning, a r d :.ras that which really made the act an ex erience. 
It was affective in nature. now turn to perception, to that which 
is usually designated the first .conscious experience of situation or 
object. It is well to remember when we are discussing this rl'ase to 
note vihrst e have said about the circuit of the psychological act 
and the terms used. All knowledge,it is said, is based on direct or 
insirect apprehension of objects or situations. This apprehension 
depends on the present effect on the sense organs of such objects or 
situations. These are the usual academic descriptions or the initial 
paints in the perceptual process. It is however, a total misunderstand- 
ing of the subject to think of perception as isolated or separate 
from those aspects of behaviour which we have already discussed. It 
is not really .adequate to describe a percept as the im-ression made 
by an object acting on the senstorgans. Such an account would be 
psychologically valueless. The object on that basis would not be per- 
ceived at all. Our experience at this level, as at other and higher levels 
is coloured by our past exp eri..ences,by the setting or context which is 
rel.pti.ve both to the subjective and objective aspects ,and by our 
purposes and aims at the time. It is very questionable if Are sh7ould 
employ any such term as senation. Situation is not as we have seen 
simply nad.e up of discrete stimuli. We shall discuss this point later 
in a statement of the Gestalt theory. Meantime we can make our point 
cleary saying :that there are numerous occasions every day where the 
sense- impressions are entirely without any conscious effects! and to Atot4 
no attention is given.The lowering of the threshold which gives the 
77 
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necessary condition for the entrance of the impression is not due prim- 
arily to the intensity or r'uration of the stimulus.These,we admit, are 
influential,and may determine attention,but there are organic conditions 
and an experimental background which have more to de With the response 
than any quantitative nature of the sense-stimulus. There is always, in 
a study of mental .proce;3ses1 an insurgent 4anger 9f isolating a phase of 
experience from the inner organic purpose which is tr;Fu core of behaviour. 
1 " t 
Prof. Soearman,writing, in this connection, says That, before any cognition 
at all comes into play, there must occur certain events,which are not in 
themselves cognitivet only the soil out of which cognition springs. These' 
precognitive events have themselies two distinct stages of which the first 
is prenatal altogether,being purely physical amid physiological. Then fol- 
lows the secconrl stage,which indeed is mental,but not cognitive. The 
physiological processes in the sensorirun by some rLysterious rriearis generate 
sentient states of mind. Such states are,at startin ,;_merely lived,n9t 
known. But surely these states are influert.tial in the w ,ole_ we call 
experience even at the perceptual level,and a study of them must enter 
into any psychological g d-F sr_ ip tion of mental process. It is not'sufficient 
to dismiss them in any such cavalier way. It may be that Prof Spearman 
does not feel that analysis of such states is necessary for the puupo* e 
he has in view. ` : ?e cannot leave the -flatter there. It seems to us that 
to get any real understanding of the growth of experience it is incum- 
bent on us to trace it genetically from its pri4ive beginnings. We may 
plucK re 1Dercept out of the soil from which it springs,and give a descrip- 
tion of it in terns of sensation and response,but it is not a full de-3- 
2" 
cription. Percept ton, in point of fact,is,like all other psychical processe9 
an integral part of the larger whole of experience.An impression i3 attend- 
ed to because it interests the subject,arfecting it pleaselatly or pain- 
fully,and so hae acquired practical significance.Me =rely cognitive signifi- 
cance has not place a t, all at this level. 
1Principles of Cognition. Spearman. ;.41 
2 Psychological Principles. Ward. on143 .fr. 
34. 
The main point we are making is this:- that in perception there are more than 
two main factors. Here as elsewhere there is an inner view -point which is 
essential to any adequate explanation of the experience.In discussing this 
"1 
point Dr Dreyer says: On analysis the experience will be found to contain 
as least three factors . (.A) A felt impulse ,(B) a visually apprehended object 
or situation,and (C) a feeling of interest or worthwhileness,passing into 
satisfyingness. This is in keeping with the quotation from Ward, the situation "2 
is attended to because it interests the subject. The situation or stimulus 
is but one aspect of the perceptu.?.l experience,and no number of sensations, 
however intense, will yield the other,which is really the essential element 
tt 
in the reaction,and constitute4 the act a rerception. In our every -day 
experience we find this verified.Perception is not a mere blundering Process 
in which through appeal to the sense- organs of any stimulus certain situations 
or objects are cognised. It is a process related to and integral in experience, 
is guided and determined by experience. No one disputes the modifying nature 
of the sensory- pattern,but it is important to note that reaction t© any 
sense impression is determined only indirectly by the sensory -pattern. The 
meaning of the sensory -pattern,which lies in the relation of the object or 
situation to impulse,-- a reLion which we defined as interest- is the 
determining factor. It is surely absurd to ignore this inner,iipulsire, 
affective side,and content ourselves with the analytic description of the 
sensory -pattern. 
There is another point of view from which we can approach this 
subject. Ogden,in an interesting section on the Aesthetic nature of per - 
t13 
ception says: Long before we are able to think about life in general and 
about its problems we are guided in the pursuit of ends that are net com- 
prised within the cycle of a, single Perception. And this guidance is afforded 
not by discernment but by feeling. The conformity of any specific event to the 
impúlses and demands of life as a whole is felt even when it is not discerned. 
It r 
The guidance is afforded by feeling. That is entirely in 
1Inatinct in man.Drever.p 133. 
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keeping with our analysis. There is the primary worthwhileness or meaning, 
and it is that which really constitutes the primary aspects of tI:ie per- 
ceptual prOce5U. It is not,wc admit,the whole process. There are meanings 
acquired t h cough experience,_Lr1d thus the act of perception rcay ìnd deer 
possess primary ,and secondary meaning. We Liez of tMs secondary meaning 
as derived neanii'lg,arising as it does from past experience or experiences,. 
But $11ch derived meaning,present though it be, in noway invalidates the 
claim that apart from thee first or primary meaning the process of perceiv- 
tl 1 
ing is incapable of explanation. The readiness to perceive this,or that, 
or something eise,points to a selective factor, the toots of which go back 
It 
to end lie deep in the instinctive nature of man. The contribution of the 
background of experience,. ,nd . le,n' s impulsive tendencies are, in ne wise, 
;. ,Zegligible factors in )exception. The fact that we are ready to respond 
to some things and not to others is not due, to any mere growth of habit. 
That explains very little. 'ale must for the selective factor go hack to the 
instinctive tendencies themselves. 
It is really the failure to take this genetic and organic 
view that has hampered and distorted sa much of our study of the higher 
thought processes,and coloured so rtiany of our theories of meaning with 
logical presuppositions. Perception of an object : r situation ,if it is to 
be more than a mere that,rnust be shot through with valur,:.nd this in 
relation to the life- interest. In short,perceptien is really perception 
of meaning,and this we held is,in its primary nature, due to affective 
factors. 
Affection and Perception. 
It will be profitable for us ,before proceeding furthur to diseuse in more 
detail the affective factor in the perceptual process, It will rely in Talc - 
9,, 
ing clear our thesis of affective meaning. Fro71 the point of view of 
to-OLLciv 
analytic psychology perception is,at the core,a sensory phenomenon topt::e 
ohenomena of affection :_tnd imagery are added. That does not imply that 
l.psycil,ology dnd. Fúuca tion, Ogdenapol,7l. 
G do do do o 
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affection is either ] ;iullly, or in time , 4ti% process posterior to the 
sensory phenomena. The explicit side we can analyse and describe in such 
terme as sensory phenoniena,but the implicit or inner aspect is not so 
easy t) describe. These are not perceived,aithough integral to the 
process of perception. It is this implicit side that is the affective. 
By its very nature it is difficult te describe, In all experimental 
work on the thought processes it is the elusive factor that we find 
quite impossible to kooserve. The mere non- ohservence,however,is 
.ot an evidence that the affective factor is absent. In any purely 
cognitive description of the percept Arve have but the skeleton of 
experience. One find ,3 this over and over again in the work undertaken 
in the laboratory. It always falls on the subject side.If ,however, 
a.s we have stated the readiness to respond goo back to and ii e4 deep in 
mans instinctive nature it is evident vvhereever theA :>>v3 s tiiilulted 
sr, active affective factors are yoreserito It is these which give glow and 
colouzr to thF perception,and in our view' furnish the primary meaning. 
.tn illustration of the affective factor in the perceptual process 
9 9 
is _found in H.J.Watt's Sensory basis and Structure of knowledge. 
"1 
He says, A situation must be brought about that prompts the animal 
to move of itself ,and the outcome of the movement must be sooner or 
later the satisfaction of some appetite or instinctive tendency, Sight 
and sound,etc, by merely varying together do not form percepts. There 
must be some current of nature, reflex or spontaneous action, in which 
the ser tions of sight and sound as well as r ovement slay run out and so 
become the conditioning stimulus in the primary current of action. It is 
admitted t hat all parts of the psycho- physical. +l.echanism are autono- 
mous arid contri'oìitary,but the largest part -the really determining part 
99 
comes fro ri the instinctive tendency. This is simply a statement 
ALA 
indicating the central place a passional. element4 in the total behav- 
iour. 
i Sensory bails and Structure of 1,_nowledge. ZO*, 
3 7 . 
Sensation and Perception. 
Much of the difficulty snd controversy about perception huas arisen 
becsuse of ambiguity in the terfflsr employed. The most alnbigu.ous is that 
, 1 
Of sensation. This term is really ty_picel of t P pñA:tQsaphica,l bias 
that, has coloured so mu.ch of psychological enquiry. It is extremely 
difficult to arrive at any exact definition of the term. That combined 
wit:rs fse-t that it rias an a,tomietic flavour nakes one feel that it 
would be well to discard it altogether in psychological study. In an 
article in the Am erican journal of Psychology, vol.3J.no,2. ,11.M.Ogden 
il 
raises tl _is A.ses t i on under the form of a discussion entitled: Are 
there any sensations? He is,ef course, arguing from the stand -point of 
the Gesstaltpsychol' gie. The suggestion is ceetainly of interest. The 
term certainly must either be revised in content or else discarded 
altogether in the interests of accurate psychological terminology,and 
that for various reasons. 
ln the first place it is more or less a terre borrowed from i 
philosophical discussions. Prof. Spearman says The concept of senssati:>s 
rose out sf a metaphysical diffi culty, and can be traced throughout 
tis.e history of philosophy frsm t'-e sophists to the present day. How1by 
some means/ to capture the absconding real thing is , of course, the task of 
,i 
philosophy, and various have been the paths of attempt. After outlining 
It 
these attempts he says, to meet the difficulties +h.e plan usually adopt- 
ed by osyc h o logy,and even by conilon-sense in its tol e rant,all embracing 
n 
and nothing reconciling way,has recourse to this concept of sensation. 
It is taken as being . some kind of state into which the stimulus brings the 
sub ject,but by this conversion it becomes sensory experience: that is to say 
something lived undergone,enjoyed and the liketi.The other definition ( as 
n 
knowledge) :seems to have arisen only through popular confusion. There 
we have one indication of the difficulty,and an attempt an ddef.ibition. 
If we turn to one who writes as a philssopher,?rof.Kemp Smith we find 
that sensation has a twofold content, that is, we can distinguish two 
04, 
aspects; the process of sensing and that which is ssensed,sensarn. 
1Principles of Cognition. Spearman.p 43. 
2 do do do 
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These are some indications )f the difficulties of definition on shat 
we te°rYO tIse epistemological side. 7e do not sate much better on the 
psychological side. In many cases the philosophical bias is evident,and 
we get are atomis3tio r ,int of view quite out of keepins with experience. 
More ®ever the term suggests too much the passivity on ties Y r anic side. 
which we found to 44 elite opposed to a true description of experience. 
1 
Stout in his Manual, indicates anotIser -psychological difficulty. He 
speaks of the feeling -tone of sensationo.r in later editions .of the same 
work, of the affective -tone. The feeling or :effective phase we held fells 
on the subjective side,and unless we interpret sensation as indicating 
some stateinto which tile stimulus brings the subject we cannot see how 
the phrase can stand. 
Or again, the term has lead to are externalisation that y ieldb 
an intellectud,&i :stir view- point in which the organic nature of experience 
is ,if not lost, ler?szt., obscared. The tersi is altogether so unfort;unater 
in its history and content,that it would be well to leave it aside al- 
together. The psychological act is adequately described in the terms 
we have discussed such as, situation,response,and. experience. 
In mentionir _ ^t.leAarticle on Are there any serlsa tionf we said 
the >.t his discussisn centred round the Gestaltpsychologief We find there 
an additional co°,ifirmation of our argument. The main protest cf this 
school is against the , ugges ion that a percept, or for that part any men- 
tal state, or piece of behaviour, is nothing more than a group of sensations. 
What is termed the bundle hypothesis is ruled out altogether. An illustra- 
tion of their argument from the experimental side will take clear the 1203- 
ition. This is taken from a recent work by Drs Collins and. Dreyer of 
11 
Edinburgh university. Take for exalmpls the fence phenomenoz.Fi;ure(5 ) 
given opposite, snows eight lines,aa,bb,CC,ai1.d dd,` o drawn that the dis- 
tance between a and a, and b and b etc, iws less than the distance between 
a and b. Sensationally we should get merely eight lines in pairs with the 
1. Manual of Psychology. Stout . p 224. 
2. Experimental Psychology. Collins and Dreyer. p.1O7 




Or take a child imitating an adult walking, it is the whole actnot a series o 
of discrete or separate movements that is imitated. These illustrations are 
given not simply to set forth the Ge Malt theory,bi.zt to indicate how that 
from this point of view our thesis of affective meaning is confirmed, 
lhis e admit is no part of the Gestalt theory,and it i,s not 
to be taken as indicating that KoLfkaj or any of his school are likely to 
accept our conclusions. But the argument set forth confirms our statement 
w ¡c- 
made earlier that the presentation itself i, not sufficient the_Aenergy 
that traces out the pattern. There is the arousal of a definite affective 
tendency in the appetitive tendency of hunger in the case of the ape.It 
is not difficult to imagine a state or situation, in which the presence of 
food will issue, in no behaviour. The presentations. r. emz ins a mere that. 
The inner or organic condition i9 lacking. The behaviour in the case of 
Ko hlevr ape is not due sim ily to the presence of the stimulus food, 
but to the arousal of the affect, coñáecluent on a state of dissatisfaction, 
in the instinct condition of ,.tun er. It is the affective factor that 
gives to the synthesis the nieanin and thus leads to >r issues in satis- 
faction. 
In closing this section we may say, t î.a -t k rLile we have analytically 
distinguished in pe.rcepti on, irn_pulse, interest,and presentation. it is only 
in abstraction we have done so. In the concrete behaviour the act is a whole 
and the three are necessary constituents within that whole. To separate 
outs or to exclude anyone, is to abandon any real attempt at a complete 
pwycholagical description. If we direct attention only to tr1e objective or 
cognitional aspect we can give no rFal explanation of the different inter- 
pretations of the same situation by two different individual,o, or by the 
same individual at different times, In relation to every si tlaation, whither 
we cognise them or not ,ve ex,oc:z fence impulse and inteerest,and to deny 
their existence is to deny experience altogether. It is eelu lly futile to 
41. 
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say they have no determinative part it the meaning of the situaticn.`T'hey ar 
integral and constitutives of the experience as such.leaning is never given 
by some sort of incomprehensible back- stroke. It is involved in the 
perceptual experience from the beginning, tind,,Without i .t, perception is 
impossible. Desc ,rtes,who at the beginning was criticised for the bifur- 
cation of body and mind,has a very interesting paragraph in his discussion 
"1 
of the passions. He says, .the sight of an animal is a perception rio which . 
is acded the emotion of fear,with the consequent tendency to flight or 
defe =nce.This process does not involve the intellect. The passions do not 
proceed from the reason or the Till. The full perception of t bur tient ,l 
state is rather the effect than the cau -te of our bodily movements. It' iS 
in this realm of the passions, the sphere of of 'ecti on that we find what is 
really the meaning of the situation.In perception 'the reaction i:3 really 
to a meaning,which is the ground of the experience. 
Before passing to the second level of conscious life common- 
ly designated the Ideational level. it is essential, even at the risk of 
sacrificing unity, to discuss from the affective view -point the processes 
of attention LLnd association. We are not discussirig,in any elaborate way, 
the psychology of either,but indicating how, in the development of our 
thesi s, bhe Éff ective .factor is central :.ir both . -)I't )ils difficult to place 
this discussion elsewhere,and the passage to ideation would b6, impossible 
without it. There is really no break in the continui t& Jf ti c- argument. 
1. Passions, Descartes.lo.l07. 
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A discussion -)f the affective factor in. Attention,and As ociation. 
The Affective factor in Attention. 
In this discussion we are not,:;.s stated,corïcwrned with any general ana- 
lysis of the atteetieq# process. We are viewing the subject as it is 
organic to our thesis. Attention is Tnte}gral toLand lies at the root of/ 
all we have said about perception. As Ward _says a situation is 
attended to because it int .rests the subject ,and that statement makes 
it imperative that we should consider theta phase of mental life. 
The conditions of attention may be conveniently ditided into 
two groups;the objective and the subjective. The objective conditions 
require little elucidation. The very word attention denotes the pres- 
ence of cognitive factors. The stimulation of the sense- orans by some 
object or situation is the external Of obblective condition of attention. 
But even that statement requires some qualific4ation.There are, every day, 
st±i ulati ®ns that fall below the thre;shold,. nd. do not enterconsciouz- 
ness,ùnd to which no attention is given.That indicates that intensity 
'has swething to do with attention. One admits that,and yet the fact 
that a weak stimulus may by its very nature compel attention when. a 
stronger may nott points at once to the fundamental nature of the 
subjective conditions in determining =attention. The subjective condition! 
such as the predominant interest of the rn rment,k td. the arousal of 
some instinctive tendency,,: have more to do with the direction and 
the sustaining of attention than the objective conditions. Curiosity, 
which is an instinct conditimn,may, if aroused 9c etermine attention 
to a weak stimulation..Even in the case of a sudden noise the ,e ct of 
attention ir1Z.y be cue t) the L.rousal of a certain affective condition, 
arising froi-ri fear or some such instinctive feeling. 
From a purely biol®rical view -point :It tEn.tion may simply 
be the adjustment of the organism to its en.vironment,but t%le psycñ.olo- 
ical account goes deeper. The adjusment of boeiljt and mental 
attitude is to be in adequate relation to the appropriate stimulus. 
i 
Y 
when this occurs at the conscious level we se, that the oranism attends 
to the stimulus; the. t the object is ira trF sting to the creature. What after 
9,11 is an interest,but the readiness to function of an inner disposition 
or tendency# Our prevailing clispositions,moods, o.r instinctive tend.enc ±es 
1 
p,r.P all effective in determining attention. ntcnells in his book, The 
Structure and growth of Mind , describes instinctive beha..visur ao the 
,+th instinctive prosecution of the interest of a situation. This interest 
(,f the situation does not lic in the objective field,'out in the felt rela- 
tion of impulse to : ituatisn. This interest is determining attention. 
But not only is the directive nature of attention Jo d' ter- 
rained, sustained attention is due aleo to the same affective conditions . The 
illustration we gave of the stoat pur.`suint, its prey supports ti¡!i'.J view. "The 
8ust.ei.nec± attention,which marks the prosecution of the hunt after the prey, 
it die to interest,and not eir;lply to the characteristic behaviour ,f tele 
the prey. The whole is governed by the interest evoked,and the affective 
bonds established between the instinctive tendency and the object .Trie 
attention alters in focus only when satisfaction is achieved, 
A furthur point, which the same illustration makes clear i the 
selective factor in the atterttivN oroces . Other objects may and do often 
Cross the path. )f the hunting, animal as it pursues its prey,'but these, so 
t11e Stoat is concerned ,Axe non -existent. This is alen the line 
of dissociation at a primitive level. That in no way disputes or minimises 
the argument for a la .er and more complex emotional displacement, but it 
ins interesting to note the affect, operating as integral to the attentive 
process 1producing this dissoci, t í-1t, 'î -sect in the interests of the econoeiy 
of our mental _Life. 
9 
.Rignano inehis work The Psychology of Reasoning ,supports thie, 
point of view. It is unnecessary to follow him throughout his afeument.Tn2 
his discussion 9r the relation between attention and con; cioumness he argues 
that the impossibility of more than one affective tendency to bP operative 
at any . one time results in the impossibility of giving heed to more than 
1. 
1. Structure and growth of Mind, Mitchell. pl25 . 
2 Psychology of Rea,sOnin; Rignano. /c;(C- 
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or1e object at a timeej, plurality of stimulations of nerves may 03-Fxist, 
but they affect consciousness only by 'Leans or one at a time. The reason 
is that the organism is enga -Le with each conscious state,eLnd cannot be 
attending to two things in the same instant. This gives te us the affect- 
ive background and condition of the focus of attention, Attention i$ 
never divided or dispersed. If it is ..sufficiently intense ; it Will con- 
tinue to be directed toward.a.given object.If it is less intense it will 
alternate from one object to another according to tl -±e prevailing interest. 
This latter condition gives rie t the suggestion of dual attention. 
In thus stating1 what we consider to be, the determining con- 
ditions r e.ttenti.on as interest,and therefore affective, we admit that 
three cannot be supported by any purely introspective examination. That 
as a rule,yielde only the objective data. To introspect the affective 
phase is to bring about its d 
S ppearance,The particular affectivity 
gives place to another involved in the act of introspection. The interest 
has changed, and with it the affectivity. But tia.at admission does not 
involve the denial of the interest factor in the attentive process. To de- 
ny it is to empty experience of any real content,and to leave out cif e_. '.. 
account the directive and the regulative factor in the process of atten- 
tion. It is not difficult to see how, i f this point of view with regard 





Watt,says,in his latest work," We may place: recognition next t) 2ercepti®n. 
But h w shall we explain the experience(' part of its explanation consists 
in merely placing recognition in the system 
or all experience we call 
mind,and the rest consists in stating precissely what relation recognition 
has to its lower neighbour. perception. The process of recognition,v e may 
infer, is that in which a pe-rce)± fcl`ming,or bein actuated ,in c )nnection 
with one : c°' t of energic sources (u ppetite, instinct, etc.) suddenly finds 
itself running in lines of a previously formed percept that admits an in- 
n 
i ®w of energy from some o ,her source. Watt here touches a point critical 
to our furthur investigation of the subject in hand. Te are appraoching the 
subject with which he is dealing from a different angle,but it is suggeat- 
ive,that this writer in discussing recognition, sh)uld indicate that, like 
the percept, it is related to specific energy sources.However high the 
level of psychical integration we cannot escape fry. Yes. this organic view. 
Watt,furthur ,states that the energy source activity is the result of 
2 n ti 
a definite stimulation of its own. Mere presentation in itself is not suff- 
icient to yield thw energy that informs tl1e object with the fact of re- 
cognition. It is the arousal of a certain interest that opens the sluice 
19 
as it were, and given rise tp the experience.Thi i proceee of recognition is 
based on association,ancl it is to a discussion_ of that aspect of 'eental 
activity we now proceed. 
Ideal representation is based on the reinstatement and 
recognition Least experiences in the form of images,an.d that not in 
isolation, but in context of relationships. It is necessary in tr .oileg 
the pi ce of affection in the higher levels to discover its place in the, 
process by which rein statement takes place: that of association. There is, 
as Freud, suggests nothing arbitrary or acciderit_al in mental life,and we are 
are not likely to find any adequate account of reinstatement of past ex- 
ieriencess apart from enquiry into the organic factors that determine them. 
l.Sensory Basis and Structure of wi dLe. u,J.Wa tt. p.210 




Oonsered experiences are not stored up somewhere in an ine,ctive con - 
dition,in a condition of hibernation,so to speak. It must be remembered 
that, they repre_.ient mociif. icatijns of a living system,and partake trerefl 
fore in its life activity." They are not uninfluential in dCCerrnining 
the present activity of the orvanism.Yesterday is to- morrow, to uae 
rather a cryptic saying. We may divide the year into days, weeks,and 
months,but time is continuous. We may separate a novel intO.;chapters,or 
sections,but the .story is continuous. There is ,deeper than they teeming 
superficial'. links, a n uncerlying .stery or pu..ri)ose that io the ultimate 
bond..Aseociation may be regarded by eome a3 dependent pri rf arily on 
04ysioloEical . conditions e being,ao James suggests a particular c.i. 
df the law of neural b.abit,but that does not carry us very far in 
a psychological description of the experience. 
Stout, in his Manual, writing on the associative process 
a 
mention two different firms, s3imit,4Lrity lend contiguity. There are 
other ,o- called .:,eoondary laws such as primacy, re.cency,vividness,and 
frequency. We inention these laws as indicating respectively tie, 
r:ore cu;erfici.:,1 and fundamental laws as stated in the psychological 
text -books. Neither give8 to us ,what we think, the fundamental factor 
in the associative pr ce:siss. They di not tell us why or bow experiences 
are significantly related. Similarity on the objective side does not 
provide a bond uniting two experience e. . It is not similarity,but a 
community of interest that unites .Contiguity ,if we accept Stout's 
addition of interest is much nearer the truth. Dr Drever,hotTrever , 
suggests -e H .) r.,-: fundamental law of , yste ic rela.t i on,and states the 
law ae follows: Our ex'oerierlces based en a contiguity of interest tends 
to form wholes or systems. The result is that as3soci.aLive bonds are 
formed between wholes,and their constituent e1.t°ments,,LnC; between the 
1 .nychol.gjr ref Every-day Life . Dreyer .113 . 
2.Manual of Psychology. St Jut . p.440. 
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con itiuents and the wholes.. The truth is that the fundamental principe 
l 
of association is not contiguity in the strict eense,but rather cantig-- ,i.'' 
uity of interest.The stronger the dominant interest,the conative ten- 
dency guiding the whole process, the a tore selective is the revival a e t 
to bey. 
The so- c- alled secondary laws are not any more - satisfactory. We 
admit tk , -t recency,vividness,etc are conditions favouring recall, 
but they give us no insight int s th. e fundamental b anr' s by which ex- 
periences are associated. These bonds lie deeper than any of the 
characteristics rriarkin`; the immediate n.uture of the experience as 
indicated in the laws suggested above. The critical term is all the 
foregot, at-tements i.3 that of interesst,and it is in the examination 
of this we shall fired the real factors in the associative process. 
1 
Stout speLks, of the dominanr, interest,and_ says that the stronger the 0 
" 
dominant interest the more selective the revival is wl t to be. What 
then is the ne,ture of this interest ?.It is not found in the objective 
aattern of the experience;but in the org:_.nic needs,.and tendencies, 
and the pue)oses in view. Here we are in touch with the feeling e.spect 
of mental activity,and guided in our search, for the determining 
factors, to the affective phase of our ex_-oerirnce. 
The morn .eeCeota'ble statement of the laws of association im 
that ggiven by Bad-ouin in his chapter on Affective A.: s sX!cation" , in 
» 1I 
his book, Studies in Psychoanalysis. He ,states t'ne lass as follows: 
2 ,) 
Amont;; the images 3u.scentible of association(by the well-nown laws of 
similartty:Land contiguity) those,which have a common feeling tone will 
the most readily become associated. ComMenti.rZv on this,Badouin says. 
117 
Underlying the a6scclationi5ts doctrine is implicit loostul-te that 
the r eprr,Serltative life _Le self-exl3licable:, tht the fantasies of the 
imagination can be made com1oreherisibl. study of images. People 
came to realise that this doctrine was inadequate and arbi trary ,a,nd te 
suspect where the magnet v,,ae t:) be l'ound, tte., in the affective life. It 
. Manual _f :Psycholog; Stout op -..-40 
?Studies in Psycho-analysis. Ba,douin.p 45. 
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is difficult to account for t'ee variety,a,nd ,at times, what -,e e,1s to be 
the ir.r.atonality of our experience,unlesn we twtin to this deeper point 
of view. The analysis of thr representative elements in any reproduced 
experience is never, in itself, _ 3tifficient to yield ::-; cl-1e to the magnet 
that draws cax17erierlceo into relation and fuses them with each other. The 
11 
1 
magnet ia found in the common feeling tone. Rib®t,says Representations , 
which have been accompanied by the »ca,;1e af f'Fyc ti ve u tate , te r!d henceforward 
tto bbe a.ssQC4ated.Their affective similarity î.y1 ïs the link between the 
N 
8e1rateioexperiences . This is quite a different thing from the law 
of sirnila±it;yr e.z usually stated. The fact i:3 that states of conscious- 
ness a.,^e not linked together because they have previously occurred 
toge ther,nor because 1r02 E,rcFy i ve similarities between them,but becaue 
they have a common affective tone. An experiment conducted by the ,)res- 
ent writer indicates the accuracy of the foregoing :.rgument. A subject 
confronted with a definite sitzwtion found that awing to etr)ng affect- 
ive totZel cer. tain features were not only unattended to,bI_tt actual dis,i oc- 
iati_®n took place. 
T:t,- prscesks :described as dissociation is operative in every-day 
life,and,while its rela,t_i©n ta association may be expreet3ed in negative 
furm,it is in the ,mental life a positive process. It really strengthens 
the argument for the place ahd power of the affect in the processes 
sf reinsta.tecnt,a.d reproduction. Te all know that an intense 4.n°ti®rhal 
experience has the effect of-narrowing consciousness. Certain common 
aspects sf experience are ,for the tuile being .completely inhibited, 
NW- 
and *her ,,spec ts given prominence. We are4 identifying emotion u:ii te a f fieet- 
ion,"kmt the latter is involved,and lies at the root of the form.er.In the 
whole f experience the affective is nst,nor can be its tctally absent. 
It ma,y,at tinies,be relatively feeble,but it is never uninfluential. 
In association as elsewhere the dominant interest i.e that which ;giiided 
and deter lines the unity and centinh_ii ty of the process. 
1 Creative Imaginati.en. ?ibet. p 109. 
A confirmation of what we term affective as._>ociation is found in the 
study of dreams.This is not the place or the occasion to enter into a 
detailed discussion of this difficult region of psychological enquiry, 
but the mental activity is not separate from, or different from, that of 
"1 
waking life. River's says,The factors(operative in dreams) are not in- 
operative in waking life. Their effects are seen in behaviour,and the 
more superficial ties of the real associative bonds or the value they 
have for the individual. In dream analysis we discover the deeper bonds. 
" 
We may find in waking life the presence of what Freud calls the reality 
n " 
principle,or what River's terms the epicritic level hold: in abeyance 
n a 
the pleasure principle ,or the protopathic level,but the two latter 
are not absent in waking life,nor are they uninfluential, The point i.$ 
that,in dreams, we can discover factors operative in experience,which, 
in waking life,are often concealed. Dream analysis confirms the thesis 
of affective associ.ation,ana is only on ti affective basis that 
such experiences become explicable. One illustration will suffice. It 
" ti 
is taken from Badouin. I awake remembering some fragments of a dream 
t, 
in which I have been guided by a person who was like M.Laederach. In 
real life this gentleman had played a part in a law -suit in which I had to 
defend my i idea of suggestion,which,it seemed, had been regarded as revol- 
utionary. An obsolete law against magic had been invoked by the prosecu- 
tion. The affair turned out all right in the end gut had been very troub- 
lesome to begin with. In half -consciousness of waking I attempt to analyse 
my dream,and, first of all,beneath the name Laederach I hear,as if in 
harmonics,the words Leiderach, Umfrid,Unrat,and Henrath. The strange thing 
is that the closest auditory associat}on is between the first and the 
last words of the series,Leiderach and Henrath. I t seems to me that Unrat 
had been called up by Henrath,and Umfrid by Unrat. At the moment of. wak- 
ing I follow the sequence in the r F verse order .`?mien I have found Henrath 
it seems to me that this had been the name of a man,who,when I was quite 
young,acted as my guide in a foreign town,and cheated me extensively.The 
happenings in this town constituted myt first experiences of serious act- 
ion on my own intiative; indeed they represented - o,one_ of the crises in 
1 .. l _g S - <.,t,e t ,,.c - 




my life,my first vigoro is attempts to shake off the dominance of my 
environment,my first affirmation of any own ideas. The outcome of this 
affirmation was that I had to be cast off by some of the persons most 
dear to me.( I they erceive that the guide Laederach of my dream has been 
condensed with Henrath both as regards personality and name) But my 
dream contained a word play on the name Henrath, for the last syllable 
of this name Rat means in German,adviser,a term,which may well denote a 
guide.I disparage him by calling him Unrat,for I interpret this as 
meaning evil counsellor,before I recall that it signifies filth.But 
Laederach is also evil counsellor,which I express quite simply by break- 
up the name into two German words,Leider Ach(alas). Thus the deeper 
affective tie marked by the superficial associations begin 'to become 
apparent. The word Umfrid,less intimately linked to the others,on the 
sur.face,gives a fuller expression to the deeper ties. Its signification 
in my mind is the opposite of peace,just as Unrat signifies the oppos- 
ite of good counsellor.Umfrid is the name of a German pastor distin- 
guished during the war for the courage with which he championed pac- 
ifist views,a course of action which led to persecution. Vow the ideas, 
which at the time,when I had been acquainted with the guide Henrath, 
had cost me some of the dearest friendships of youth had also been 
social ideas of a pacifist cha- acter,and I had bitterly reflected that 
one who desires peace begins by sowing strife. Asimiliar reflection 
less bitter and more ironical had crossed my mind when I had seen how 
my ideas concerting suggestion,which were benevolent,and were un- 
questionably pacificehad involved me in a fight. The affect,which link - 
the four words, dominated my dream. This rather lengthy illustration, 
worked out with Badouin' s usual careful attention to detail, confirms 
the claim that,in Association we must get behind the recognised super- 
ficial bonds0to the deeper law of affective assóciation.This has a 
direct bearing on the thesis that meaning is affective, indicating,as 
it does,that,even in the more highly complex states, the affect is a 
centràl factor. We pass now to the discussion of Meaning at the 
Ideational level. 
1.Studies in Psycho -analysis, Badouin.p 48. 
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There is in a recent work,which has come to hand just as this section was 
completed,,a very interesting confirmation of the view advanced in the 
Hl 
previous pages. Before describing the technique of word association it 
is necessary to sound a warning note. When a person responds to a stimulus 
word such as tree,with the first word that occurs to him,say, river,it is 
correctly assumed that these words arc- associated with each other in his 
mind ;but nothing is revealed as to the actual formation or process of 
association which is simply inferred with more or less acumen by the 
experimenter. Such inferences are dangerous unless they are assisted by 
careful introspection by the subject,and even then cannot be accepted with- 
out reserve since the ability to introspect is a difficult art. But the 
original association as we have seen over and over again is the result of 
subjective selection by the person and not the natural selection amorst 
words themselves. Word associations are objective phenomena due to subject 
It 
ive causes. We shall see this worked out in more detail when we come 
to our experimental section. Meantime, it is interesting to note this 
confirmation of our point that one must look deeper than the more of 
less superficial bonds for the real process of association. 
1. Educational Psychology. Fox. 218. 
52. 
leaning at the Ideational level. 
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In the growth of experience there takes place what we may term the 
stabilisation of meaning. This is,of course, the product of experience. 
n n 
In our discussion of Meaning and Significance we mentioned that there 
91 
is a primary meaning,which constitutes the response an experience at all; 
something which is the primary tissue of experience. In subsequent 
ba 
po 
experience there is what we termed derived meaning.This acquired through 
experience. Meaning thus becomes stabilised. There is here,as elsewhere, 
a gradual development of Structure ,and there takes place what we term 
the structuration of meaning. This marks a considerable advance in mental 
u 1 
growth. This structuration of meaning crystallises itself out of the 
various stages of development into a definite aymbolpattern of great 
stability and duration- to be changed only in time by the superimposition 
n 
of another symbol. This leads to,what we may term on the objective 
side a greater and firmer articulation,and thus leads on to significance. 
In this the predominance of the cognitive factor often leads us astray 
in our discussion of meaning itself. The symbolpattern,-varies:.in form 
in individuals,and also in relation to the context of experience. It is 
this fact of structuratioh into symbolpatterns,and thus greater ob jectiv- 
atioh of experience that leads so often to the treatment of meaning as 
intentional,and also to the identification of image and meaning,which 
is characteristic of Titchener's writings on the subject. It would be 
interesting at this point to trace the structuration in the growth and 
development of language,and the rise of formal logic,but that is best 
w cam. s,é aa- 
treated at a later stageAthe conceptual process. We pass rather to a 
study of the Ideational process and indicate how this structurat.ioniis 
effective therein,and what bearing it has on the subject of meaning. 
1. Ontogenetic aspects of Meaning.Martin.L.Reymert. 
International Psychological Congress.p4. 19? A. 
Feeling and Imaging. ..... ..... _.__.10. 
There is,as stated,in the previous section nothing accidental in mental 
development. The different levels of conscious experience do not just 
happen,but emerge to meet the growing demands of life, in its relation 
it 1 
to,and struggle,with conditions. Feeling ,which is the first tentative 
step towards supplanting blind struggle among the adaptive tendencies,anc 
which is a regulative factor in all our activites,is not adequate to 
a complete adjustment of the organism to the environment, In itself 
feeling does not provide an adequate explanation of our activities.t 
The affect,which,which in point of experience i3 the initial core of 
primary meaning,does appear to relate to 3ituations,which are,as a 
t, 
matter of objective fact exceedingly different. Thus the organism 1list- 
akenly strives to put an end to a conflict in a manner,which,while 
perfectly adapted to one situation,is extremely ill- adapted to another. 
That is a matter of common experience. The conflict is not resolved on 
the subjective side alone,but in the power to call up the experiences 
which conflict,and by examination resolve it. Thus comes the image,and 
we see at once the biological reason for the close connection between 
image and affect,and the tendencies for images to arise when normal 
}i 
action is arrested. The image represents a new stage in mental develop- 
ment. We see the growing predominance of the cogntive aspect of mental 
life,which,in the end promises the greater intellectual control. There 
is a greater objectivation of experience,and the defining of situations 
within a systematic objective pattern of expereince. It is right to 
note,however,that new speciauisations do not shut us off from the 
earlier and more primitive modes of response.It is easy to see that the 
growing predominance of the cognitive factor may diminish the feeling 
phase,but at no time can we say that experience is passionless. 
Another point of view from which to approach this higher 
level is,that apart from the emergence of this power of imagin : and 
reinstement experience would never pass beyond the level of perception. 
1. Feeling,Imaging,and thinking, B C Bartlett.British Journal of Pscyh. 
vol.xvl part 1. p 16.1925. 
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As a merely perceiving self I am bound to this desk,to this room,but 
with the power of recall and imaging I can i.live through scenes of 
past ädientures. More than that reasoning becomes impossible. There is 
an interesting pathological c-Ise on record,which indicates the kind of 
consciousness a purely perceptual one would be. That is the case known 
as Grashey's patient. His consciousness was pureply perceptual,his 
ideal representation impaired. When asked the colour of snow he could 
not tell unless actually looking lt snow. 
It is not essential,however,that we should pursue this line 
anyfurthur. We are simply indicating that mental growth is a growth, 
and the successive steps in development are not soparable,but together 
form the whole of. experience. The emergence of the new is not, the des- 
truction of the old. There is continuity in the mental life. The fact 
that in the interests of our increasing adaptability to our environment 
new levels emerge is no reason why even at the higher level primary 
meaning is not present. It is not displaced by either the derived 
meaning or by significance,but all three are constiuents within the 
more complex stage of experience we have reached. The point we must discus 
is the way in which there is a greater objectivation of experience, 
and the grmwth 
r 
the cognitive factor. There is also the relatively 
greater detachment from the object or situation , which seems to 
reduce somewhat the felt relationship between object and organism.This 
detachment seems to give rise to the idea of a field of knowledge 
the meaning of which is really cognitive and relational within a system, 
and thus independent of the affective element ,which we found so 
characteristic of earlier behaviour. 
Hitherto we have been discussing reactions due to the 
stimulations of the sense- organs.We were in contact with a definitely 
controlling medium,and the organic relation could not be ignored. Now 
we are discussing a processlwhich reaches its end without or independent- 
ly of the external stimulation. Hence the greater degree or freedom. 
But,notwithstanding, this detachment of the organism from situation,we 
find on examination that the real core of the reaction is not without 
its ',oars ñal element,its affective colour,and centre. 
56. 
The Image and 1:eaning. 
We can pursue this investigation in the examination of the nature and 
function of the image. The image proper must be distinguided from what 
is known as the after -image. .After - images are both positive and negative, 
and are due to the stimulation of the sense organ.They diminish and 
fade away. Thay are really what Stout calls after- sensations,and do not 
come within the purview of our argument. The primary memor.y image has 
the same attributes and aspects as the original sense exoerience.By that 
is meant that an imaginal tone has approximately the same pitch as the 
originally experèenced tors:.The image is just the reproduction of the 
original senne- experience in that forrn,and its function is identical. 
So far as the mental process is concerned the difference lies in the more 
complex and highly developed nature of the mental act. The image does not, 
any more than the original sense -experience or impression provide the 
energy that issues in the resultant concrete experience. The organic 
relationship is the same in the one as in the other so far as the immed- 
iate,content is concerned. The reinstatement of past experiences in the 
form of image or images is due to some psychical activity,and there is 
present in,guiding and directing,such activity a central interest,the 
core of which is passional or affective. I am taking a walk in the country, 
and I come to a stream.Inediately there is aroused the interest of fish - 
ing,and this starts a train of images,which,while in one sense knit to- 
gether by a law of systemic relation are nevertheless due to a deep 
affective bond. The same situation may,so far as the objective elements 
are concerned, evoke a totally different reaction. The primary meaning 
even in the imaginai experience is due to interest.There is also derived 
interest due to expe:W Ince in the past,and there me be significance in 
a wider context of relational knowledge. The point is that for me,as for 
the.other,the objective situation,and the reproduction of the past exper- 
iences are conditioned by a central interest. It is this felt interest 
arising froma relation between impulse and situation that gives primary 
meaning. 
We are not,in any way suggesting that the image is the meaning, 
>7. 
Meaning,/ 
nor do we identify image and idea. The image is only one constituent of 
the idea;the other and the more important constituent is the meaning. 
The image is,if we may employ the figure,the vehicle of the meaning. 
It suggests or plays it part in the experéence which has meaning in 
and for the organism. It is that which gives the image its place and 
value in the more complex process of mental life which we are studying. 
This is,weknow,frankly opposed to the position set forth by 
Titchener. In reply to Buhler's statement that it is impossible to 
" 1 
ideate a meaning.Titchener says, I have been ideating meanings all my 
life. meaning is represented in my consciouness by another of these 
impressionists pictures. I see meaning as the blue -grey tip of a kind 
of scoop.which has a bit of yellow above it( probably part of the handle 
and which is just digging into a dark mass of what appears to be plastic 
naterial.It is conceivable that this picture is an echo of an oft re- 
peated admonition to dig out the meaning of some passage of Greek or 
a 
Latin. From that passage,and others in the same book it is evident that 
Titchener analyses meaning into imagery. Sometimes he finds kinaesthetic 
il 2 
as well as visual images. Not only do I see gravity,and rnodesty,and 
pride,and courtesy,and stateliness,hut I feel and act them in the 
11 
mind's muscles. Later he says that meaning is originally kinaesthetic. 
We need not,at this point enter fully into the thesis advanced by 
Titchener on meaning as originally kinaesthetic. We can,and I think must 
admit that kinaesthetic sensations do contribute to the meaning,but 
that is far from admitting that image and meaning are identical or 
treat meanina is adequately described in terms of kinaesthetic sensa- 
tion. If we accept the latter,then the former is possible. The image, 
however.so far as the introspective reports are concerned, may have 
different meanings according to the differing context' or circumstances, 
and to analyse the one into the other is to introduce into our descrip- 
tion of expert,e4tce,a It is probable that anyone with keen visualising 
or audit y powers may, through vivid imagery come to iáAXÍI r certain 
images with certain meanings,but that is not the identification of 
image and meaning° 
2Experiinentaal Psychology of. thought processes.Titchener.pl3.ff. 
ü a e eeD 
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The image is the reproduction in consciousness of past experiences; 
the mode of reinstatement. It emerges in the growth anci development of 
mental activity in the interests of the increasing adaptability of 
the organism to its environment,granting a greater range and freedom 
of behaviour,and also power of distinction within the growingly com- 
plex experience. The passional element is,however,.never absent,and it 
is there the primary psychological meaning is found. The structuration 
of meaning on the organic Side, through experience, has at its core 
the affective phase,and even in the later deveopements this is always 
influential. 
Irnageless thought. 
- - W . + -. V . . . rr s - +r A y. y .' IY r. i . ..... 
There is ,at this stage,. a very pertinent and important question for 
psychology,and one that is bound up with any discussion of meaning. It 
is that of imageless thought. A fuller examination of this critical 
problem will be given in the later section on conceptual process,but 
meantime we cannot avoid some reference to it. Itis not a new problem. 
1 
It is as old as Aristotle,and the controversy is not yet settled. 
Aristotle raised the question on an enquiry into the separation of 
soul and body. His conclusion is that if there is any such separation, 
and,if the functions of the soul can be carried on apart fror the 
body,then thought was that process,and was imageless. His .finding,how- 
ever is not in support of that hypothesis. He says that, though `hought 
in itself is independent of the bodily organa,in actual fact in human 
beings thought i3 never without images,and,as images are not independent 
of sense- organs, thought,so far as human beings, is concerned,( - 
e~ t) is not actually carried on without bodiltr, organs. Aristotle, 
/More ,treating this question from the psychological point of 
view,indicates the imageless thought is not a fact of experience. Stout, 
2 
in his Manual is quite emphatic, He says, It is quite inaccurate to say 
that such persons(that is persons who hold that they have imageless 
thought) think without images,for the verbal image is just as much an 
1 De Anima .Aristotle. 
2.Manual of Pscychology. Stout. 4-// 
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image,in the psychological sense,as the visual picture of the object, i . 
All the higher processes of conceptual thinking are possible only by 
means of images,it may be verbal images. Stout in his Analytic Psychology 
seems,to depart from this view. But even a philsopher like Bosanquet 
n 1 
says, I cannot recognise of my own experience imageless thought. I 
believe in all thinking there is imagery. The wh)le difficulty,in this 
eubject,seems to arise from the tendency to isolate one part of the 
mental process,and omit the wider organic context, Thinking is not 
something going on in a realm apart from the organism whose experience 
it is,and it is difficult to understand how images can be dispensed with. 
n 2 
It may be possible to argue that all thought,strictly speaking is image- 
less,for all thought is concerned with propositions sought or found, 
in other words with problems,suppositions or assertions.It is intention- 
al not presentational.But on the other hand all thought is concerned 
primarily and ultimately with images. that is to say with such of 
their relations as are relevant to the immediate problem.There is,as 
Stout states the verbal image at least.A pure intelligence seems,so 
fax as psychological enquiry goes an ideal as yet unrealised. We 
cannot ,as Sydney Smith,in a humorous aside says,get outsidee our skin 
and sit on our bones,nor can we get outside- the organic conditions 
in which mental life is active,and through which it expresses itself. 
If,thevt,4s we conclude imagless thought is as yet an unproved assumption, 
the presence of the image in all thinking confirms the presence of !,the 
affective factor. 
Image,and experience. 
There are one or two furthur points requiring examination. The mental 
process of imagining is really two -fold in its nature or reference, It 
has a direct reference to past experience. It has,through the repro- 
duction of the past,and its relation to the context of present exper- 
ience, a constructive reference to the future. It is,therefore , const- 
luctive as well as reproductive. This function of the imagining process 
confirms the presence and fundamental nature of the affect. What the 
4, 040474AN4 cá9., M d-, t - .i 4- j-1/ 
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psychoanalyst terms the condensation of images lies at the root of 
the constructive imagination,and implies the presence of a central 
affective factor. The original and primary nature of meaning,which . 
we found to be affective, is not changed ,when through reproduction , it, 
experience ,,,io reinstated in the form of image. It is admitted that in 
a train of images, or in trie image appearing in a context of relations, 
there is a greater objectivation ,and consequently a predominating 
cognitive phase. Meaning thus attains a secondary, or significant 
quality. Descartes,with his pronounced intellectualistic bias says 
that,once we have joined corporeal action with a thought,the one 
never presents itself without the other.This implies that feeling 
is always a factor in recall,and that the general principle of n 
association, that among various images susceptible of association 
by contiguity or similarity,those which have a common feeling tone will 
most readily become associated.. 
Furthr the train of images is. not a mere fortuitous 
thing.Transitions in the flow,which mark a break or change in the 
guiding interest are transitions from one train to another,and are 
j. 
determined by the dominant affectivity. I am at a loose end,and tak- 
ing up a magazine turn over the pages idly until I am arrested b 
the title of an article on Eskimo traditions,and the discovery of 
America by Norsemen. This title has for me meaning both primary and. 
secondary. It has meaning because I am deeply interested in old Norse 
history;it has significance because it is related to events in history 
with which I am already familiar. Hence before I read the article it 
has meaning for me both affective and cognitive. As the reading progres 
-es the meaning whole is modified on its affective side by the satis- 
faction of an interest there, the awaking of a new interest here; on 
the cognitive side by becoming continually more definite and partic- 
ularised. The point of this quotation is that the unity and continuity 
of the process,which is not only reproductive of past experience,but 
Z. Instinct in Man. Dreyer. p 139. 
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,through development of new interest,productive of related experience, 
is sustained by an interest,which is primarily affectire,and,through 
integratíon,both affective and cognitive. Our quotation of the 
dream analysis from Badouin confirms this view. In that analysis the 
same fundamental affective interest directs and determines the train 
of the reproduced experiencesyand guides in the formation of the 
context of present experiences. The whole experience is capable of 
rational explanation only from the affective side. 
Our last point is simply an attempt to make clearer that which 
gives coherence to the experience. In all thinking we are face to face 
with a definitely selected,and more or less chherent train of images. 
This pattern of context is not explicable from the objective side 
alone.The formation of disposition through past experiences afford 
an insight into the structural aspect of the subject,but it does not 
yield any explanation of the dynamic aspect. The psychical core of 
this dispostion,if we trace its growth,is a meaning in and for the 
organism 4- a meaning which arises from a relation of impulse to 
presented situation,a feeling of worthwhileness. That is the genesis 
of experience and the dispos;tion. In the reinstatement of experience 
there is,as Claparede says, an evocation of this interest core,which 
is the energie power behind and in the functional aspects of the 
whole process of recall,and guiding and controlling it. Attention to 
this or that image,wliich is essential in the prosecution of the 
1" And i t 4 on 
general purpose is due to the primary affectivty. 
the primary affective tendency that the coherence or the incoherence 
2 
of the intellectual process depends.But what is this intellectual 
" 
process fol &owed and at the same time ,guided and urged by the primary 
affectivity of the state of attention,which it is the function of the 
primary affectivity to render coherent? In its most typical and fund- 
amental form it is nothing else than the pursmit, on the part of the 
1 Psychology of Reasoning. Rignano.p69. 
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primary affectivity, of a nymber of events or changes,actually observed 
. 
or irnagineci,relative to the object of the primary affectivity. Thus the 
hunter who follows the game with his eye and sees it disappear into a II 
bush, turns his whole attention on the bush;and the almost imperceptible 
movement of the latter assumes greater importance in his eyes because 
he knows drom experience,that it is connected with some interesting 
fact concerning the game,i.e. the movement of the latter inside the 
11 
bush;and its expected exit. There is ,in this quotation both primary, 
and derived meaning.The really satisfactory explanation of the whole 
coherent piece of behaviour is possible only by a recognition of the 
relation to a tendency that is instinctive,and an interest factor which 
11 
is affective. The same applies in other fields as Rignano suggests. 
In the same way the chemist who follows the different occurrences or 
trnasformations of a certain substance,and who sees it dissolve in the 
liquid prepared and heated for the putpose ,fixes thence-forward his 
whole attention on the solution and on every subsequent physical or 
chemical phenemenon that it subsequently presents,because he knows 
that it is connected with the substance which is for him, the object 
of interest,and which he continues to follow even while it is hidden 
11 
2 
from sight. The primary affectivity by a process, which is inhibitory,, 
eliminates extraneous factors,and guides the process to a satisfactory 
issue. Every process is surely in the interest of some end,and is 
never independent of organic satisfaction. This is not a submission to 
an hedonistic psychology that implies naked selfishness. It does not, 
at this level make pleasure or unpleasure the motivating factor in 
mental activity. It is rather the expression of the fundamental 
self tendericies.The sentiment of patriotism,for examply, in its sublim- 
est form is not unrelated to the social as well as the individual in- 
stinctive tendencies. 
i Psychology of Reasoning. Rignano.p 69 
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In the light of our discussion it is not too much to hold that even 
in the higher process of ideation the purely cognitive point of niew 
yields no satisfactory insight into the nature of meaning. Theenergy 
or drive is guided by and relative to what we term the interest of 
the situation, and is affective. It is the affective factor that 
gives primary meaning,and is involved in every later significant 
relationship. . 
64, 
Section on Experimental Evidence. 
E5. 
It is expedient,even at the risk of breaking the continuity of the argu- 
ment,to turn to the experimental evidence in support of our thesis of 
affective meaning. The experiments follow the main lines of the discussion. 
We begin with an investigation of the place and function of feeling in 
behaviour and from a study of the primary nature of response,pass to an 
examination of the higher processes. Such a programme may seem to be too 
ambitious,but,if we remember that we are conducting a specific enquiry into 
meaning,we shall realise the limits of our investigation. Our experimental 
work will,we hope, achieve a twofold purpose. It will,we think, not only 
prove our thesis of the affective nature of psychological meaning,but also 
lead up to a discussion of the conceptual process. 
The following experiments were conducted in the Psychological 
laboratory of Edinburgh university,and were spread over a period of six 
months. The subjects were of two quite distinct classes. One class con - 
sisted of male and female students who had a very brief acquaintance with 
experimental methods.;the other consisted of experts,including some honours 
students and lecturers. The reasons for this diversity in qualification in 
the subjects are as follows; (1) There is a very real difficulty in 
assessing the respective values of subjects for work of this kind. It is 
essential to rely largely on introspective reoorts,and in this connection 
the limitations of beginners are obvious. They have not realised the need 
for,nor acquired the skill,,n,giving a detailed and accurate account of the 
factors involved. There is also the tendency to some unconscious qualifi- 
cation of the evidence either from suspicion or nervous apprehension. 
(2) The experts,skilled in the methods and the art of introspection,are 
more placid in their approach to experimental work,but they have also some 
limitations. There is a tendency to bias, and the possibility of giving 
reports more in accordance with their own theories on the subject treated. 
The personal point of view has often to be discounted. Introspection 
on the part of the expert very often borders on inference. Bias may and does. 
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often manifest itself in both types. The choice of subjects,however, 
from both sections enables the operator to check reports,and by comparing 
the evidence eliminate some of the faults. The difference in the reports 
by different subjects,and by the same subjects under different conditions 
and with different apparatus helps to,if it does not entirely,eliminate 
the personal bias . 
Subjective and Objective difficulties. --------- ...... .......... - ......... -------- 
Subjective difficulties have been partly noted above. They are largely 
bound up with the individual experience and psychological make -up of 
the subject. Adaptability,resulting from the repetition of the experiment, 
does,in the later stages, affect the report. Yatigue,d.ue to the length 




A cardinal failure in experimental psychology is its remoteness from 
" 
practical life. It is difficult to get,in the laboratory,the conditions 
operative in ordinary experience. Surroundings are more or less artificial, 
and the concentration necessary imply a strain,which,if not altogether 
absent from ordinary life,is not so prominent. This latter condition 
may,however,prove of value. We may be able to discover factors influential 
in the field of consciousnees,which are often unnoticed in ordinary life. 
One found,for example,that the ticking of the stop -watch in one experiment 
was a distracting factor,but its use in checking the time of the response 
was essential to an understanding of the nature of the mental process. 
The foregoing are the more general difficulties operative in all 
experimental work. 
Difficulties incidental to the special type of experiment employed. 
In the experiments conducted on the Galvanometer,which form the first 
part of the report we found peculiar difficulties.The central difficulty 
l'Introspection as a method in Psychology. Koffka.British Journ,of Psch. 
'/f _X2 /q7 /k, 
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lies in the fact that there are four varieties of feeling. This difficulty 
n 1 
is present in all experiments on the affective processes. The varieties 
of feeling can be enumerated as follows. (1) So- called sense feelings; that 
is agreeableness or disagreeableness attaching directly to the sense exoeri- 
ence.This is a primitive level in the whole reaction or response,and cannot 
be explained apart from the affective toning due to the arousal of some 
affect. (2 )`j'he kind of feeling we call interest with the satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction involved in the reaction. The feeling varies in tone 
according as the interest is gratified or obstructed. This we call the 
primary meaning.13) The higher or more complex state of emotion and mood 
in which cognitive_ factors assume greater prominence. This, of course, 
demands an enquiry into the affective factors involved.(4) Feelings grouped 
together as aesthetic feelings and constitute a problem in themselves. 
The difficulty facing one on the very threshold of experiments 
on feeling lies in the fact that it is impossible to introspect a feeling 
state. It is,however,possible under experimental conditions to discover the 
influence of affective factors. The vital thing to note is that in invest- 
igating the psychological nature of the process involved in any reaction, 
no satisfactory explanation or description is possible from the objective 
data alone. All our reports indicate the presence and potency of subjective 
conditions. These are not always conscious(in some cases they are by their 
very nature incapable of becoming conscious),but they are influential. 
Unless we are prepared to accept the extreme behaviouristic position we 
cannot despite the difficulties set aside the introspective methods.The 
inner view of the response is not less important from the psychological 
stand -point than the outer. This rather lengthy introduction is necessary 
to give the experimental reports a true setting. There are other points 
which will be dealt with as they arise in the experiments. 
1. Note. The outline given follows the main line of that given by 
Collins and Dreyer in their book,ExperiMental Psychology ,p187. 
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We pass now to the actual experiments. 
Details of the experiments. 
Types of experiments, 
(1) The Galvonometer;Psycho- galvanic response or reflex. 
The free -association method by word presentation was employed in eonduct- 
ing this experiment. Its employment ,in this connection,depends on the 
fact that an emotional disturbance,in response to the various words is 
recorded in a way that is impossible in the usual free -association method. 
The emotional excitement is evidenced in certain emotional interference 
with the response,in the length of time and in the type of tl -e response. 
(2) Free -association experiment by word presentation. 
(3) A series of experiments framed on those conducted by Prof.Spearman 
N 11 
and reported in his book on the Principles of Cognition. Details of 
these experiments will be given vJhen we set forth the reports. 
Subjects. 
(1) Three honour's students,male. These students were expert in experiment- 
al work. 
(2) Two lecturers in the Pscyhology dept., Edinburgh university. 
(3) Eight students,four male and four female. These were students in their 
first year of psychology. 
The first experiment; The Psccho- galvanic response. 
This type of experiment has come into much prominence in the investigation 
of emotional states. Our aim is not so much a detailed investigation of 
the emotional state,as an attempt to arrive at the affective and cognitive 
elements in the response,and to assese,if possible,their respective values, 
and predominance. It is really an attempt to discover the nature of meaning 
which,we held, constitutes the response an experience. There are,we know, 
certain organic conditions,glandular and nervous,which are more correctly 
classed aSphysiologieal. These do not,b.owever, give any adequate explana- 
tion of the behaviour. They may and do indicate the difficult nature of 
the task. How far any experiment such as the Psycho -galvanic response 
is capable of yielding satisfactory evidence on the subject of meaning 
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we shall see in the course of our discussion. We can say here that it is 
helpful in bringing into prominence features in behaviour,which are not 
noticeable under other conditions. 
Apparatus arnd. Method. 
Nib 
Apparatus a mirror Galvanometer -see sketch on opposite page .A dial 
resistance with two constant resistances and a suitable shunt,and a batters 
A spot light is thrown on a selle froma lamp and s thus that the amount 
of the emotional resistance is measured. The electrodes are connected 
with the left hand of the subject. There is,however,intervening two 
clothssoaked in salt solttion,a,d the whole is bound with a bandage. 
The variable resistance was adjusted until the current was flowing through 
the Galvanometer. The subjects left hand is placed in a Theatst6ne bridge 
and the wxperiment begun. 
Method. 
The subject was seated in a darkened room,so that the quiet essential to 
the favourable conducting of the experiment !night be secured. The left 
hand and arm bound as stated above was fixed as comfortably as passible. 
Connection was made with the apparatus so that the body's electrical 
resistance would be shown by the movements of the spot- light on the scale. 
This movement unseen by the subject. The operator gave the stimulus- 
word,and the subject was asked to respond immediately. The organic 
disturbance was seen on the scale by the deflection of the spot -light. 
There is always a latent time between the giving of the stimulus and 
the swing of the spot- light.This enabled the distinction between deflect- 
ions due to psycho- galvanic responee,and those due to the accidental 
movements of hands or muscles to be noted. Introspection was taken ,before 
































Before. An attitude of preparedness, involving feeling of strain and. expect - 
£tion. Localisation of feeling in the front of the head. 
At the time. A sudden appearance of image;t ienmeaning,which brought into 
_ .r.y..yy yf.Y.Y...y 
consciousness the response word.. At other times the meaning seemed to pre- 
cede the image,but was not without some definite relation to the stimulus- 
wort. 
After. The general introspection at this stage was simply one of relief. 
There was,however, bound up with that,a feeling of satisfaction or dissatis- 
faction with the nature of the response. 
Before entering on any analysis of the introspection it is 
right to mention that this subject reported a general attitude of indiffer- 
ence to the experiment.This intifference,however, is not a merely neutral 
state,but is influential in the total behaviour. 
Examination of introspection. ..... r .......r Yr..yy .ar.sy.yYP.r.r.r4 
It is essential to distinguish two main features in the intros- 
pection given above: the general situation,and the particular mental react- 
ion. The feeling of strain reported in the first introspection is not just 
relative to the coming or expected stirnulus,but to the whole situation. 
,, n 
The Conscious attitude of the Wurzburg school is not explicable unless 
a view inclusive of more than the particular reaction is taken. There is 
influential,in the behavieur,the wider context,and the response is deter- 
minet by factors inclusive of more than those present in the actual experi- 
ment. The experiment was new;the conditions surrounding the subject,desp- 
its every precaution, such as ta provoke some organic dlisturbance.These are 
indicated by the deflections of the spot -light before the major response 
is made. The point is this that there are certain affective factors due 
to the operation of certain instinctive tendencies which are influential 
in tine total behaviour. There is a condition not unlike fear in a state of 
subconscious excitation. This is ,no doubt ,held in subordination by the spec- 
ific task,but it is a determining factor in the response given. 
The introspective reports confirm the distinction state. 
The more specific or immediate response ie not unrelated to 
the wider context The report given as the presence of image then 
meaning seems to indicate that the word appeared first as a mere "that" 
until the affective interest gave to it a content. Uoreover the very 
character of the response words yield.D evidence of an association based 
not on superficial bonds such as similarity or contiguity but on the 
deeper basis of affectivity. The difference in the measurements are 
indicative of the intensity of the affect. 
Of course the differences in measurements are due to causes 
other than the immediate organic disturhances. There is the organic 
resonance of the one experience which may still be in a state of 
subexcitation. or the reverberations of which are not wholy gone. That 
is one of the unsatisfactory factors in this experiment. There is also 
accommodation which ensues in the succeeding stimuli; an accommodation 
to the general conditions as well as to the particular experiment. But, 
even when allowances are made for these, the fundamental point of the 
definite affective quality Cannot be gainsaid. Take the response to 
"mother " which shows a greater deflection than the others. How do we 
account for that except on the basis that there is a very definite 
arousal of affective experience which gives content and meaning, and finds 
its expression in the word love? The primary note is not one simply of 
a generalised sentiment, but of a particularised experience based on a 
primary meaning to the subject. There is a wider and cognitive 
reference possible, and it may be actual in the subject, but it is the 
development of the former primary meaning. 
2nd experiment. Subject B. 
Stimulus Word. Response Word. keasurement of Deflection. 
War Wounds % Y- G 
Dog Roy Y- 3 
Flower Garden 9- 2 
Mother Home G 
Study Books 
Fish Sea ' 
Introspection. Before: Feeling of strain, but no localisation. 
At the time: There was twice a quite conscious search for response 
word: then the image appeared and word came. Image reported as 
present on every occasion. Emotional disturbance was also reported. 
After: The same as in A: dissatisfaction or satisfaction according 
to the nature of the response, yielding place to a feeling of relief. 
Examination of the, introspection. It is unneces6ary to recapitulate 
the distinction mentioned in our former section. All the responses of 
B are not critical, and some seem to give little or no indication of any 
affective tone. It is however unlikely that it is absent from any. 
The responses where it is most pronouced indicate a state of ernmtion 
f 
due to some very disturbing experience. For example, the first responr 
"wounds" carried with it a feeling of almost physical pain. It 
certainly had a most marked affective tone passing into intense 
emotional stress. Its primary meaning had distinctive organic 
reference; its significance was acquired through later experiences. 
It is easy to dismiss "home" as the response one would expect to "-pother" 
It is a were matter of co- ordination - but that is a superficial 
explanation. We mast take a more scientific view of as':3ociation. 
Co- ordination does not arise from the more juxtaposition of experiences. 
Relations are not mere superficial or accidental ties. There is a 
felt relationship, and this is primarily due to the affective factor. 
The introspection seems to indicate that emotion is never merely organic 
resonance, a sort of back- stroke in consciousness of some organic 
disturbance. It is the product of experience having both priory and 
secondary meaning. 
Subject C. 
Stimulus Word. Response Word. Measurement of Deflection. 
War Fight 
Dog Cat )- 
Flower Rose 9- 3 
.other Father 3 3" 
Study Room 4_ 
Fish River. /6 - z 
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Introsuection. 
Before: Feeling of strain and expectation. 
At the time: A search for response at times and rejection of certain 
suggestions. A feeling of impatience at delay thus caused. Imagery 
present in every response. 
After: feeling of relief. 
Examination of re omits - 
In this experiment the reports differ but little from those in B, 
but the difference though slight is not insignificant. The statement 
abodt the rejection of certain suggested responses indicates the presence 
of certain affective factors the nature of which it is not necessary for 
0 
us to investigate. The point is that here therein indicated a very 
definite, determining interest guiding and determining the response: 
In summarising the results of these experiments certain main 
conclusions may be stated. ('1) There is evidence in support of Rignano's 
argument about the disturbance of organic equilibrium. "Every organism 
is a physiological system in a stationary condition and tends to preserve 
this condition orrestore it as soon as it is disturbed by any variation 
occurring either within or without the organism." This property constitutes 
the foundation and essence of all needs or desires of all the most 
important of the organic processes. All movements of approach, of attack 
or flight, or seizing or rejecting, are only so many direct or indirect 
conseiuences of this very general tendency of every physiological condition 
to remain constant" . That quotation probably goes further than we would 
care to admit. We would amend it by saying that the sit,lation provokes a 
general disturbance of organic equilibriums and thereby a generalised feeling 
of ,uneasiness which, on the presentation of the stimulus, becomes more or 
less particularised, and the effort to regain equilibr ám finds its avenue 
of satisfaction in the response made. This is really affective. The 
equilibrium is, however, not static but dynamic. 
1. Psychology of Reasoning. Rignano 
P. 1 & Fol. 
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(2) The stress reported in the introspections confirm this, and supports 
the statement made earlier that the beginning of the act lies in a 
state of dissatisfaction in the case of one or other of the instinctive 
tendencies. 
(3) The presentation of the stimulus is, in a primary sense, related to 
this felt need or organic impulse. Its place in any objective pattern 
is not at this stage present to consciousness. Relationship within a 
system is a later development acquired through experience. This does 
not involve any cavalier dismissal of the objective factor in the total 
experience. That is admitted, but it points to our conclusion that 
there is a primary meaning which is affective. The reflection which may 
and does find relational significance in the wider context, and the 
ob j ectivati on of the presentational element is of the nature of a 
secondary meaning acquired through experience. It is,however,never 
independent of this affective quality or unrelated to the primary 
meaning. 
Second Series of Experiments. 
This series were of the Free Association by Word exposure. 
The_Apppparat-is: Exposure shutter of the following type. 
(fr 
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The words used were placed behind the shutter,and exposed by the mani- 
pulation of the key. A stop -watch was used to check the time between the 
exposure of the stimulus -word and the response -word. 
Method and purpose. 
56 
The subject was ..seated in a comfortable position facing the shutter, 
and asked to take up an attitude as free as possible from strain.The 
operator informed the subject that the word ready would be given before 
the presentation of the stimulus- word.Simultaneously with the exposure 
of the word the stop -watch was started,rmnd as soon as the response was 
made the watch was stopped. Introspection was taken before,at the time, 
and after the exposure.No further instructions were given. It was felt 
that any other suggestions might in some way influence the result. 
The purpose in view was to discover,as far as possible,what were the 
factors entering into and determining the reactions. 
The subjects were eight students,four male and four feynale,all more or 
less inexperienced in experimental methods. 
The words employed numbered ten in each case,and were the same in each 
experiment. The reason for the similarity is obvious.Comparison of 
results,and the study of the introspection would not yield any common 
conclusion if this had not been observed. Concrete words were used With 
one exception,and the exception was simply to test the amount of tension 
and dissimilarity,if any, between the abstract and the concrete. 
Words as follows. 
Page;Lift;H)use: Sofa: Hill;Long;Stone: Fruit;River;Trail. 
The Purpose. 
444 
To discover as far as possible the nature of the associative bonds which 
1 
the stimulus aroused into activity.Jung,in his association experiments, 
designates one class as ego- centric,where the response implies .subjective 
1 Experimental Psychology.Collins and Drever.p 217. 
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valuation in connection with the situation called up by the stimulus -word. 
It is plainly possible to bring this under the head of inner -association 
if we recognise two groups of inner -association: Association depending 
on thought relations,and associations depending on affective relations. 
This distinction,however,must not be considered. an exclusive one.It is 
based more or less on the distinction we have drawn between primary and 
secondary meaning,and our purpose is to discover how far the affective 
is primary,and the manner in which the one developes into and penetrates 
the other. 
Response is always to meaning in and for the organic life,and our point 
in this experiment is to discover the psychological process in the 
total reaction. This could be done only by taking into consideration the 
introspections of the subjects. The obvious connection from the object- 
ive point of view may be quite misleading and with )ut any real guidance 
as to the inner aspect of the subject's experience. 
The Experiments. 
We have numbered the subjects,and placed them in two groups. 
Male students as follows: 1,11 up to 4,M.: Female 1,F. to 4,F. 



































The introspection on this series may be summarised as follows. 
Before. Attitude of expectation,añticipation; no feeling of strain 
that could be characterised as unpleasant. 
At the time. 
A suggestion of latent energy suddenly released,like trig - 
er action.ïore or less immediate presentation of image of response -word, 
but no conscious rejection of any one word in favour of another,except 
n n It " 
in the case of motot- cycles and West Indies. Where the response came 
readily,as it did in most cases, there was a pleasurable feeling. 
" 
After. A general feeling of relief summed up in the phrased That's one 
over". 
Without making any detailed analysis of this subject's introspection at 
this point it is useful to state the reason for the delay in the responses 
to Hill and Fruit. In one case it was the recall of a motor accident, 
and in the other the fact that some intimate friends come from that part 
of the world. We shall discuss the analysis later,but it is obvious that 
here we have inner associations that are both affective and cognitive. 
The former.however is primary. Even in the alternation,wnhich evidently 
took place, there is a conflict of primary and secondary affectivties. 
Each experience has for the subject both primary and decondary meaning: 
Primary in relation to some definite affective tone and quality due to 
felt interest in the immediate situation,and secondary in relation to 
past experience. Significance is in relation to a wider context. 
2,11. 
Stimulus -word. response -word. Time. 
Page. Boy. 3. 
Lift. Pat Thomson's 2. 
House. Windows. 4. 
Sofa. Seat. 2. 
Hill. Arthur's Seat. 5. 
Long. Knitting needles. 2.5. 
Stone. Plum. 6.4. 
Fruit. Stones. 2.6. 





Before. Feeling of strain,and a general uneasiress which. was decidedly 
unpleasant. 
At the time. Definite image of presented word,but no meaning except in 
a few cases.The appearance of the response- word,a.nd this seemed to give 
n fr 
meaning to both. Except in the response to Plum there were no alternative 
words. 
After. Simply the feeling of relief with a pleasure tone. 
It is obvious that in this experiment there are associations which can 
be classified under the head of subordination,and arise from systemic 
relations. There are,however,in all the presence of the affective factor. 
3,M. 
Stimulus -word. Response- word.. Time. 
Page. Book. 3,5 
Lift. Electric. 2. 
House. Corstorphine. 4. 
Sofa. Sleep. 5.4 
Hill. Valley. 7. 
Long. Short. 6.5 
Stone. Road. 3.A 
Fruit. Orange. 6. 
River. Water. 2.9 
Trail. Indian. 4- 
Introspection. 
Before. Simply expectation. 
At the time. A difficulty in concentration due to auditory stimulus 
of the ticking of the stop -watch. Word dimply noted at first, then image, 
then meaning. No alternations reported. 
After. Relief with pleasure tone. 
This introspection differs very little from the last. 
4.1!1. 
Stimulus word. Response- word. Time. 
Page. Young man. /3.. 
Lift. . Stile. 4.5. 
House. Home. 2.9 
Sofa, Softness. 4. 
Hill. The Law. 3. 
Long Time. 6,5 
Stone. Harrison Park. 5. 
Fruit. Sour. 3.8 
River. Water. 4 
Trail. Man. 6.5. 
Introspection. 
Before: Wandering attention to aspects of the general situation suce as 
room apparatus etc. Effort to concentrate. 
At the time The appearance of image and then repponse; no alternations 
reported. There was, at times, feeling of arrest and unpleasure 






























Before. u,uite pleasurable expectation,and no feeling of strain or wanderini 
Y ti 
of attention. 
At the time. No àiternati. on or feeling of arrest. At times a feeling of some 
thing seeking to enter consciousness, then image,rleaning and response. 
After. Feeling of relief. 
2,F. 
Stimulus -word. ResponseYword. Time. 
Page. Book. 7.5. 
Lift. Hotel. 4. 
House. Craiglockhart. 5. 
Sofa. Rest. 3.5. 
Hill. Valley. 2.4 
Long. Ruler. 6.4 
Stmne. Hard. 2. 
Fruit. Juicy. 3. 
River. Bed. 3.5 
Trail.. Track. 4.6. 
Introspection. 
_.1 
Before. Feeling of strain,and also distraction by surroundings.There was 
a continual effert to concentrate. 
At the time. Definite feeling -tone present in all the responses,varying 
in intensity. Imagery always present,ranging from tactual to visual. 
There was at times F, very pronounced feeling of arrest. 




Stimulus-word. Response -word. Time. 
Page. Boy. 4.5. 
Lift. Jenne's 5. 
House. Home. 3.8. 
Sofa. Custom. 4. 
Hill. Top. 5.5 
Long. Time. 4. 
Stone. Wall. 6.5 
Fruit. Sweet. 3.4 
River. Water. 5. 
Trail. Zane Grey. 3.6. 
Introspection. 
.before. Feeling of strain. 
At the tine. A felt interest present in most of the responses. Image 
often present before meaning. There was,at times, a very definite feeling 
of relations,which preceded the appearance of response -word. It was 
difficult to obtain any insight into the nature of these relations.The 
only statement was that it was a felt one. 
After. Feeling of relief,with an appreciable pleasure -tone. 
83. 
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Stimulus -word. response -word. Time. 
Page. Book. 3. 
Lift. Boy. 3.5. 
House. Windows. 4. 
Sofa. Sleep. 5.6 
Hi_ ll . Top. 4. 
Long. Needle. F. 
Stone. Whin. 3.5 
Fruit. Stones. u. 
River. Water. 5. 
Trail. Trail. 4.5. 
Introspection. 
Before. Feeling of strain. 
At the time. Consciouness of arrest,and feeling of unpleasure until 
response was made. At times there was quite a number of alternatives, 
but selection and rejection seemed to be quite independent of volition. 
After. A definite feeling of dissatisfaction with un- pleasure -tone. 
Discussion of the introspections of the whole series. 
Some of the results are of little value due,no doubt,to the inexper- 
ience of the subjects. The introspections lack detail. On the whole, 
however, there is smfficient data for a careful study of the nature of 
association,the presence and absence of image,and the relative value 
and primacy of the affective and cognitive elements. We canliest state 
'' Cur 'cónclusións in the order of the introspections. 
Before. 
The reports confirm the conclusions reached in the experiments :on the 
Galvanometer. There is a feeling of strain,and the presence of mental 
tension. This means a disturbed organic equilierrium.There was also,no 
84. 
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dou.bt,kinaesthetic sensations entering into and colouring the responses. 
While we do not subscribe to Titchener's view that these kinaesthetic 
sensations constitute the meaning,we must recognise their place in the 
content of the behaviour. 
The steps which the introspections seem to indicate may be stated as foll- 
ows. There is an uneasiness producing a disturbed organic equilibrium, 
and this gives rise to a feeling 4 strain,and a search for some rele- 
vant stimulus. The thresholó. is lowered for the entrance of the relevant x.l 
stimulus.The presentation offers a. means satisfaction and the restor- 
ation of the equilibrium,and this leads to the relief and the removal of 
tension. There is therefore an affective factor present in and giving 
content to the experience. 
At the time. 
The alternatives reported in a number of cases can be explained only by 
the presence of conflict between primary and secondary affectivities,as 
Rignano suggests.The associations which have a common feeli.n_?; tone or are 
united in a common interest ultimately triumph. The satisfaction or relief 
from strain which is sought is not primarily an intellectual one,nor can 
the response be called,in any intellectual sense,a judgment based on 
cognitive apprehension of distinction from,or appropriate relation to, 
the factors in the presented situation. The wh)le reaction is is line 
with the dominant interest,and the strongest affective tendency. No 
study of the objective situation alone will give to us the meaning. 
The response is,of course, not unconditioned by the past experience 
of the sub j ect,as wallas by the immediate purpose.This simply implies that 
both primary and derived meaning are present.In some cases one is more 
prominent than the other.What we must note is that the reaction involves 
the relation between situation and the felt impulse towards it,issuing 
in satisfaction or dissatisfaction,which is essentially affective.The 
wider,and more developed cognitive significance seems to have little or 
no, place. The interest is the governing factor in the whole response. 
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After. 
there is little to add on this aspect of the introspections. The feeling 
of relief is simply a return to equilihriurr,but not as Rignano holds, 
a static state. 
The third series of experiments. 
This third series of experiments were designed to mark the transition 
from the more primitive levels of behaviour to the more conscious processes 
or levels of Perception,Ideation, and Conception. The aim was to make the 
experimental work correspond,as far as possible, with the general argument. 
The Apparatus. 
The same as in the last; Free association shutter and list of words ex- 
posed. 
The Method. 
This was altered in certain important details. In these experiments certain 
definite instructions regarding introspection. The instructions were as 
follows. 
Subjective: A. Tone of experience;pleasure or unpleasure. 
B. Interest in presented situation. 
C. Feeling of organic disturbance;strain,etc. 
Objective; A. As something external,cognised. 
B. As related to or gaining significance from contextual 
relations. 
C. As actually contemplated,and as far as possible the procese 
issued in judgment. 
The Purpose. 
The purpose was to discover the steps in the process of objectivation 
from the initial feeling of uneasiness in which the situation is not so muc 
cognised as felt, to the point when, through psychical integrationl.the 
situation becomes more or less that situation,and has place in a system. 
The words used were as follows: Trnut;Dog;My;Copper; Daisy; Body;Lion; 
Money; Sleep; Thrush: Fox. 




The subjects in these experiments were both experts in experimental 
work,capable of giving accurate and detailed introspections of their 
experiences. 
Introspection was taken before,at the time,and after. the presentation of 
the stimulus -word. The introspections were written by the subjects. 
Experiment A. 
Stimulus -word. Response -word. Time. 
Trout. Fish. 3. 
Dog. Chien. 4.5. 
My. Son. 4. 
Copper. Wire. 1.5. 
Daisy. Flower. 4. 
Body. Mind. 3.4 
Lion. Tiger. 4. 
Money. Gold. 3. 
Sleep. Cow. 5. 
Thrush. Bird. 2.5 
Fox. Wolf. 34 
Ir_troapection. 
Before. Feeling of strain,localised in front of the head and round the e 
eyes 
At the time. Attempt to criticise the appearance of the word,then nothing 
except a vague feeling until response -word appeared. The immediate task 
seemed to be the compelling of response. Image and meaning seemed to 
corm together. 
After. Relief. 
General in line with instructions given. 
Consciousness of unpleasureable feeling with distinct organic sensations 
at the beginning. Then came vague apprehension of something presented,but no 
definite content. The effort to realise the meaning of the stimulus -word 
seemed to bring the response- word,and relation was noted. This seemed to 
give objectivation to the whole situation. General feeling one of alertness. 
Alertness./ 
The stimulus seerled to provide an avenue of escape from a general c.rLanic 
uneasiness. The steps in jud` oment seemed. :,.s follows: General attitude 
of exr ectati_on; then arpearance of stimulus-word which seemed vague and 
indeterminate until some experimental context et..erged into con- 
sciousness. This irie.,nt grea:ter o'r_;jecti_vwtion,a,Trraren^ss of object, 
awareness of meaning in relation to conext and arising therefrom. 
.;1'_rerirclent Ñ B. 
Stimulus -word. Response-word. Time. 
Trout. Fish. 2. 
Loe: . Cat. 5.4 
S.Ty. . Boy. 2 . 5 
Copper. `Ì :ri_r. e. .6 r 3 
Daisy. Field. 4.5 
Body. Mind. 2. 
Lion. Beast. 3. 
or, eyPower. Morey. Power. : . 
Sleep. Bed. 3.5 
Thrush. Mavis. 4.3 
Fox. Hound. 2. 8. 
Introspection. 
Before: Strain; wandering of. attention. As exiler_ i lent advanced a greater 
readi.nes s to respond ana diminution of strain. 
At the tine.: Saw vvord at first but without any meaning; theiapprehend- 
ed the concrete meaning and associated word appeardd. At times the 
response iras nade vithput any awareness of contextual relation. 
After: Satisfaction was the usual state at this stage. 
General Introspection. 
111:19 AM. 
Organic senations undoubtec?ly felt 
r 
Pnd . unpleasure ,Jas the usual tone. 
Tl-ere was a feeling of tensi.on as if o'hstruction has taken place,and 
definite attitude of waiting. The 11.26C appearance of word was as 
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a rule without Meaning,but it relieved tension,and released activity to- 
wards a satisfactory end. Following the meaning of the word came context 
and then satisfaction. 
These introspections are significant from varioa3 ic -points .Wéyshall 
trace the development suggested in the instructions given. 
Subjective. 
There is what we ma/ term a certain organic uneasiness.Activity seems to 
have begun before any stimulus -wordis given.The general situation of the 
experiment itself has evidently something to do with the state of disturbed- 
. organic equilibrium,but there is nothing of the nature of pereeptior- ut 
this stage.This organic disturbance is not without influence in the later 
response. There is on the organic side a search for the appropriate stir - 
ulus,which will restore the equilibri'i.The impulses,which are active,are 
subject to no willed control. This is clearly a precognitive state. The 
starting point in the activity is a state of dissatisfaction in the case 
of one of the instinctive conditions,and this is maintained until satis- 
faction is attained. 
f 2 
The aspect of expectation is really of the nature of an adaptation,and 
involves kinaesthetic aid other organic preparation for the response. It 
is indicative of the fact that the reaction has already commenced. 
n n 
Cognition is at first a mere that without anybking we cat; call meaning. 
It compels as it were the focussing of attention with theend of prospective 
satisfaction in view. The primary meaning is found in the relation between 
it n' 
impulse and eitt.iation,the feeling of worthwhileness ,and ensueing satis- 
faction.It is an interest condition. 
Feeling,however,ae indicated previously is an insufficient guide,and this 
compels a greater cognitive concentration on the presented situatien,and 
thus objectivation. It is here we find position in context of other,and 
related experiences. This is the secondary meaning acquired through 
experience. 
(3) 
There is further in the introspections given a suggested confirmation 
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of larbe's conclusion that all experience may become judgments if it lies 
in the purpose of the experiencing subject that they should accord either 
directly or indirectly with the objects. Nor is this antagonistic, to 
Watt's definition that judgment is a sequence of experiences whose process - 
ion from the first term of the stimulus has been determined bye, psychol pg- 
ical factor now past,but persisting as an appreciable influence. All Watt'e 
experiments are judgments. 
The only qu lification one would make on the foregoing is that there are 
influential within the conscious experience,either of relation to stimulus .. 
to r.esponse,or of response to context, factors which are affective in 
to n 
nture,and which constitute the primary meaning. The Aufgabe ( which the 
Wurzburg school mentions ) -the problem- is present in the stimulation of 
the cognitive or recognitive aspects of the whole. Here also the interest 
factor is present sustaining and giving unity to the whole. It may not 
indicate the means by which a satisfactory end is reached,but it implies 
the end. 
(4) 
Our final conclusion from this experiment in relation to our thesis is this. 
The meaning of the perceptual situation is primarily in relation to my aim, 
'or purpase,sr need of the moment,and is defined in consciousness as the 
interest of the total situation inclusive of both organism and presentation. 
This interest is the dynamic element in the activity. Meaning is in the 
relation of situation to the organism, or of the situation as a part tb the 
whole of which it is a part,or of the situation as part of a whole to other 
parts within the whole.The whole is a whole in cognitive meaning or signi- 
ficance only through the fundamental organic relation- through the primary 
meaning or interest. 
89. 
The third and final series of experiments were framed partly, ,t least, on a 
I, n 
series reported in Prof. Spears an's book The Principles of Cognition, chap., 
XLV pp , 217 and fol. 
,, 
In introducing this section of his book,Prof. Spearman says, That he is 
giving the promised evidence that in good truth the primary mental effect 
of any kind of sensory stimulation is what may be properly called a mental 
state. In this problem we shall have to consider the tremendous problems, 
It 
as the origin,nature and function of objectivity. We recognise the subtle 
and critical nature of the investigation and agree with Prof,Spearman when 
he says that the mere number of subjects engaged is not nearly so important 
as their introspective ability. We limited the number of s12'_, jects to two,but 
the two chosen were observers of high intellectual ability,skilled in 
experimental work and capable of giving a- clear account of their experience. 
The first,and not the least critical of tasks was to get a clear under- 
standing of the terms subjective and objective.To secure this the following 
instructions were given. These instructions are taken from 2raf .Spearïnan' s 
book,page 220. 
Subjective. 
(1) Connected with the perception or idea of any part of the body. 
(2) Connected with the idea of the mental self,or ego,or personality. 
(3) Actually constituting the state of consciousness. 
Objective. 
(1)Connected with the apprehension of anything external to the body. 
(2)Meaning anything other than itself. 
(3) Localised in space. 
(4) Indicating a purely cognitive relation- contemplated ,intuited,confronting 
you,put before the mind. 
The characters specially under investigation are (3) subjective,and (4) 
objective. 
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The following objects were used: A match-box placed near enough to observe . 
to engender stereoscopically solid appearance. A mouth -harmonium to obtain 
auditory sensations.A small flat cork for tactual sensations.This was 
pressed firmply on the surface of the hand. Iiixed tactual and organic 
sensations were secured by the pressing of a cushion very f irml;,; (a ) 
over the top of the head,and(b) down on the abdomen. 
The immediate purpose was to determine how far objectivity is modified 
by differences in sensory quality, car of intensi ty, or clearness. 
As a contrast subjectivity was exemplified by the pleasure derived from 
the pure tone of a musical word in rapid succession upwgrds.This was 
supplemented by unpleasure secured by the last tone being replaced by a 
crashing bow on a tin -box. 
The reports on this experiment were practically the same as Prof,Spearman' 
A. Visual sensations were more objective than sound.13, Sound more 
objective than touch,and C, The organic sensations revealed little or 
no ob j ect.ivity, simply a felt experience. 
Where we found a real and challenging factor in this experiment :,was 
that variation in clearness was not due to athing connected with the 
stimulus or the different parts of the sensory field,but to certain defin- 
ite subjective factors. This we think critical in the experiment,and 
demanding innestigation.Spearman seems to ignore this altogether. It may 
be that he thinks it does not come within the scope of his particular 
investigation,but it is certainly necessary in any psychological analysis 
of experience. The variation,aecordin g to our observers,was due to the 
presence of affective factors. There was reported,at tines,a certain con- 
flict of feeling and interest,and a tendency to dwell upon the situation 
provoking the strongest affective tendency. Peripheral elements in the 
sensory field were as objective as those more central,but the objectivity 
was induced by the distracti.n such elements introduced. 
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it is only fair to say that Prof.Spearman was not,at this stage,in his 
experiment seeking so much the process of objectivatin as the observed 
differences of sense inyensity and clearness. He simply states the facts. 
But the facts are not,in themselves, the real indications of the subject- 
ive and objective factors. These we find in the reports on the process of 
bjectivation. For our observers these seem to lie in what Jung calls the 
ego -centric associations. 
Second experiment. 
y 7 / ! + r. r . 1 ! . r ! 4 .a i 
The second experiment we conducted along the line of Prof, Spearman' s work 
was th' tt of distraction. This consisted of two series. 
First. 
The observer became as absorbed as possible in reading,while simultaneously 
the mouth -harmonium was played. 
Second. 
The observer gazed at a sheet of coloured paper about two feet in front of 
him.while simultaneously he :added together sevens aloud,7,14,21,28,and so 
on up to 203. 
The reports were as follows. First series. 
A. I found the musical distraction sufficient,at times, to reduce the read- 
ing to a mere visual image of words without any meaning.There were times whe 
the sound was the only thing in consciousness,and others,when it formed.as 
it were a back- ground interfering with the re-_ding o.ccording as intensity 
varied or the tune was chaaged. Subjectivity and objectivity variedokt 
times the reading proved the greater interest,and then objectivity was 
pronounced,and,at othet times, the music was predo7ninant.These objective 
variations were correlated to variations in subjectivity. 
(B) 
This observer reported that the sound was throughout predominant,and 
the distraction very pronounced. The reading was reduced to a mere form 
of visual images with no meaning. Sound wastas a rule, his state of con - 
sciousness.Ob j ectivation: was simply that of music,and accompanying it 
there was a certain aesthetic enjoyment. 
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Second Serien. 
A. No distraction caused by colour. The addition seemed to proceed auto- 
matically. I stopped at times to check an addition. This ar2se from a 
desire for accuracy. There was no contemplation of colour. Colour seemed 
n t! 
to be a mere that without any qualitative content. 
(B) Di3traction very pronounced,snd the greatest possible difficulty 
was experienced in carrying out the counting process. There was considerable 
alternation of attenti on,and objectivity varied in a remarkable degree. 
Pleasure and unpleasure were present throughout.On the whole the exper- 
ience was disagreeable. In the end colour was the sole constituent of 
consciausness.It was contemplated. 
This ended the experiments along this line. We realised we had,by no means, 
exhausted the possibilities of work in this connection,but the data father- 
ed seemed adequate for our purpose. From the reports of the observers it 
is obvious that 4.0 give a psychological account of the experiences it is 
essential to examine the subjective factors. An analysis of the object- 
ive situation alone is not sufficient to yield a complete description. 
Sensory intensity rnay,and does,distract,but there is something deeper than 
that. There is a subjective interest factor that takes command. Clearness 
is not due simply to any quantitative nature of stimulus,but rather to 
a qualitative factor,which,through relationship not only to the experi- 
mental context,but to the organic interest,deterrnines the prodominant 
element in the whole reaction. 
In the report of the second observer we find a dissociation of the addition 
4 
sum,and any explanation of such a fact goes back to and finds its root caug( 
in some affective tendency. We cannot account for the differences in the 
respective responses on the part of our subjects on the objective basis 
alone. The situ.iations,so far the external features are concerned,are alike. 
the responses are different. Why? Is it not because there is a difference 
n 1 
in interest. Experience is determined by the nature of the experiencer 
as well as by the nature of the presented situation,The one cannot be 
understood !part from the other,and in the elementary case this reduces 
itself to instinctive conditions on one hand,and that which is commonly 




denoted by sensation on the other . Experience as carrying and implying 
meaning involves both in relation to each other.With the growth of 
Psychical integration in the developing experience both sides develope,and 
the relation expands in meaning inclusive of more and more until in human 
beings it is or may be inclusive of things actual and possible. Analyse 
the most elaborate process and we corne inevitably on the two poles of 
experience. The affective can never be eliminated,nor can the experience 
be. described from the cognitive aspect alone. The distinction between 
primary and secondary meaning is a distinction within a whole we call 
experience. 
Fox on experiments on Preperception. 
In the July issue pf the British Journal(vol,XV) there is an article by 
Charles Fox on preperception,and an account of experiments which he 
conducted. It is interesting in this connection. We admit a difference in 
purpose,but so penetrating is this subject of meaning that it .r.aniifies 
every field of psychological enquiry. We shall give the article as. it stands 
making our criticisms and comments in relation to our, own subject. 
( see article en;osed. ) 
At the very )utset we find it essential to differ from his narrow definition 
zLperceptual activity. He says" in su;:!!marsing the results of previous exper- 
imental investigations on perception in order to discover the nature of 
attention Prof. William t%ames,came to the conclusion that three factors 
were involved;narnely the process of adjusting the sense organs, iie tiJilal 
i.repa, atioc.,ai,u the inhibition of irrelevant movements and ideas.He 
considered that in voluntary attention,the process of inhibition was merely 
incidental and not an essential part of the process. It is evident that 
conscious inhibition presupposes attention,and, therefore, cannot,wi thout 
circular reasoning account for it. The accomodation of the sense- organs,altt 
though necessary for sensorial attention,and probably present in ideational 
actiTity.is a ratter for physiology and need not concern us further. In 
1 Instinct in. man. Dr Drever.p,128 
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any case,such adaptation is only a favourable condition of attention.We are 
left,then, with the ideational preparation or perception as the distinguish 
t, 
ink; feature of the attentive process. We need not pursue this quotation 
further at this point. 
The first criticism is t.his.'nre cannot dismiss inhibition,either uncon- 
scious or c pnscious,as merely incidental.'7e found in our experiments that 
such inhibitions were determinative in the selective and gv.iding of 
mental activity. The process of inhibition was,we found,due to affective 
factors,which not only had the tendency to narrow the focus of attention, 
but to guide the entire process. 
The same objection must be made to the d i. smi ss &1 of the process of adapting 
the sense- organs. This is not merely a matter for the physiologist. Adapt- 
ability may be a mechanical feature in the activity of the organism in re1a= 
tion to its environment,but that is not the whole explanation. We found that 
activity originated in the state of dissatisfaction in the ease of one or 
the other of the instinctive tendencies,and this led to a lowering of the 
threshold for the entrance of the relevant stimulus. Adaptation of the 
sense - organs was inevitable. Adjustment then is due to something 
more than environmental conditions,and enters into and becomes a part in 
the description of the total response.Ki.Ñaeethesia is involved and is 
an element id the psychological explanation of the whole. We cannot hand . 
the matter over to the physiologist. The factors mentioned a -e all 
influential in the meaning of the whole and cannot be eliminated in a study 
of preperception.. 
at t, 
If we turn to the section on qualitative conclusion we find statements 
tt 
of peculiar interest. One of the most important differences made bt,preper- 
ception is very difficult to describe,as it is so essentially subjective. 
The observer feels that his mental energy is being more effectively spent, 
and this tendsto make him more active. Such effective use of mental effort 
is accompanied-by a distinct feeling of satisfaction,which seems to make 
n 
the effort easier. This is,to our mind, a far- reaching admission, It is 
quite in line with what we have been saying on the presence of the affective 
factor in mental activity.This report seems to indicate that the response 
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I. THE MEANING OF PREPERCEPTION. 
IN summarizing the results of previous experimental investigations on 
perception in order to discover the nature of attention Prof. William 
James came to the conclusion that three factors were involved; namely, 
the organic process of adjusting the sense organs, ideational preparation, 
and inhibition of irrelevant movements and ideas'. He considered that, 
in voluntary attention, the process of inhibition was merely an incidental 
feature and not an essential part of the process. It is evident also that 
conscious inhibition presupposes attention and, therefore, cannot, with- 
out circular reasoning, be used to account for it. The accommodation of 
the sense organs, although necessary for sensorial attention and probably 
always present in ideational activity, is a matter for physiology and 
need concern us no further. In any case, such adaptation is only a 
favourable condition of attention. We are left, then, with ideational 
preparation or pre -perception as the distinguishing feature of the 
attentive process. It is necessary, however, to avoid what Prof. James 
Ward calls the doctrine of presentationism, according to which pre- 
sentations are regarded as entities interacting amongst themselves ; and 
to do so we must keep clearly before us the fact that the interaction of 
1 Principles of Psychology, vol. i, ch. xi. 
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presentations is always dependent ultimately on attention'. The mistake 
here alluded to is especially prevalent amongst experimentalists who are 
apt to confuse the conditions favourable to attention with the attentive 
process itself. Such process involves the conception of mental activity, 
which is evident whenever a conscious state is the result of previous 
conscious processes. It is safe to say that all attempts to dispense with 
the notion of mental activity on the basis of experimental researches 
have so far completely failed. 
In his valuable, but strangely neglected work called Problems of 
Life and Mind2, G. H. Lewes first used the term preperception. He 
pointed out that the effect of previous experience was to enlarge our 
present perceptions making us more and more independent of the 
immediate stimulus, more and more masters of the external world. The 
present is largely the resultant of the past revived as a present experience, 
" and this revival makes pre -perception a factor in perception." In the 
same way a new idea " must be prepared for, pre- conceived by the 
exhibition of its points of similarity and attachment with familiar con- 
ceptions." Both a new object presented to sense and a new idea pre- 
sented to thought must be " soluble in old experiences" before either 
can be perceived or comprehended. These phenomena have, of course, 
been long recognized. Thus, in the Midsummer Night's Dream we read : 
"Such tricks hath strong imagination, 
That, if it would but apprehend some joy, 
It comprehends some bringer of the joy; 
Or in the night, imagining some fear, 
How easy is a bush suppos'd a bear ! " 
Again, in all ambiguous geometrical figures and patterns, a strongly 
imagined effort to see one form rather than another is usually successful 
in making us perceive the expected shape. 
Prof. James, in his chapter on " Attention," following Lewes states the 
theory of preperception as follows : " the only things which we commonly 
see are those which we preperceive and the only things which we pre - 
perceive are those which have been labelled for us, and the labels stamped 
into our mind If we lost our stock of labels we should be intellectually 
lost in the midst of the world." This doctrine, so vivaciously affirmed, 
consists of two distinct parts which, if true, are both of fundamental 
importance to educational theory. The first is that effective observation 
depends on preliminary knowledge of what we are about to observe; 
and in some sense this must be true since the trained observer is more 
1 J. Ward, Psychological Principles, ch. Iv. 
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efficient in his own department than the untrained. The second statement 
is that language or an adequate terminology is essential to preperception. 
It seemed to the writer that both these positions ought to be experi- 
mentally examined so as to discover the precise difference made by 
ideational preparation and whether language is essential to the process 
of observation'. 
II. THE GENERAL PLAN OF INVESTIGATION. 
Experiments with these aims in view were performed with over 
eighty University graduates, mostly honours men, taken in sets 
ranging from six to twelve in a group. The procedure employed with 
the last two groups is the most satisfactory and will be described in 
detail, but as the earlier experiments indicated by their results certain 
essential improvements in method they will be touched upon here. In 
general, the experiments were conducted on the following plan. Lantern 
slides were prepared, showing suits of armour, which were projected on to 
a screen in front of the subjects who were told to observe the picture as 
accurately as possible, as they would be asked to describe in writing all 
they had seen.. After the first slide had been closely observed for about 
one minute it was withdrawn, and the subjects were told to note down 
immediately every detail they remembered in as concise a form as 
possible and also to state any general observations they had made. No 
time limit was imposed and each signed a declaration, before giving up 
his record, that he had tried but could not recall anything else. The set 
of subjects was now divided into two groups, one of which had a lecture 
in which the structure of a suit of armour was explained and illustrated 
by slides showing drawings of each part and the technical names of the 
parts were written up on the board. It was found that none of the 
subjects had any but the vaguest knowledge of armour, derived from 
hazy recollections of pictures or casual visits to museums, and the 
technical terms were almost absolutely unknown; only three or four of 
the total number of students examined knew an odd term or two, but 
hardly knew exactly to which part it applied. When the lecture was 
1 The term preperception is firmly fixed in psychology in English- speaking countries, 
but unfortunately covers distinct phenomena; one on the perceptual plane, the other 
ideational. In Stout's Manual the term is equivalent to complication,' a purely perceptual 
process. Ward in his Principles deals with the doctrine in his chapter on Ideation though 
the facts dealt with are mainly perceptual or transitional. James uses the term loosely to 
include perceptual and ideational experiences indiscriminately. In the present study the 
word is used in the sense in which it is defined in Baldwin's Dictionary, namely as "The 
ideal representation of an object preceding and facilitating the perception of it." 
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over the two groups were again combined into one set and were shown 
another slide of armour for one minute; then they recorded their 
observations as before. Introspective records were also made. In this 
way it was possible to compare two groups; one with, and the other 
without definite preperception. Marks were assigned on the following 
scale. Two were given for each part correctly noted (e.g. neck guard, wings 
on knee) ; one mark for each position correctly recorded (e.g. left foot ad- 
vanced) ; and one mark for each correct description (e.g. arm guard chased; 
solerets pointed). The same numbers with a negative sign were assigned 
for incorrect observations under these heads, i.e. marks were subtracted. 
The first set of subjects examined consisted of twenty -three ex- 
service graduates of average age 26 years. When the first slide had been 
shown and records of observations had been made they were divided 
into groups L and N consisting of eleven and twelve respectively. The 
lecture was given to group L and immediately afterwards both groups 
were combined and shown the second slide, and then a third slide; 
records of observations and introspections being made after each. 
For group N the average marks for the three slides were 20, 22 and 
25 (the medians being 21, 24, 20) ; for group L the averages were 30, 
38 and 38 (medians 30f, 372 and 38f). It will be seen that the groups 
were of unequal merit at the beginning and that the group which had 
the lecture improved relatively only slightly more, if at all, than the 
other group. The outstanding feature of these marks is the surprisingly 
small difference made in preperception by the lecture. The intro- 
spective records make clear the reason for this; for, after the second 
slide, half the subjects in group L complained that the endeavour to 
remember the technical terms confused them and made observation 
more difficult. Some of the introspections may be quoted as they 
illuminate different points. Thus one subject said: " The technical terms 
were of use only in so far as they broke the suit into pieces thus indicating 
what parts to look for." Another said : " The knowledge of technical 
terms enabled me to work systematically," and this was confirmed by 
several. " The lecture aided the observation in that I used the sequence 
of the lecture and was able to anticipate objects, e.g. I looked at once 
for the lance rest." This may be compared with the following: "I would 
not have seen the lance rest if I had not expected it. I had to search 
for it. The lecture hindered observation because of the technical terms. 
If more time had been given after the lecture this might not have hap- 
pened. The lecture, however, was of direct assistance in that after it 
much less attention was paid to such details as decoration which was 
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immediately dismissed as Milanaise, chasing, etc. In this way technical 
terms helped." The next two records indicate clearly why the lecture 
made so little difference. " The lecture aided me because (a) it prepared 
me to deal with the suit part by part instead of wondering where to 
begin; (b) it was a guide to parts to look for. The terms helped observation 
when they were thoroughly known but hindered when I had a difficulty 
in remembering them." " The half -learnt terms obtruded when observa -: 
tion was going on, tending to a mixture of two endeavours -to observe, 
and to fix on the right terms ; with the result that neither was properly 
accomplished. In the few cases where the name was recalled without 
effort, the observation was helped." 
It was evident that the chief effect of preperception was to introduce 
order into the observation and that technical terminology was only of 
assistance provided that it was thoroughly well known. 
III. REFINEMENTS IN METHOD -THE TIME FACTOR 
With the next set of sixteen subjects special care was taken to see 
that the technical terms were well known, for which purpose the lecture 
was repeated twice and the terms emphasized. Questions were also 
invited and answered. In order to secure a better comparison the 
subjects were divided into two groups of equal ability as measured by 
the marks obtained on the first slide. Two slides only were shown this 
time. The results, nevertheless, were puzzling since the group that had 
the lecture seemed to have profited by it astonishingly little compared 
with the other group, as the following figures indicate. The average 
marks of group N (the unlectured) for the first and second slide were 
172 and 31 (medians 15 and 29); for group L the averages were 17 and 
34 (medians 19 and 332). A further set of eighteen subjects gave the 
following averages for initially equivalent groups; group N, 192 and 37 
(medians 20 and 35); group L, 192 and 51 (medians 21 and 53). This 
last result is much more what might have been expected á priori. There 
were still baffling results obtained with other subjects owing to the eager- 
ness of the groups who had the lecture to concentrate on detail and to neglect 
general features, which neglect caused a certain group of L subjects, who 
had the lecture, to score less than its equivalent N group in the second 
slide. Also several of the men required more practice to adjust them- 
selves to the experimental conditions: The experiment was so interesting 
to nearly all the subjects that their eagerness militated against the calm 
which is essential to this kind of work; especially when they were shown 
the first slide. It was evident, also, that merely being familiar with the 
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structure of armour and the terminology was not sufficient to display the 
full effects of ideational preparation. The subjects ought not only to 
learn their lesson but to have a sufficient period to digest it. Adequate 
time for mental assimilation of the knowledge given by the lecture 
turned out to be the kernel of the problem of preperception. Attention 
is facilitated by preperception only when this condition is fulfilled. Time 
is of the very essence of the problem. During the interval there is an 
actual stamping in of the previous knowledge, a phenomenon to which 
Dr Ballard has given the name of Reminiscence. He says : " The belief 
that the change that takes place in the nervous system during conscious 
learning is to a certain extent continued when the learning has ceased 
is forced upon us when we consider those phenomena of reminiscence in 
which the physical basis is marked and manifest." He gives as instances 
the improvement of skill in swimming, skating, typewriting, etc., which 
occurs in the intervals when no practice is being taken; and concludes 
that " an actual modification of brain structure, of the same nature as 
that which is supposed to occur during learning, gradually goes on 
during the intervals." The only objection to this view is that the changes 
are supposed to be purely nervous. There seems no sufficient reason to 
doubt that mental changes of a similar kind also take place during periods 
of inactivity. The results of the present series of experiments have con- 
vinced the writer that mental changes, leading to better systematization 
of facts and more adequate assimilation of terms, takes place after the 
conscious learning has ceased. 
IV. THE FINAL METHOD OF INVESTIGATION -SUBJECTIVE ACTIVITY. 
The final method of experiment adopted, which proved satisfactory 
in bringing to light the effects of preperception, may now be described. 
Sheets of paper were distributed to the subjects, divided into two 
columns with a subdivision for introspective remarks. The purpose of 
the experiment was announced as being the attempt to discover the 
difference made in observation by a preliminary knowledge of what one 
is about to observe; and the subjects were also told that they would be 
asked to describe on their sheets everything they could remember. They 
were likewise informed that suits of armour would be projected from the 
lantern on to the screen. Slide (1) was then shown on a screen in a darkened 
room for 12 minutes. This time was discovered by several preliminary trials 
to be the optimum. All agreed that the time was sufficient for a complete 
1 Ballard, " Obliviscence and Reminiscence," pp. 70 ff. and 82. Monograph supplement 
of this Journal (1913). 
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observation, but when they were asked at the end of the whole experi- 
ment for how long they thought the slides had been shown their answers 
varied from 1 minute to 5 minutes. If a longer time is given several 
subjects begin to get restless and are apt to let their attention wander; 
with less time they feel hurried. Before each slide is exhibited it is as well 
to assure the observer that he will have adequate time and that he need 
not worry on that account. 
The slide was then withdrawn and immediately afterwards the 
subjects were asked to state in one column in' brief catalogue form every 
detail they could recall, and subsequently in the other column any 
general observations which could not conveniently be considered as 
detail. Any remarks they wished to make, not of an observational 
nature, were to be placed in the introspection column. As much time as 
was wanted was given to making these records, at the end of which the 
subjects wrote and signed the declaration " I have tried my best but cannot 
recall anything else." No sheet was accepted without this statement. 
What the subjects were really trying to do was to read off from their 
memory image the details which they had noticed during their observa- 
tion of the picture. It may be objected that a good visualizer will be 
able to decipher details which he has not observed, but, as it were, 
photographed and subsequently developed. But this view has been 
shown to be a mistake. The best visualizers, who claim to have perfect 
imagery, are not capable of reading off details which they have not 
definitely attended to. It has been demonstrated, for instance, that such 
a person claiming to retain a complete mental picture of the front of a 
building (say) is unable to read off the number of pillars unless he has 
definitely counted them. Prof. Woodworth, as the result of the study of 
his own imagery asserts that "it always consisted of facts previously 
noted." He goes on to say that " an actual situation presents an almost 
unlimited variety of facts or features, of which an observer notes a few, 
the rest remaining undiscriminated in the background....Later he may 
`remember' the situation, but this is not to reinstate it in its original 
multiplicity or continuity. He recalls the features which he has observed, 
or some of them, but not the great mass of them which remained in 
the background. Lacking this setting or background, he is not in a 
position to make any fresh observation in recall'." Prof. Woodworth's 
conclusions have been repeatedly confirmed in the course of the present 
investigation and also in some experiments undertaken by a totally 
different method by the present writer. In brief, we cannot study mental 
i "A Revision of Imageless Thought," Psychological Review, xxa (1915). 
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imagery without reference to mental activity and all that preperception can 
do is merely to facilitate such activity'. 
The next step in the method was to interchange the records amongst 
the subjects. The picture was again thrown on -to the screen (this time in 
the lighted room) and they marked each other's papers in accordance 
with the scheme given above. Every doubtful point was referred to the 
writer for his final decision and he subsequently examined the sheets. 
This method of marking has the great advantage that it forces the 
subjects to examine the picture in detail and stimulates interest and 
competition amongst the groups, which is necessary in this type of 
experiment. The method of evaluating the marks must take into account 
the fact that both groups have some practice in preperception; and this 
has been done in the calculations made below. 
The whole process was repeated with a second slide (2) which was 
also shown for 1 - minutes and marked in the same way. The marks for 
the two performances were added together and, on the basis of the totals, 
all the subjects were divided into two groups of equal ability. For the 
particular set of fourteen subjects whose results will be considered in 
detail the combined marks for the two slides were 354 for group L (the 
lectured group) and 343 for group N (the non -lectured group). It was 
not possible to get closer totals, as one subject proved so considerably 
superior to the others. The advantage of combining two sets of readings 
lies in the fact previously noted that some habituation is required in 
order to allow several of the subjects to adjust themselves to the ex- 
perimental conditions. 
The lecture, printed in the appendix, was now given to group L, the 
other group being dismissed. It was repeated twice and the various 
portions of a suit of armour were shown on the screen, each technical 
term being written on the board. At the end of the lecture, slide (1) 
was again projected on to the screen and the parts indicated by name. 
Finally, the terms were copied into note -books by the subjects who were 
told to go over them during the following week until they were perfectly 
familiar with them. Questions were freely asked and answered during 
the lecture. In this manner the seven subjects of group L were enabled 
completely to assimilate all the terms and the details of the structure 
of armour, thus being placed in a most favourable attitude for pre- 
It is often assumed that the content of a remembered fact must, of necessity, be a 
sensorial image, visual, auditory, verbal, etc. But there is no convincing evidence whatever 
for this view, and many professed psychologists suffer from introspective illusions, con- 
fusing feelings with images. 
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perception. All the subjects successfully learnt and could use all the 
terms freely. Exactly one week later both groups were recombined and 
two further slides (3 and 4) were exhibited, as before, the details of pro- 
cedure being the same. When each observation had been recorded and 
signed they were told to state on the back of their sheets " what they 
thought of the slide " itself, i.e. without comparing it with the others. In 
this way it was hoped to get some light on the question of aesthetic 
appreciation in the two groups. 
At the conclusion of the whole experiment, when the records had 
been marked and given up, the following questions were answered. 
Those who had the instruction stated whether and how their observation 
had been aided or hindered by the lecture and the technical terms; those 
who did not have the lecture stated whether the absence of a terminology 
hindered observation and in what manner. They were expressly enjoined 
to give no theory but simply to describe their experience. 
V. THE QUANTITATIVE RESULTS. 
The combined marks for each subject for slides (1) and (2) at the 
first sitting, and for slides (3) and (4) at the second sitting are given 
below : 
Without preliminary knowledge (Slides 1 and 2). 
Group L Group N 
Subject Marks Subject Marks 
A 94 P 61 
B 54 Q 60 
C 53 R 53 
D 51 S 57 
E 42 T 42 
F 39 U 41 
G 21 V 29 
Mean 50.6 Mean 49 
m.d. 14.2 m.d. 10 





A week after the lecture (Slides 3 and 4). 
Group L Group N 
Subject Marks Subject Marks 
A 153 P 85 
B 114 Q 94 
C 107 R 75 
D 107 S 55 
E 102 T 45 
F 118 U 81 
G 82 V 67 
Mean 11F9 Mean 71.7 
m.d. 14.1 m.d. 13.8 
Coefficient of variation, 12.6 Coefficient of variation, 19 
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The effect of organized preperception can clearly be discerned in the 
differing variabilities of the groups. For the linlectured group N remains 
practically constant in this respect; whereas the group L displays a 
marked decrease in variability. It is important, for the theory of educa- 
tion, to realise that systematic training tends to produce greater uni- 
formity within a group. Group N had, of course, some training in the 
observation of the first two slides and in marking them, but such training 
was undirected by precise knowledge, and unsystematic as compared 
with that of group L. Experiments of this nature may serve to differ- 
entiate the relative values of class instruction and individual work 
especially for weaker pupils; since the decreased variability, as the figures 
show, is brought about by levelling up the less able whilst the trained 
group as a whole and individually show better results. 
If we desire to compare the trained group with the untrained from 
the point of view of the relative difference made by preperception, we 
must resort to the statistical device of using as our unit the standard 
deviation of the groups. The standard deviations of groups L and N at 
the outset were 20.6 and 11.1 respectively, yielding an average of 15.8. 
A week later the deviations were 19.9 and 16 with an average of 17.9. 
The crude figures in the above tables were converted into multiples of 
these units, yielding the following numbers when cleared of decimal points. 
Subject 
Group L 
Marks (in terms of a) 
Slides Slides 
1 and 2 3 and 4 Subject 
Group N 
Marks (in terms of a) 
Slides Slides 
1 and 2 3 and 4 
A 60 85 P 39 47 
B 34 64 Q 38 53 
C 34 60 B 34 42 
D 32 60 S 36 31 
E 27 57 T 27 25 
F 25 66 Ú 26 45 
o 13 46 V 18 37 
Mean 32 63 Mean 31 40 
As the figures are now comparable, we shall not be far out in assuming 
that if group L had no lecture they, too, would have risen to an average 
of 40 instead of 63. Consequently 23 marks is the gain due to preper- 
ception ; and to find the percentage gain we must start not from their 
original average mark namely 32, but from 40. This is a gain of 57.5 per 
cent. To put it otherwise, these figures show that as a result of preper- 
ception the trained group is able to observe somewhat over one and a 
half times as much as the untrained group; which implies, as pointed out 
previously, that they are capable of so many more separate definite acts 
of attention'. 
1 See the discussion on p. 7. 
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VI. THE QUALITATIVE CONCLUSIONS. 
Having thus obtained a numerical estimate of the effects of pre- 
liminary knowledge in facilitating attention, it is time to consider the 
non - quantitative results which are, perhaps, of more significance. In 
dealing with these use will be made of the records of the whole of the 
eighty subjects and of their introspections. 
One of the most important differences made by preperception is very 
difficult to describe, as it is so essentially subjective. The observer feels 
that his mental energy is being more effectively spent and this tends to 
make him feel more active. Such effective use of mental effort is accom- 
panied by a distinct feeling of satisfaction, which seems to make the 
effort easier. Thus the person at one and the same time feels that he is 
more active with less effort. One of the N subjects put the matter in 
this way : "Lack of terms distinctly hindered my observation. I knew 
one technical term from reading Scott (tasset) and I always looked first 
to that part of the armour and had a feeling of sureness about this. Lack 
of terms hindered the mental separation of the armour into details; I 
could only remember each detail as soon as it was separated." 
After the lecture the subjects of the L groups took the initiative and 
went out on a voyage of active exploration to discover the definite parts 
named; whereas previously the picture, as it were, had the initiative 
and the person was passively trying to remember what it offered to him. 
Or, to vary the figure, just as an animal expecting the appearance of its 
prey is ready to spring with all its muscles pre- adapted for that purpose, 
so the person expecting to see certain details in a picture has his mind 
attuned ready to pounce upon them. Owing to this difference of attitude it 
frequently happened that the elaborate decoration on the last two slides 
confused or baffled those who had no lecture, so that they lost the wood 
for the trees; but this never happened with the lectured group who were 
able to dismiss the decoration with a name, and subsequently to re- 
member its nature. These experiments, therefore, yield confirmation of 
the view put forward by Dr C. S. Myers that recollection of an observed 
visual fact may be based on purely verbal imagery without any sensorial 
image of a visual nature being present'. 
It will be remembered that the subjects were asked, at the end of 
the experiment, to say how the lecture and the knowledge of terms had 
helped their perception of the picture. The records show that the greatest 
help is given in supplying a plan for the observation, i.e. in making it 
more systematic and definite. Recognition becomes more rapid as a 
1 Text -book of Experimental P8ychológy, p. 141 (1911). 
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result of preperception, and more certain -no subject ever complained 
that he could not see a detail after the lecture was given. The lecture 
makes the details stand out from the picture; as one subject said, 
" The ordinary parts were emphasized because one knew where to look 
for them. Without the lecture it was the curious or outstanding parts 
that were noticed." The latter part of this statement is open to challenge. 
In the fourth slide the size of the lance rest,' when projected on to the 
screen, was about two inches in length and, as may be seen from the 
picture, forms a conspicuous feature; but it is hardly ever seen by a 
subject who does not know what it means. In fact, it was this object 
which induced the writer, after the first set experiments, to insist on the 
declaration that everything that could be remembered had been re- 
corded, as it was difficult to persuade a person otherwise that he had 
missed so conspicuous a feature. In slide (3) where the lance rest is 
inconspicuous owing to the ornamentation, it was never overlooked by 
those who knew what to look for. Finally, the absence of expected parts 
is immediately noticed; several subjects declaring that they needed only 
to look for missing parts after the lecture in order to take in the picture. 
One subject of an N group who had considerable artistic skill pointed out 
a curious difficulty. He said that he failed to observe the picture 
accurately, in detail, because he could not separate constructional from 
decorative lines owing to lack of preliminary knowledge of the structure 
of armour. 
With regard to terminology it became evident that its chief use was 
to facilitate description, i.e. to make it more concise, more telescoped.' 
But this is not all; for frequently the mental image needed a word to 
fix it, that is to say, the terms formed `pegs,' as one subject said, on 
which to hang' the detailed observations as they were made. Closely 
connected with this is the aid given in discriminating parts by the use 
of words. Words make the dissection of the suit into parts much easier. 
For this purpose it is essential that the names should be perfectly 
familiar. The following introspective record illustrates this : " Terms did 
not help me because I thought of the armour in terms of my own making. 
My method was to consider the parts of the body covered and then the 
name. Breast plate was breast plate ' in my mind and cuirass' only 
by an effort of memory. This does not apply to ` greaves.' since I happen 
to know this term as a literary one." 
We can best, perhaps, see the utility of terms by noticing what the 
subjects who had no lecture reported. "With terms," said one, "I 
would have tabulated all the possible parts into a generalized suit of 
armour and I should have then gone through the given suit checking 
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these off." In other words lack of terms prevents generalization. Another 
subject stated that " Lack of knowledge of structure and terms hindered 
me owing to lack of definite starting points, and definite systematization 
in classifying parts. Also by necessitating the use of roundabout phrases, 
which was apt to turn my concentration on the visual image to con- 
centration on the terms expressing it." Several others pointed out the 
necessity of putting their observations into language, whilst the slide 
was shown, in order to recall the image later. Thus one particularly con- 
scientious observer made the remark : "I could have mentioned several 
other points but having no terms I was quite unable to express what I 
had noticed." He really meant that his memory image failed because 
he had no terms with which to retain it. Another remarked that he had 
a difficulty in retaining the relation of one part to another and he 
thought that terms would have helped him in this respect. Some few, 
however, denied all this and maintained that the absence of terms simply 
made their descriptions more clumsy. We are here probably dealing 
with ultimate differences in mental make -up. 
VII. PREPERCEPTION AND AESTHETICS. 
A final tentative suggestion is offered as to the aesthetic significance 
of these experiments; as it is hoped that the method will ultimately 
yield facts bearing on aesthetic education. One difficulty militates 
against any very precise results. Any mention of appreciation during 
the experiment would, inevitably, interfere with free observation and 
introduce disturbing factors. For this reason it was decided to approach 
the matter indirectly, by observing the number and nature of the 
aesthetic remarks made spontaneously by the subjects. 
The fourteen subjects of the two final groups were asked to state 
with reference to the second, third and fourth picture, what they 
"thought of the slide." They were told in each case not to compare the 
slides but to treat the one under observation by itself, and to state 
whatever occurred to them with regard to it. Readers of this Journal 
are acquainted with Mr E. Bullough's four perceptive attitudes, which 
may be referred to by the following letters : A, The objective aspect; 
-B, the intrasubjective; C, the associative; and D, the character aspect'. 
The objective attitude is that taken by subjects who refer to such 
aspects as the poorness or stiffness of the picture or whether it is a line 
drawing or photograph, and so on. The intrasubjective attitude is shown 
by such comments as exciting, stimulating or cold, etc., these physio- 
1 Bullough, "The Perceptive Problem, etc.," vols. u and m. Myers and Valentine, 
"Individual Differences in Attitudes towards tones," vol. vu. Myers, "Individual Differ- 
ences in Listening to Music," vol. xm. 
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logical effects being produced by the slide on the subject. Those who 
adopt the associative attitude refer to tournaments, chivalry, modern 
weapons and so forth. Finally the character aspect is revealed by such 
remarks as fierce, stubborn, valiant, etc., which indicate some human 
characteristic possessed by the picture. 
There seems to be some considerable doubt as to the aesthetic value 
of these aspects, more especially as Mr Bullough apparently regards the 
objective attitude as practically extra- aesthetic. Again the value of the 
associative aspect depends on whether the associations aroused are 
completely fused with the picture or not. For our present purpose it is 
sufficient to regard A, B, C and D as forming a scale of aesthetic values 
from the lowest to the highest. 
With regard to the second slide the subjects of group L were classified 
roughly as 5A and 2C; and group N as 4A and 2C. One subject gave no 
reply; so that both groups were of about equal merit as regards aesthetic 
appreciation. For the third slide the numbers for group L were 5A and 
1D and for group N there were 3A, 2B and 4C. These figures show that 
the subjects gave distinct indications of belonging to mixed types, so 
that some had to be counted in two or more categories. The relatively 
larger number of the objective type in group L, together with the 
paucity of other types, points to the fact that the lecture by forcing 
attention to the details of observation fails to allow of the development 
of aesthetic appreciation. For slide (4) the figures for group L were 
3A, 2B, 1C, 5D and for group N they were 2A, 1 B, 2C, 6D'. The numbers 
of mixed types has increased in both groups ; greater knowledge of 
detail whether systematically or incidentally acquired has now stimulated 
aesthetic appreciation. Similar results were obtained from earlier sets of 
subjects. The final conclusion may perhaps be stated tentatively thus ; too 
great concentration on analysing detail may interfere with the aesthetic 
attitude at the outset, but as the result of increasing familiarity this effect 
seems to disappear. 
APPENDIX. 
LECTURE ON ARMOUR. 
A gradual progress is evident in the improvement of arms from the 
earliest times. Starting from the tenth century we are able to follow 
step by step the gradual change in defensive armour. The mail shirt 
remained in use for over five hundred years, and was replaced by com- 
plete plate armour only after a transition period in which coats of mail 
1 The large number of D remarks is, doubtless, due to the fact that it is difficult to 
avoid giving a `character' aspect to a plan of a human figure; which fact may be held 
somewhat to vitiate the results. 
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partly composed of plates of iron were used. The armour of the sixteenth 
century had beautiful flutings called Milanaise, and in the second half 
of this century was adorned with chased engravings. 
Our slides are concerned with the perfected plate armour showing 
some traces of the old coats of mail as vestiges of the earlier covering. 
The casque or helmet was of diverse shapes and of great antiquity 
but the real bowl -shaped helm, the salade, only came into use in the 
fifteenth century. This sometimes had a neck guard at the back and had 
a moveable or fixed vizor or sight piece, which however was usually so 
short (end of nose) that a beaver, or chin piece, was necessary to guard 
the chin, neck and mouth. Later came a rounded helmet or armet, the 
crown of which was sometimes crested and sometimes the chin piece 
and gorget were fastened to it. 
The neck collar, made of leather, which supported the rest of the 
body armour and lying underneath (therefore never seen) supported the 
Gorget, or throat guard, sometimes with pauldrons, or shoulder plates, 
attached. Often the pauldron was a separate part. 
Below was the cuirass, or breast plate, which protected the chest 
and was often made with a prominent ridge. This had usually a lance rest, 
which was placed on the right of the breast plate and was used to support 
the lance, when on horseback. 
Below the breast -plate was the waist piece or great brayette, that 
part of the armour which guarded the abdomen. It was composed of 
steel plates and usually ended in 
Tassets, designed to protect the upper part of the thighs, and strapped 
with thongs to the brayette. 
The arms were protected by the arm guards, composed of upper and 
lower armplates joined together by the elbow piece, which sometimes had 
prominent wings. 
The legs were guarded by the cuisses on thigh, and the greaves on the 
shins, joined by the knee plate, sometimes with wings. 
In addition there were gauntlets, with or without separately articulated 
fingers; and the armed shoes or solerets, sometimes with long points. 
1 Salade. 
2 Vizor. 
3 Neck Guard. 
4 Beaver. 
5 Neck Collar. 
6 Gorget. 




10 Lance rest. 
11 Great Brayette. 
12 Tasset. 
13 a Upper Arm Guard. 
13 b Lower Arm Guard. 
14 Elbow piece. 
15 Cuisse. 
16 Greaves. 
17 Knee plate. 
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is meaningful,both in the primary and secondary sense,in so far as it issues 
in satisfaction. The subjective factor,though difficult to describe, is 
essential to any full psychological explanation of the expeáierice. Any 
mere quantitative measurement of the stimulus cannot give meaning thr 
significance to the reaction. However carefully we may study a single 
phase or isolate various mental processes for particular study we must 
remember we are dealing with a whole,and subjective factors are not less 
important than the objective. 
Since completing this section there has come to hand an interesting article 
by Martin,L;Reymert,of Wittenberg College,Springfield,Ohio.We cannot do 
better than give it in detail. 
*The following study will try to open us this field(of meaning) by very sim- 
ple method.s,and marka mere orientation for further and more extended 
investigaton. Three hundred child observers( 5 to.l4) were examined in 
individual sittings.Firstly,we exposed. a 60 angle drawn in black on a 
white card. Question ;That is this? What does it mean to you? Some responses 
of relative frequency may be quoted: Figures,letters.teacher's rnark,arrow, 
bird's beak, roof of house, point, tent, crescendo, box, street corner, 
anchor, plough, game of rabbit, wolf's mouth, cow's foot, kite, etc. 
Experimental reports were obtained by questions immediately after response. 
How do you know? Why does it mean that to you? The reports were exceedingly 
interesting and suggestive. The following three series were then contributed 
with a view to get light on the bearing of attributes of size,position,etc 
of simple geometrical figures on meaning.Just one figure was given to each 
child . on the same day. Thus each series called for five consecutive days of 
examination and report.Onitting here the tables and other exact data,as also 
reference to related literature,tre following suggestive inferences may 
be cited. 
(figures are given on following page.) 
The inferences are as follows.: 
(1) Meaning seems to be derived from,and to be built up by, experience. 
Ficures Exposed. 













From Martin L. Reymert Pamphlet on Ontogenetic aspects of 
meaning. International Ysycholocial Association proceedings. ¡gab 
96. 
(2) By far the most dominating fn..ctors of experience carrying meaning 
were kinesthesia or movement or bodily activites(as apparent in the 
sittings for the retracing of figures,suggested mnvements or bodily attit- 
udes.This is found in the repoiti., )- the more difficult the stimulus, the 
younger the child,the more kinesthesia. 
(3) Meaning springs forth from a context,a gross pattern, or a gross pheno- 
menological situation - almost invariably coloured by pleasant emotional 
content. 
(4) One and the same stimulus may give rise to almost any meaning,and this 
meaning is often independent of the attributes of the stimulus,like posi- 
ticn,size,etc. Meaning does not seem to reside in the stimulus,but rather 
in the relation between stimulus and response. 
(5) Such relationships are very unstable in young children;with advancing 
age and the homogenou* training they tend to become stabilised and ttniform. 
( To college freshmen every figure in _aeries B means an angle rind nothing 
else.) 
(6) Meaning evoked by these figures seems to evolve in two stages: 
a. From object,or situation pattern,or context. 
b. from symbol -pattern or context. 
a. Is very unstable, imaginary, or emotional.b, is generally of a definite 
context or pattern based on learning. 
(7) The structurauion of meaning then seems from our material to terminate 
and crystallise itself out of various stages of development in a definite 
symbol -pattern of a certain duration -to be changed only by the super- 
imposition of another symbol. 
(8) Meaning pattern or structure may,at times,seemihgly have no conscious 
concomitants. 
(9) While the naming of meaning is the natural reaction, c+11ild1 á n ,Llay 
ih püil ely kinesthetic and other forms of expression within the 
general pattern. 
It may seems as if some of the conclusions suggested run counter to ours, 
but the main development is really in line with our treatment. The last 
note does not imply that meaning is kinesthetic,itindicates the form of 
imagery in which meaning may be carried. That is a vastly different thing 
97. 
A discussion of Meaning in Conceptual pr®cesses. 
This section demands ,at the very beginning,an outline of the method employed, 
and an indication of the steps in the discussion. We have approached the 
subject of meaning in the conceptual processes from three stand -points. The 
following outline will prepare the reader for the general argument. 
(A) 
There is a descriptive outline of nature of the conceptual process. 
(B ) 
A discussion of the evolution of the concept in developing experience. 
In some waysthis is an anthropological approach. 
C 
In this section,which is not altogether distinct from the former,we 
come closer into touch with what,ia Psychology, is called the Genetic. 
( D) 
Our last section is an approach from the Ahalytic stand -point. 
We have drawn our conclusions at the close of each section. This makes what 
r.. /Q.47"c vv l P f 
seems to be a break in the continuity of the whole. If, ,follow llowmg the 
44ir, 
above outline,realise,that the various points are really distinct steps within 
y 6f rïr.,._c. .f-v)--;ir-r; v, , i.c... . Cvo^s. 
a whole we call conception7the coherence,,, will be made clear. 
6` 
Section one, tncluding A and N - the descriptive nature of conceptual process, 
tt n 
and the discussion of the Evolution of the Concept. 
11 
This section is inclusi're of What we have termed the 
fl H n 
Anthr.pologi6a1 and Genetic approach . 
98. 
In passing to the conceptual process we pass to the secti®n,in which,owing 
to the complex nature of the mental activity,it will be found the most 
difficult to establish the theory of affective meaning. It is good to 
remind ourselves,at the very beginning,that in discussing meaning at this 
level we are dealing with certain distinction with a whole,and that we 
find the three forms which we have mentioned within this whole:primary 
meaning;deeived meaning and significance. The relative predominance of the 
latter in ne way dismisses the former. All three are involved in the process 
Our difficulty is ,in showing, the relati en,and in discovering if, at any El 
p©int,we can Bay the affective factor is not central;that meaning is purely 
cognitive. 
Our method of treatment ma. seem away y a,t times ,to lead us from the 
main line of the thesis,.but that is owing to the nature of the discussion. 
We shall begin by giving a brief description of the conceptual process,its 
distinctive features,and then trace the evolttisn of the concept,indicating 
its relation to, and distinction from the previous stages discussed.This 
will by g e n etic t rea tment en ab le us to discover the mental fact o rs involved 
in the process. We shall,then,by an analytic investigation of the function 
of the concept discuss the place and power of interest. P P po
Conceptual process. 
NW 0E11 
The conceptual process is the third or highest level of conscious activity, 
and it is in relation to this process that the higher thought process are 
discussed. This,however,does not imply that thinking is not present at other 
and lower levels of human consciousness,and non -existent in animals.If 
thcekking can be defined as the conscious adjustment of ors ,ism to situation 
then it mall, and does, take place in most of the stages discussed in this 
thesis. But in the generally accepted d.esaription,from a psychologiaU 
stand -point, the thought processes are taken as implying the mental activity 
manifest in judging,comparing ,reasoning. It is possible to describe the 
characteristics of the conceptual process as two -fold. The thinking of 
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relations and the apprehension of the general and the abstract as opposed 
to the concrete and the particular. The first step in conceptual thinking 
involves the selection ofçand dwelling upon harts or aspects of a concrete 
situation. We have no difficulty in illustrating this from ordinary exper- 
e 
ience.For example the selction of the colour,hardhess,shape of the table 
at which I am writing. These are separated out as aspects,and dwelt upon 
as qualities in the whole and san each be thought of as apart from the 
whole,or in relationship with other things in their own separate universes 
of qualities. That is what we term the analytic phase of conceptual thínkin 
A process of discrimination and analysis. The synthetic aspect indicates 
the thinking of the relation of the parts to the objector situation or 
to each. other. There is also the process by which an aspect or quality, 
held apart from the total situatien,is placed side by side with other aspe 
pests or parts and comparison takes place,and also syntlá.sisation into 
a general idea,representative of more than the partiq.ar object or 
situation takes place. We thus,have what we can call,judging,comparing, 
reasoning. That is what is termed the $e, -book or academtd outline of the 
conceptual thinking. 
The relation of conceptual thinking to other processes 
It is interesting and suggestive to ask at this point what is behind and 
in the proeesses,say,of discrimination and comparison stated above? Our 
investigation of any situation even at this level is not determined solely 
from the objective side.. There is an interest factor. Conceptual process 
is not,any more than any ether process) unrelated to,,or independent of the 
processes involved in the whole of experience. Its isolation for specific 
study is not illegititete,but we must remember we are dealing with a part 
of a psychological whole called experience. 
OR 
We find in the study of experience the following facts. There is 
ro 
no instinctive behaviour without an intelligent factor.The one determines 
the end without prescibing the means of achievement ;the other gives form 
and method or means towards realisation. If we take the illustration 
a n 
already given from Koehler's Mentality of Apes we find that ,while the 
appetitive tendency ,evoked in Satan by the sight of foot, gave rise to ac- 
tivity it did not prescribe the means of securing the food. That was ac- 
1.00. 
acquired/ 
through experience and involved intelligence. The other side is also 
1" 
true.There is no intelligent behaviour without the instinctive factote 
The same illustration makes this fact clear on its active or teleolog- 
ical side. We set side any suggested bifurcation by calling the whole 
experienee,and recognising that both factors are involved. The point 
we are making is that we must keep closely in touch with the or #anic 
nature of psychical growth. Higher processes emerge in the life int- 
erest of the organism.. Apart from the emergence of this higher level 
of conception we would be limited to the simple reale, like rashey's 
patient,and reasoning would be impossible. But experience is a whole, 
and our distinction are distinctions within a whole. This we feel 
it is necessary to emphasise. There is continuity in mental life, 
and the first stages are no Dismissed from, nor lost ins the subsequent 
and higher stages. 
The evolution of the Concept. 
We described the characteristic features of the conceptual process as 
(1) the thinking of relation,and(2) the apprehension of general or 
abstract ideas. A characteristic process by which these are- achieved 
is that of reflection.. The learñirg from and in ,experience, which is 
involved in intelligent behaviour, involves this form of mental activ- 
ity This process however, does not take place in vacuo, but involves 
a relation to the whole experimental context,both past and present. 
Experience,on which reflection takes place for the guidance of pres- 
ent and future activity, includes even the primitive impulsive and 
instinctive factors. These may have been sublimated in the progress 
of increasing adaptation and mental grwwth,but they are integral to 
the whole. The mother who is nursing her sick child may,and does, 
manifest the higher thought activities in her behaviour,but there is 
an immediate and intimate relationship to the parental instinctive 
tendency. Such activity is not necessarily ego- centitc or selfish 
1. Instinct in Man. Dreyer. p.111. 
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The subjective aspect may be the satisfaction of the instinctive tendency, 
but the whole purpose is inclusive of more,the well -being of the child. 
The mother is aiming at something inclusive of both. Involved in the 
activity we find All the stages'f.we have''discuss d,and, at the core of the 
experience, guiding and directing it, the affective factor. Meaning both 
primary and secondary are present. Sydney Smith says,in a humourous aside; 
t 
a man cannot get outside his skin and sit on his b onetlyand we may say 
that it is equally imp.ossibleo in any discussion of injsellectual processet, 
to stand outside the whole organic basis on which they are built,er 
eliminate the passional element. It is just this danger that threatens 
so much of our analy*te of the reasoning processes, and leads us astray 
on the subject of meaning. We seem unable to escape the tendency of 
confusing the logical with the psychological view -points of the subject. 
We externalise too much our psychological concepts and terme,treating the] 
as discrete elements entities,and to realise that we 
dealing with a process. Titchener is quite emphatic on this point. He says 
" 1 
What I want you to d,and what !3want some of our philospphiwal critics to 
de,is to realise that those who do their work in the laboratories are al- 
ways operating and deSdribing and observing in terms of process.The real - 
isatin is not easy:(1) be Buse language is discontinuous and our descrip- 
tions must substitute word mosaics for the moving experience,and (2) be- 
cause the terms in which we are obliged to describe our operations are 
already stamped as meaning by their use in previous systems. A pure 
intelligence seems to be more an ideal we desire than anything at 
present within our grasp. 
The marked objectivity of the data at this stage of our 
enquiry is not a little responsible for the difficulties stated. An illus- 
tration may be given from the field of comparative religion. The effect of 
biological science in giving rise to what is known as Anthropology has - 
l.Lecture6 on the Experimental psychology of thought processes. 
Titchener. p& 
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altered the entire view -point in the study of the place and power of 
-religion as a fact r in human development. The philosopher may and 
does discuss the validity if the various religious conceptions in the 
light of some accepted view of the nature of reality,but the anthr,®logist 
gives the inside view ,and seeks to ttace the determinations of the 
religious systems from their rise and development in relation to mans 
needs. His concern is not the validity of this or that religious idea 
in relation to some metaphysical view of realitypbut the way in which it 
emerges in /and satifies,or expresses/the needs and impulses of primitive 
man. The psychologist is not concerned with the _-:validity of this or that 
conceptual eyste, a.nd its relation to any metaphysical view of reality 
hut with the process itself.Stated in this way one can readily realise 
hew logic and psychology are net antagonistic ;:but complernentary.The 
study of the one is essential to the full understanding of the other. 
We ares therefore, in studying the evol,ion of the concept taking the 
right way to a true elucidation of our subject. 
In our discssion of the emergence of the Image we found that 
there was a biological reason for the higher and relatively freer adjust- 
ment of the organism and situation which it yielded. It was necessary in 
the life interest of the organism. In discussing this evolution of the 
concept we are quite in keeping with this organic view,4.nd preserving 
some continuity in our discussion. The obvious criticism that this may 
lead to a mere utilitarian or frankly hedonistic point of view need not 
at this point disturb us. Our concern is with the facts. We are seeking 
the nature of nsyche.logical meaning in the higher processes and this 
involves,we think,.a genetic treatment. 
WI 
Prof.Ward, says To understand intellection we must look at 
its development under the impetus of practical needs rather than to the 
logical ideáis of what ought to be Like all forms of purposive activity 
thinking is primarily undertaken as a means to an end,especially the 
end of economy. Logical theory of concepts assumes the previous existence 




conscious abstraction in the way logicians describe. The actual process of 
generalisation ie,for the most part,at all events,much. simpler. It is from 
this much simpler point of view that discussion begins. The classification 
undeuommon names or concepts representative of more than one particular 
has its origin in a practical point of view,and in the interests of economy. 
In the plurality of b jectsA differing from one another from the point of 
view of perception,we find the same capacity to satisfy some specific need 
or deeire,and,through this or due to this capacity,the plurality is reduced 
" 
to unity. This gives the inner point of view in the formation or rise of 
the concept so essential from our view -point. It arises not from external 
sonrces,but in the interests of eoonomy.Its value lies in relation to the 
particulars it includes1in correspondence to the associations established. 
These bonds we found were in the deepest sense affective. 
This may Bound^ a piece of special pieading,but further 
2" 
discussion will clarify the point. Even the common names and concepts which 
seem at first to be purely cognitive,and to have no affective substratum 
at all are found on close analysis to have an affective core as well as the ter 
others. The child has a natural impulse to plat. Among other things his 
play activities bring him into contact with a ball. He comes repeatedly into 
contact with round things,and1as a result of reaching towards themphe finds 
he gets the agreeable experience of causing them to roll.He,.therefere, 
places these things,whatever their matter,colour,or size,in a single group, 
which constitutes for hire the concept ball. In the matter of satisfying 
certain needs or impulses we find among objects having the same character- 
istics that one is as good as the other. The concept thus general in nature 
Ii 
is relative to a felt need. It is governed in its formatin,and has as its 
centre informing it with meaning both in relation to the immediate task or 
activity and in relation to the wider context of experience, a feeling phase, 
and interest. The satisfaction of a need informs rj'nd unifies the whole. 
1 Psychologica.l Principles. Ward. p 3e3 
2.Psychoiogy of Reasoning . Rignano.p Ioq 
3.Psycholgy of Thinking. Miller.p iyv' Z/3 
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This is not a purely subjective view giving no real place to the object- 
ive factors. The objects or situations,which enter into the whole in the 
ratifying nature of the behaviour,do so because they possess a quality 
that has such a relationship. There is a felt relationship between impulse 
and situation. There is,therefare, on the objective side a qualitative 
element that makes its contribution to the satisfaction of the dominant 
need. It is in virtue of this that the experience is an organic whole. 
The concept is never purely cognitive in eharac *er,but has a passional 
10 
element. The fierce beasts,wh.ich the savage groups in one category be be 
feared have certain zoological qu4dities differentiating them from others 
of a more docile type,and so later the more scientific classification 
yields the concepts of carnivorous and herbivorous animals.The first is 
not more utilitarian than the second;beth have in them an element of 
« 
mental economy,and are fashioned to sub serve some end. More than that, 
we can see that the distinction in meaning in the concepts thus formed 
is due to the nature of the dominant interest. Qualitative differences 
in the significance of the objective patterns are due to the change 
in the aim,er purpose ,or interest. The primitive concept may be formed 
ent,, 
in relation te some evident instinctive emètisn attaching /to flightflor 
,0.0 the self. -tendencies. The second arises also from an intere.st,.whieh has 
been effective in building up the psycho- physical disposition, and thug 
instental in the creation of the concept. 
In both there is ,what we can term .a psychDlogical con - 
stellation . The constellation consists at the core of the attachment 
of the instinctive feelings to the object or situation. Hadfield uses 
2 
.Patriotism as an illustration. It is a constellation in which the emotions 
are grouped round the idea of mur country. It matters not how extensile 
may be the association grouped round this controlling .sentiment they 
partake of and are part of the interest of the whole.The centre is 
affective. That we are convinced is at the core of the concept. 
1 Psychology of Reasoning. Rignano.p a 





This section approaches the subject from the Ariálytic side,and includes 
2 
the discus,i®n of Language and thinking, structuration of rneaning,and 
n n 
a further examination of imageless thought . 
105. 
Se far we have discussed the genetic rather than the analytic nature 
of the conceptual process. We have attempted to trace the genesis and 
development of the concept from its inner or organic side,and we have 
been led to the conclsien,that,however, much the cognitive aspects may 
seem to predominate in the finished productrthe core of the whole is 
that 3f interest and thereby affective. We now turn to a short analyticln 
study of the reasoning process. 
An analytic study of the reasoning, process. 
Every at of reasoning is governed by some purpose either immediate or 
remote. It is that which determines attention,narrows the focus of 
consciousness,govern8 the association and prescribes the train of imag+y e 
ery through which reinstatement takes place, and comparing and reasoning 
proceeds to its end. It is the expression od one side of the earlier 
history of the individual, is connected with the life- purpose of the 
individual,and finally with the instinctive tendencies. In the discuss- 
ion of the image we found that the image of itself any more than the 
actual presentation in percPptian,does not provide the energy for the 
prosecution of the activity. In the same way the process of comparing 
or reasoning or any intellectual synthesis by which reasoning may 
devise means for the succesdful achievement of the end either immediate Y 
or remote does not provide the energy. Reason may be the card or chart, 
"1 
but passion is the gale. That there is something in consciousness 
which checks the use of the mental state when it is inclined to act in 
a way that the concrete things it represnts will not permit we must 
admit on the evidence of exper nce. It is possible Wundt is right in 
suggesting that there is what he terms a concept -feeling. At any rate 
the inhibttion is due not to any objective fact but to an interest in 
M 
which feeling is essentially present. We cannot,therefore, in any 
description of the function of the concept eliminate the passional 
element. We react to a meaning which ,while it has a relational signi- 
ficance within a system of related experiences built up in relation' 
i.Psychology of Reasoning. Pillsbury.p (p/ 
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to a definite need. .646 the affective element-4m present in and for the 
primary basis of the immediate r4.14ti.on. Conceptual thinking does not go 
on in a world of meanings outit:o the individual mind. That, we must hold 
in any psychological description of. experience. It is futile to suggest 
that any amount of thinking of two objects together will make they net ion 
known tnless there is a deeper something, a felt interest arising from 
the capacity of satisfying some need. The dominant interest lies behind, 
and in, the whale process ;its modification alters the interpretation 
of specific data and governs the selection. This controlling interest 
may seem to be no part of the reasoning process,and we may be seldom aware 
of it,but the failure to recognise its influence is responsible for many 
misconceptions. 
It is on the objective side,however,that the greatest difficulty 
is met. It is difficult,say,in the matter of mathematical distinct -ions 
of figures with their specific content,and their place in a conceptmal 
system to discover anything that approximates to an affective factor. 
We may admit its pr^senee,but can hardly admit its fact as meaning.The 
properties which, for example distinguish the circle from the triangle 
seem to wholly cogñtive in nature and appeehensisn. Feeling has apparently 
little or nothing to do with the meaning of eachland the distinction they 
involve or the place in the system. We admit the difficulty,and yet the 
whole ,whatever may be the validity of the distinction on the objective 
side is to far as the individual experience goes'a- learned and acquired 
whsle and the process.. thine. is not without its interest core. Moreover 
the distinction and the reasoning ;which may be in process,io one that 
had some aim and the satisfaction of some reed however inellectual. The 
Jahstract sciences are we confess difficult 43 bring within our thesis, 
and yet we cannot see how the immediate relation of any presented data 
can have any meaning to or within the whole unless it be that of one to 
a the governing interest and having, worthwhile character. 
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Illustration of the way in which the dominant interest may modify and 
emen alter specific data can be given. To the hunter or forest -guide the 
forest presents a totally different meaning in the immediate or primary 
sense to that which it yieldst3 the botanist. The differing meaning is 
not due to any actual difference in the environ ment,but to the interest 
that governs the response. There has been built up on the organic side in 
each case a definite structure,and there is on the objective side also 
a certain pattern. We can see how true is Haldane's statement that the 
organism And the environment Cmbine to form a whole.Af course there is 
no reason why the hunter should not be a botanist and vice versa. In that 
case we have meanings;according to the governing sentiment,in the separate 
universes of interest. We have mea,n,ing in its primary relation to the felt 
interest in each cale,derived Meaning acuired through experience sand 
significance in reaction is the prospective or significant aspects of the 
data,but the experience is a whole. 
It may be argued that we are dealing with things that must not 
be confused. We can speak of a hunting instinct and thereby find in the One 
case the primitive factor,but not in the botanic side is this possible.Is 
p 1 
that objection valid? Take music, We know that the ordinary man speaks 
about the child having been born with a gift for music.Tìat is a very loose 
way of expressing what after ali. is a psychological fact of experience.We 
do not claim that the capacity for the acquiring skill and knowledge in 
music is instinctive ,but the worlting out of the capacity will involve an 
instinctive factor.Hence there is no reason why we should not say there is 
an instinct for music in the same way as we say that the Ammophilia has an 
instinct to hunt catterpillars.The acquiring of skill may not be instinctive 
at 
but the motive,the interestli..s not independent of instinct. So in Botany,and 
this may kelp al* in the understanding of the difficulty in the previous 
section in relation to mathematical reasoning. 
I. Instinct in Man. Drever.p 2./Z3 
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Language and the structuration of meaning. .. 
Ar, interesting peint in the structuration of meaning in symbelpatterns 
lies in the growth and use of language. The word becomes a surregate,and 
a ready symbol in the process of reasoning. This peint is also critical 
in any discussion of the subject of imageless thought. We cannot,obviously, 
enter into any detailed account of the rise and growth of language, That 
would lead us too far afield. We must,hewever, make some reference to this 
instrument which plays .so great a part in the higher thought activities. 
M 1 
The elaboration of this indispensable instrument,which ,more than anything 
else, enables the individual te advance to the rational stage calls fer 
consideration. If we are to recognise the process of objectivation and the 
way in which the articulatien of meaning takes place , we must study the 
instrument by which they are achieved. The structuration of meaning,which, 
we recognised, took place in the form of images of a definite sensory - .pattern 
takes place aise in the form of words. It is at this peint we find the 
distinction between psychology and legic,at leást,en its formal si&e,coming 
into view. 
We need net discuss the vexed question as to what instinctive ten- 
dency is the most ultimate in 01-der to recognise that man is gregarious. 
This tendency drives towards intercourse,and this drive towardd.,intercourse 
leads to the development of language. There is no doubt that {though language 
has reached a high state of articulation,and is now a coherent system of 
signs or symbile conveying meaning that is intentional,it was originally 
2" 
emotional expression and nothing more. Sime advance took place as seen 
" M 
as the ejective level of experience was attained,as soon as,that iS to 
say,as the individual experient could recognise that within a common 
1Rtychelogical Principles. Ward. p 1 Fr 




environment were other individuals of its own kind. Then,the desire of 
cemrunication0t is supposed,irnpeiled men to the production of language, 
and turned the instinctive into the intentional.But this transition,we 
may well believe,wae a far more gradual process that such deliberate 
purpose as desire to commtnciate implies,and also began far below the 
level of the human animai;in other worsts language was neither invented 
nor discovered,but throughout laas been evolved. It is not our purpose to 
trace this evo.iwtion. It is sufficient for our purpose to indicate that 
the first signs or symbols expressed a certain affective and emotional 
state. The articulation of the experience in this form did not eliminate 
the affective elements which constituted the experience. The presenta- 
tion of the aymbol,as a vehicle of the experience,carried with it the 
arousal of the affeativity whisk had given it content and value for 
the individual. In the growth of mind,and the telescoping of experience 
in the interests of mental economy, together with the emergence of 
higher prooessesithese signs gained in articulation and stability and 
became representative of more and more in the experience of the individual 
It is,however,true at the later stages ,as in the more prizátiv e that the 
motivoation is never without instinctive quality or its affective factor. 
In the growth of the cencept,which we traced in a previous 
section we found that one word may be symbolical of more than one 
partielar experience. The richness of the symbol- pattern depends on the 
associations it enters into or awakens. Thus though in later growth 
language appears to be detached from the primary ;n unctions of its 
origin it is part of a whole of human experience and the expression 
of that experience in symbol. In itself it is but a ekeletôn without 
flesh and biosd. 
1.Poyological Principles. Waral.p ̀  
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Imageless thought. 
We return to this subject. This is really its proper setting. Academic,though 
this topic may be,it is critical to any study of the higher thought processes 
If it is possibly: to prove imagless thought , then, it may be quite legitimate 
to argue that there is a psychological meaning other than that we have con- 
sidered: a pure intelligence in which meaning is pirely eegnitive,and from 
which the passainal element is gege.There may be as Bosanquet and Bradley 
suggests a world of meanings independent of any we have stated; something 
given and not amgaired in and through experience. There may be a phase of 
intellectual process and experience still awaiting our investigatien,and 
which will yield to us a new point of view in the study of intelligence. Our 
discisssion will take the form of a recapitualtion of the views stated in 
our last section as to its rise as a psychological problem,a statement of 
the views of leading psychologists for and against,and finally our own can - 
elusions on the subject. 
Thinking according to Aristotle(as stated previously) seemed to be 
one of the functions of the soul-,and if the soul is separable from the body 
e 
then imagelsas thinking is possible. Aristotle,however,indicates that,, while 
there is nothing in the nature of thought demanding bodily organs thinking.. 
as an actual fact is never without iroages,and images depend on sense -organs 
It seeros,however,from the psychological point of view an unnecessary com- 
plication of the problem to discuss the separability of seul and body. The 
modern position is that,if we take either,we have no behaviour.The most 
original thinking is made possible by and grows out of the whole organised 
system built up through conscious and unconscious experience. Looking at this 
problem of imageless thought it is really problematical how far it is not 
the product of philosslophisal presuppositions. It is easy at this point to see 
how the problem centres,in no small degree, in the question of the relation 
of body and mind;whither the solutien is that of psycho -physical parallelism 
or some form of interactiensism. That,however,isa metaphysical problem; the 
tis3ousssion of which we nted not undertake. we are concerned with the concret 
, 
concrete,/ 
facts of mental activity. 
Modern psycholgísts: are divided on this subject. The earliest ex- 
periments were undertaken by Ribot,and the conclusions reached are elab- 
11 N 
orated in his discussion of the Evolution of general ideas. His method 
1 
was the word -list method,and his results may be briefly summarised as 
fellows.(1) A group having visual and motor ivages.(2) A group having 
visual image of wort only. (3) A group reprting no image of any kind. Thi s 
latter group would indicate an affirmative position,but Ribot argued that 
the third group reports could not be taken lierally,becausel if the word 
was understood, there must have been something else. 
e, a 2 
Avelingrwhe writes on the Consciuness of Universals, used the 
method f nonsense words of two syllables toether with pictures,and,so 
far as his reflection on the evidence goesiholds that imagless thought 
N 3 
does take place. Stout says that there is no absurdity in supposing a 
mode of presentational consciousness which is not composed of visual, 
auditory or tactual images, other experiences derived from and in some degree 
resembling the sensations of the special eenses;and there is no absurdity 
in supposing that such modes of consciousness to possess a representative 
a 
value of significance for thought It is very difficult to grip just what 
r 
Stout means in this statement. In his Manual, he says,no image, ne thought. 
An Amerieaa inveatigator,Calkine, holds,that while,i.t is abundantly proved 
that along with imagery,and often in the focus of attention when one comp* 
area,and reasons and recognisds,there are present elements which are neither 
sensational nor affectiye,it is unwise to assert there is imagless thought. 
The Wurzburg school,mentined and criticised by Titohener,gave considerable 
data on this subject.The irradiation of which Stout speaks is not dissimi- 
liar to the Bewtlsstseinlage, meaning something like posture sr attitude. 
"The following quotation from Mayer and Orth is interesting.Bes ides 
and 
ideas:volitions we must mention a third group of facts of consciousness 
which have net received sufficient emphasis in current psycholsgy,but whose 
I.Experimental Psychology. Collins and Drever.p 24,4 
2Gonsciousnesa of Unfterbals Aveling. 1° 17 
3. Analytic Psychology Stout, p st.t, í3-. - .. , -- Ta,.,,, 
4.Experiemental psychology f thought processes. Titchener,. 
112. 
whose/ 
existence impressed us again and again in the course of our experiments. 
The observers reported that their experiences consisted of certain 
conscious process which obviously refused description either as det- 
erminate ideas or vlitians. Oath for,instance,.sbserved that the word 
mustard touched off a process which he thought might be characterised 
as the sugge8 ion of a familiar form of experience.Then came the assoc- 
iated word grain.In all such cases the observer was unable to find in 
consciouness the ideas which he afterwards employed to describe the facts, 
of experience. All conscious, of that type we shall include ,despite their 
N 
evident differences of quality,under the name of conscious attitudes. 
These positions indicate to us the divergence of views that are held.In 
the experiments we cnducted,and in which we have reported, we found 
a n 
certain features corresponding is eonscious attitudes,and they were al- 
ways influential in the determination of the nature of the reponse. But 
we never felt that they could be dlnified by any other title than organic 
adjustments due to some affective activity. 
Watt, a pprsa.dving this subject from the method(, ®f 'constrain- 
0 
et association found the essential element in the act of thought to be 
M E 
the Ausgabe or problem. That,however, is not an isolated fact in 
experience,but related to a esntext,and images are present. This dis- 
cussion yields little ,if any confirmation of, or contribution 1,to, the 
immediate subject. 
The whole difficulty in the subject of imagl.ess thought seems to 
arise from the tendency te isolate one fart of entai process. We are 
studying the behaviour of an rganiem,and we must not lose the compre- 
2 
hensive point sf view. It may be possible to argue as Ward suggests 
That all thought is,strictly speaki.ng,imageless,for all thought is 
concerned. with °repositions sought or fsund,in other words,with problems 
supp .sitisnspand assertisns;it is intentional not presentatienal.On the 
ether hand all thought is concerned primarily or ultimately with imagesa,tl 
that is to say with such of their relations as are relevant to the 
a 
immediate problem. 
1.Experimental psychology of thought prscess.Titchener.lo 
2.Psycholsgical principles. Ward. p 301. 
113. 
Some final words on the reasoning process. 
The foregoing account of the question of irnageleas thought is integral to 
the study of the reasoning process. Se far1either in experimental work,or 
in analpsia of the thought procesaes,we have been usable to agree that 
imageless thinking takes place. There is always the verbal irnage,at least. 
On the reasoning process there is ,at present, no general agreement. Views 
differing as widely as Plato's did from the Greek materiali$ts are advan- 
ced. Some are still prepared to make it a mysterious spiritual function, 
and others merely a complex process of associative reproduction deter- 
mined by physics -chemical processes 'in the brain proceeding according 
to thf. techañistic law of habit. With either of these views we have noth- 
ing in common. The truer view lies middy between,and,while recognising the 
intimate relation of body and mind,tIie two as interacting within a whole 
a 
called experience,find, a central place for feeling. Psychology of the 
thinking process, and consequently of the reasoning process as a finished 
product,ign©res too much the dynamic aspect* which is really the essential 
n 
thing . The dynamic element is the feeling element,affectian,emotientand 
R"2 
sentiment. In any coherent discourse everything tends to the accomplish- 
ment of some end, and the idea of the end controls the association in every 
part of the process. It is not only the grand suggesting principle that 
sets the train of images connected with itself in motion, it is the grand 
n 
selective principle. It is the central interest,which constit &s,what 
Uignano calls , the thread of reasoning. 
It is exceedingly rare to find persons that can with perfect 
fairness register facts or estimate them against their own views or theor- 
iea,and this is due more to the conflict of affect than any other element. 
The diagreeable nature of that which threatens the primary interest is one 
of the chief sources of this bias.Mean.ing is individual in its primary 
nature,and it is only in the processes through stabilisation in symbol- 
pasterns becomes articulated and signi ficant of more than the immed- 
iate present, inclusive of more and more. The passional element,.however, 
1P'sychology of thinking. Miller.p 10' 2-1 
et. 11,,k", r 6 /477' a. 7 cT /. 
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however/ 
is never absent. We may state the steps thus: appetitive, affective ,and 
evaluation. The latter comes under the head of the sentiments. 
Conclusion. 
The implications of our study are manifold and - far -reaching. In the stress- 
ing of interest we are touching an a psychological factor hitherto too 
little studied and examined. If we assume that the chilek, naturally seeks 
satisfaction,and that is not a groundless assumption; and that such satis- 
faction is typical of its age and maturity,we shall find interest to be the 
relevancy of the evironment to the wants that originate in the child. A 
stimulus that does not serve as a tool for the chills satisfaction as seen 
by the child is simply .not a stimihus.We conclude with a statement of the 
psychological act. It starts with the unrest in the inner self,and completes 
itself in the contentment of the inner self. This is the affective factor 
that gives meaning,and it runs throughtout thy/ whole of behaviour,, From 
our point of view it is only on some such basis that human psychology is 
human. 
rf. /í í; 
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